Template for comments on the Study on Financial Security Mechanisms under the Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol

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	n the text and Append		
Page #	Line in text	Comment	
0	0	The study is well written, and as thorough as possible given the paucity of experiential data, of relevant literature and of any evidence of damage to biological diversity caused by LMO's. It is clear, factual, objective and balanced. That said, there are at least two points that should be discussed: The first relates to the obligations of Parties with regard LMO's within their territory. As in 17 other instances in the NKLSP, the determination of financial security mechanisms is a matter for "domestic law". This is important, because it emphasizes two fundamental obligations of the Parties: 1) The BSP tasks Parties to conduct a thorough risk assessment of an LMO before the Party allows transboundary movement into or intentional release of an LMO in that Party State. That risk assessment will assess the potential for adverse environmental impacts of that LMO within that Party's territory. If properly done, then the probability and hence the risk of such potential adverse impacts should be effectively mitigated or even eliminated, significantly reducing the need for the creation or implementation of financial security mechanisms dedicated to LMO impacts of biodiversity. 2) Most, if not all, Parties already have in place laws or regulations governing the right to conduct various businesses within that Party State. Since the Party assesses the risk of and controls the transboundary movement or intentional release of each LMO, that Party is best positioned to ensure that its domestic business laws require adequate capitalization and financial capacity, if any, may be appropriate for any enterprise engaged in the development or release of an LMO to address the risks to biodiversity posed by that LMO. Moreover, when a Party determines that a particular LMO, or a set of activities with LMOs generally, does not pose potential risk to biodiversity based on its risk assessment process, it may be unnecessary to provide for strict capitalization and/or financial capacity requirements.	

		The second is the inappropriate and irrelevant discussion of the "liability" for the unintended presence of genetic material from an LMO in non-LMO crops or plants, which the authors recognize, but nevertheless raise it repeatedly with examples because of the lack of experience or literature regarding the effects of LMO's on biodiversity. It is appropriate to briefly recognise the issue, but it should be made clear that this is not relevant in the context of damage to biodiversity. Its prevalence in this report implies that GM crop farming itself is damaging to biodiversity, or non-GM farming systems are being confused with biodiversity, or non-GM farming systems are being confused with biodiversity. If there is a lack of literature or studies relevant to the topic, then other irrelevant LMO-related "liability" issues should not be used to fill that gap. The paucity of information reflects what we have repeatedly emphasised: in over 30 years since the introduction of LMO's into the environment, and in annually increasing plantings, there has never been a single credible allegation of damage to biological diversity resulting from an LMO, and hence, no "liability and redress" per the NKLSP. This is evidence of the effectiveness of LMO risk assessment and risk management procedures, and also of the low probability of adverse environmental impacts they present. We also emphasise that the unintended presence of LMO genetic material is not harm <i>per se</i> , but rather the result of different choices in farming practices, with any resulting "harm" is not only purely economic, and any resulting "harm" is not only purely economic, and any resulting in markets that have decided to exclude LMOs from their products for reasons of personal preference. Damage to biological diversity on the other hand can be real harm that must be measurable and significant to require response, and the determination and quantification of such harm is
		necessarily daunting and complex.
7	4	"Modern biotechnology" is a defined term, and that definition is important to the implementation of the CPB, so should be in quotation marks.
7	5	Article 27 of the CPB does not "mandate" the <i>negotiation</i> of rules and procedures for liability and redress, but rather the "appropriate elaboration" of such, taking into account extant international law. In fact, the NKLSP leaves the elaboration of such rules and procedures to domestic law.
7	Fn2	To be complete and unbiased, reference should also be made to the CropLife International/Global Industry Coalition Implementation Guide to the Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, September 2012 (copy attached)
7	13	The Study should note that the right to provide for financial security in domes law must be consistent with rights and obligations under international law.
7	Fn7	To be complete and unbiased, reference should also be made to the CropLife International/Global Industry Coalition Implementation Guide to the Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, September 2012 (copy attached); particularly since the authors state that all relevant literature has been included. This is appropriate given that, as noted by the authors (e.g. page 8 lines 12-22), much of the discussion on this topic concerns agricultural uses of LMOs.
8	4	"advantages" not "advantageous"

8	15	As noted, above, the <i>allegations</i> of "damage" to non-GM farmers are <i>not</i> relevant to actual damage to biological diversity. This should be stated. They do not constitute damage or harm, but rather derive from potential economic loss resulting from philosophical differences and voluntary participation in markets that have decided to exclude LMOs from their products for reasons of perceived consumer preferences.
8	22	The NKLSP focuses <i>solely</i> on damage to biological diversity, and is neither applicable to nor relevant to alleged damage to farmers. Line 22 replace " <i>rather than</i> " with " <i>and not</i> ".
8	30	Financial security should not be viewed as a mechanism to protect against "risk" in the abstract, but rather, as a potential risk management mechanism after conducting a science-based and hypothesis driven risk assessment that considers the likelihood and consequences of exposure, in terms of harm. Either low probability or trivial harm results in minimal, perhaps even <i>de minimis</i> risk.
9	4	As noted in the general comments, above, the potential for insolvency of an operator is also a function of the Party's duty under domestic law to regulate permission to conduct business in a particular field, taking into account appropriate capitalization, if any.
9	11, et. seq.	Legislators also govern the risk assessment (and potential mitigation) of the effects of an LMO prior to movement or release; and the determination of whether an operator is allowed to engage in business activities involving LMO's.
10	18	Replace "demand" with "market demand" or "operator need"
11	9	As noted above, there is no property damage. Corn with the adventitious presence of LMO genetic material is still corn, with no phenotypic or nutritional difference. There are only allegations of economic loss stemming from voluntary participation in markets that have decided to exclude LMOs from their products for reasons of perceived consumer preferences. There are zero reported instances of harm to biodiversity after three decades of extensive consumption of LMO plants. Delete "thus leading to property damage for a farmer"
11	20	Replace "can appear" with "could hypothetically appear" The damage referred to is hypothetical, not actual.
11	21	Replace "can cause harm" with "could hypothetically cause harm" These harms have not been demonstrated.
11	24	Delete "caused by LMOs"
11	25	Replace "leading to" with "that could lead to"
11	29	Risk should be correctly defined: "Risk" is <i>not</i> merely the probability that a harm will occur, but rather a function of both the likelihood and consequences of exposure to an identified and hypotheses-driven harm. Either low probability or trivial harm results in minimal, perhaps even de minimis risk.
11	30	Replace "probabilities are" with "probabilities and potential magnitude are"
12	1	Replace "The uncertainty" with "Further, The uncertainty"
12	2	Delete " <i>LMO</i> " in "concerning the LMO impact of civil liability regimes on LMO's and operators as they"
12	5 et. seq.	The statements by Swiss Re with regard to risks of allergenicity, fitness and impacts of wildlife are <i>incorrect</i> . National risk assessment

		processes carefully assess each of those risks and resulting authorizations
		for movement or release consider and mitigate, if needed, potential risks in
10	1.0	these areas. Swiss Re is correct that the risks posed by LMO's are very low.
12	10	Edit text: "respect to the scope of magnitude of potential damage."
12	11 et. seq.	This general statement should be deleted or justified with more recent
		scientific evidence. It is not the technology used to develop an LMO that
		determines its potential risk. In agriculture there is scientific evidence to
		support the contrary view, with increasingly sophisticated biotechnological
		tools allowing for greater precision, and consequently uncertainty and
		complexity may indeed be reduced.
12	27	Replace "demand" with "market demand" or "operator need"
14	14	Edit text: "information with respect to the <u>probability</u> risk and also"
15	12-13	Are there any real examples indicating demand or supply?
16	4	Restate or clarify the meaning of "equally covering".
16	6	Delete "that" prior to "calculating"
16	15 et. seq.	Much of this paragraph is irrelevant content, and confusing the discussion
		of inter-farmer/producer allegations of harm with damage to biodiversity is
		particularly inappropriate. The clear and extant impact of the former issue
		on insurability of LMO's can and should not be implied to the latter.
		Potential damage to biological diversity is specifically assessed and
		regulated, and there has never been an allegation of such harm.
17	18	Is the risk really <i>new</i> ? Is there really <i>little known</i> ?
		This is not really the case – the limited information is simply a function of
		the "risks" not being demonstrated despite three decades of GM crop
		cultivation. The report could mention here the impact of the lack of history
		or evidence of damage on insurability.
18	8-9	The "Guidance" should not be referred to – it has not been formally adopted
		or endorsed by Cartagena Protocol Parties.
		Instead, in this context of "standards", the authors could recognise that
		LMOs are highly regulated by governments. The Cartagena Protocol
		obligates its Parties to conduct a risk assessment, consistent with the
		framework set out in Annex III, before taking decisions on LMOs. This is
		for the purpose of assessing the risk of potential adverse impacts on
		biodiversity. The Cartagena Protocol also requires its Parties to impose risk
		management measures to the extent necessary to prevent such potential
		adverse effects. In their domestic implementation of the Cartagena Protocol,
		Parties develop biodiversity policy that defines protection goals according
		to their priorities and circumstances. The level of regulation applicable to an
		LMO will reflect the acceptability of the assessed level of risk with respect
		to those protection goals.
18	18	Legislators also govern the determination of whether an operator is
10	10	allowed to engage in business activities involving LMO's.
19	22	Further emphasizing the duty of the Party to regulate the conduct of
19	22	business in the field of LMO's to verify, as necessary, that operators are
21	26 -4	adequately capitalized and have sufficient assets.
21	26 et.seq.	Again, further emphasizing the duty of the Party to regulate the conduct of
		business in the field of LMO's to verify, as necessary, that operators are
26	4	adequately capitalized and have sufficient assets.
26	4	Delete the extra "an".

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26	Box 5	It should be noted earlier in the discussion that the Compact is not a true
		pooling or risk sharing agreement, but rather a hybrid in which the
		members define and finance the process for access to response costs, but
		the risk and funding of response costs are not shared and are more akin to
		self-insurance.
		We note that this is the only relevant existing mechanism specifically
		addressing damage caused by LMOs to biodiversity, and its membership
		consists of the largest developers of GM crops, which much of this
		discussion is focussed on. However, this mechanism is only briefly
		mentioned in Box 5 and not at all referred to in the main body of the text. In
		comparison, the irrelevant topic of "property damage" to non-GM farmers is
		given extensive attention in this report.
		Line 10: insert "largest agricultural LMO developers"
26	28	Insert text: "the memberships goals [for the availability of insurance and
20	20	of broad access across the industry to response costs] will be difficult"
27	13	Delete "and complicated (often new)"
27	18	Edit text: " Ex ante only information is only needed on to establish the
41	10	relative contribution"
28	Section 3.4.5	
20	Section 3.4.3	It should be noted that risk-sharing could be orchestrated by a trade
		association which could also establish industry best practices for various
		segments of operators. An example for agricultural LMOs is the Excellence
		Through Stewardship program (excellencethroughstewardship.org). Such
20	27.22	an approach could be triggered or supported by government regulation.
30	27-33	Again, confusing the discussion of inter-farmer/producer
31	1-12	allegations of harm due to adventitious presence and different farming
		practices with damage to biodiversity is irrelevant and particularly
		inappropriate. This in not a form of "environmental harm" (as referred to
		on page 31, line 13), and by repeating this the authors are implying or
		asserting their own opinions that GM farming is itself environmentally
		harmful compared to non-GM farming practices – this is not the scope of
		this report, nor can such views be scientifically justified.
		The allegation of economic loss to a non-GM farmer's crop cannot be
		compared in any way to the creation of and magnitude of a fund to
		compensate for the potential costs of response measures for
		damage to biological diversity. These "economic losses are the result of
		voluntary participation in markets that have decided to exclude LMOs from
		their products for reasons of perceived consumer preferences.
31	13	It is inappropriate to suggest that the preceding discussion of funds to
		compensate farmers for alleged economic crop value loss is
		"environmental harm".
35	8	Replace "losses" with "damage"
35	Box 9	Line 22 – what is the "risk" in this example? This is not about biodiversity
		and is an irrelevant example.
36	1-2	The fund referred to as an example does not concern relevant "damage".
37	26	In considering mandatory financial security, it should be noted that the
		mechanisms for accident and consequent damage from oil pollution and
		nuclear power are known and understood, while the mechanisms and
		damage to biological diversity from LMO's are speculative, such risks are
		thoroughly assessed and considered to be very low and have not
		materialized into even an allegation of harm to biodiversity.
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38 42	20 et. seq. 5 et. seq.	This section discusses the costs of damage prevention. As mentioned previously, LMOs are highly regulated. The release of a GM crop into the environment requires regulatory authorisations, and ongoing regulatory compliance requirements and product stewardship. The NKLSP applies to authorised uses, as well as unauthorised and illegal. Authorised uses involve extensive risk assessments by many regulatory authorities worldwide, and these require scientific and technical data that is generated over several years of testing at significant cost (e.g. see https://croplife.org/plant-biotechnology/regulatory-2/cost-of-bringing-a-biotech-crop-to-market/). Is this economic investment factored into considerations of "damage prevention" and "incentives"? Further, the different routes to damage — authorised, unauthorised and illegal — are not separately considered in this report, however the potential for each will impact "incentives" as there will be different regulatory consequences. It is <i>not</i> necessary for self-insurance to work that reserves or assets would
.2	S ett seq.	have to be set aside, as long as the operator has sufficient reserves or assets to pay the response costs in the event that the operator's LMO actually causes damage to biological diversity. That can be verified by regulation and regulatory review of proof of financial wherewithal such as that described
42 & 43	Secs. 4.4.2 & 4.4.3	in Box 2 on p 20 and in p 20 FN 77. These discussions of social and environmental impacts of self-insurance highlight the need for adequate policies related to LMO's, but do not support a conclusion that mandatory financial security should be required as a matter of course or as a condition on the right to do business in the field of LMO's under the Party's business law. For any insurers, it does suggest the need for adequate regulation and oversight of these entities, including adequate proof of financial wherewithal such as that described in Box 2 on p 20 and in p 20 FN 77.
45	16	The term "victims" is inappropriate. Better: "Costs of restoration"
46	12 et. seq.	That is not correct: The Compact is exactly such a mechanism created and implemented by the major developers of agricultural plant biotechnology.
47	6	Edit text: "where the regulator or an insurer monitors" "the activities of the fund contributor or the insured"

Please submit your comments to secretariat@cbd.int by 25 June 2020.