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CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY SERVING AS THE MEETING OF THE PARTIES TO THE CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY
Third meeting
Curitiba, Brazil, 13 – 17 March 2006
Item 6 of the provisional agenda*

STATUS OF CAPACITY-BUILDING ACTIVITIES

A compilation of the responses to the questionnaire for the review of the Action Plan for the effective implementation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety

Note by the Executive Secretary

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In its decision BS-II/3, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety invited Parties, other Governments and relevant organizations to submit to the Secretariat information on progress made in, and effectiveness of, the implementation of the Action Plan for the Effective Implementation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety as well as views and suggestions on desired revisions to the Action Plan. In paragraph 26 of the same decision, the Executive Secretary was requested to develop a questionnaire to facilitate submission of the above-mentioned information. Accordingly, the sent out the questionnaire to all Parties, other Governments and relevant organizations on 16 September 2005. As of 15 January 2006, 46 responses had been received, including 42 Governments (i.e. 31 developing countries and countries with economies in transition and 11 developed countries) and 4 organizations.

2. The Executive Secretary is circulating herewith, for the information of the present meeting, a compilation of all the responses to the questionnaire received. The responses are arranged by question asked.

3. A synthesis report of the submissions received, i.e. the background paper describing the progress in, and effectiveness of, the implementation of the Action Plan is contained in document UNEP/CBD/BS/COP-MOP/3/4.

* UNEP/CBD/BS/COP-MOP/3/1

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RESPONSES TO THE QUESTIONNNAIRE

1. Has the Action Plan influenced or guided your capacity-building activities or assistance for the implementation of the Protocol?	Yes	No
	31 (67%)	11 (24%)

Number of Governments that did not respond, i.e. Non-responses (Government): 4 (9%)
Number of organizations that did not respond, i.e. Non-responses (Organizations): 0

2. Please explain briefly, if yes, how your Government or organization has changed course because of the Action Plan or, if no, why the Action Plan has not influenced your actions. *(Comments were received from 37 respondents (80%)*

Bulgaria:
"As a country in the process of developing a national biosafety legislation and with no experience in the field of transfer, handling and use of LMOs resulting from the modern biotechnology, we consider the Action Plan very useful as providing a clear scheme to be followed. Developed on the basis of the Government submissions regarding capacity-building needs and gaps, the Action Plan is very objective."

Egypt:
"Although not to the expected extent, the Action Plan … has catalyzed capacity on several fronts."

EC:
"Biosafety is an issue in EC research cooperation, in development and technical cooperation as well as in regulatory dialogues and administrative exchanges of experience with non-EU countries. However, most of these activities were started already before adoption of the Action Plan but they fit into its framework."

Finland:
"Finland is currently planning and developing relevant projects to assist capacity building activities for the implementation of the Protocol. The Action Plan is taken into account in the planning process."

Gabon:
"Le Plan d'action nous a influencé partiellement dans le montage du Cadre National de Biosécurité et de concevoir notre instrument d'adhésion au Protocol."

Germany:
"The German Initiative for Biosafety Capacity-Building was launched in 2000 before the Action Plan was negotiated or adopted. Therefore … could not influence the development of biosafety capacity-building activities supported by Germany. However due to its broad focus, all activities supported by Germany are fully in line with the action plan."

Hungary :

"The Action Plan provided a clear guidance on the development and strengthening of capacities for the effective implementation of the Protocol by identifying the key elements requiring concrete action and by sequencing of activities."

India:

India already has in place biosafety regulatory framework in the form of the Rules for Manufacture, Use, Import, Export and Storage of Hazardous Microorganism/Genetically Engineered Organisms or cells, 1989 notified under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. Although India has been addressing the biotechnology issues, a comprehensive approach for the biosafety issues in order to comply with

Cartagena Protocol was required. Keeping this in view, India is implementing a GEF – World Bank Capacity Building Project on biosafety. The capacity-building project will enhance the India's national capacity in order to implement the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. This project will address the capacity-building needs of the country for implementing the national biosafety framework related to the transboundary movement of LMOs in the context of the Cartagena Protocol and coordination of the implementation of the Biosafety Clearing House (BCH).

Iran (Islamic Republic of):

The action plan encouraged discussions among relevant scientists and decision makers on dimensions of biosafety. The outcome of these was National Biosafety Framework (NBF), which is a template for the formation of Biosafety structure in the country.

Lithuania:

"Action Plan … has served as a basic framework document, aimed at assisting Lithuania to build-up relevant institutional capacities."

Slovenia:
"The Action plan provides list of key elements and steps to be considered which we used as a starting point for planning national capacity-building. It proved to be useful check point to use [though] it is not specific enough to support the implementation efforts within the country."

Sweden:
"The Action Plan has not mainly influenced our actions since the capacity-building programme started before (1999) the decision on the Action plan was taken."

Tajikistan:
"Action Plan has been taken into account while planning of actions for Cartagena Protocol implementation and capacity-building."

United States of America:
"The Action Plan provides a useful list of the key elements of capacity building projects intended to enhance the ability of countries to meet their obligations under the Biosafety Protocol. […] Our projects support many of the elements of the Action Plan."

Zimbabwe:
A national policy has been developed and the legal framework required to address the gaps.

Global Industry Coalition (GIC):
"The Action Plan guided decisions of the GIC to fund capacity-building in certain areas (e.g. the Biosafety Clearing-House) and to focus our technical assistance on specific issues such as risk assessment and risk management."

3. Has your Government or organization undertaken or supported any activities/ initiatives specifically to implement the Action Plan?	Yes	No
	29 (63%)	12 (2611)

Non-responses (Government): 5 (9%)
Non-responses (Organizations): 0

4. If yes, please list the capacity-building initiatives/ activities taken or supported by your Government or organization since 2001? (*If already submitted to the BCH, please simply indicate the record number. Please attach additional documents, if available, or provide a website where they can be obtained.* (*Comments were received from 31 respondents (67%)*

Armenia:
It was established the roster of Stakeholder organizations Composition of inter-ministerial Commission and Composition of Expert Committee, annex 3,4,5.

Austria:
PHARE Twinning Project SK03IBEN02 "Biosafety Monitoring System", Slovakia
Other Twinning Projects: Lithuania, Poland (should be included in the BCH already)
UNEP GEF Projects: Resource persons in several workshops in CEE countries (e.g. Croatia, Romania, Lithuania)
Participation in the bilateral GTZ-Project (Germany) with China in the GTZ Workshop in Bonn (7/8 November 05)

Belize:
National Workshops on the Cartagena Protocol/development of NBF
Biosafety capacity survey
Seminar on Risk assessment from international expert (Dr. Abdul Moeed of New Zealand)
Seminar on regional activities in Biotechnology (IICA)

Bulgaria:
http://bch.biodiv.org/database/record.aspx?id=238

Cambodia:
One BCH proposal submitted to UNEP for BCH capacity development.
www.cambodiabiosafety.org

Cuba:
- Participación en Talleres Regionales.
- Información suministrada al Centro de Intercambio de Información sobre Seguridad de la Biotecnología.
- Identificación de las necesidades de creación de capacidad.
- Fortalecimiento de la Autoridad Nacional para asumir las funciones del Protocolo.
- Cuba fue la sede Reunión de Expertos de composición abierta sobre la creación de capacidad para el Protocolo de Cartagena, en la cual se adopta el Plan de Acción.

Ethiopia:
- The preparation of awareness raising material.
- Holding awareness raising workshops on the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and draft National Biosafety Framework.

European Community:
The European Community has contributed to capacity-building initiatives in the field of biosafety in developing country Parties as well as in Parties with economies in transition. However, as mentioned above, these activities were in general decided upon before adoption of the Action Plan at the first meeting of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Convention.
Examples include:

1. The European Commission has co-financed the workshop on capacity-building on Article 18 of the Cartagena Protocol held in November 2004 in Bonn, Germany.

2. *EU Twinning Project PL 01/EN/IB/03 – "Biological Safety System in Poland"*

The overall objective is to assist Poland in improving the administrative capacity in the field of biological safety by development of a national biosafety system in line with EU standards which covers the contained use of GMO as well as their deliberate release into the environment and placing on the market. The main project components are: 1) Project Inception Phase, 2) Legal review and assessment of the state of approximation of the Polish legislation to the EC' Acquis Communautaire; 3) Decision-Making; 4) Inspection; 5) Assistance in establishing accredited laboratories; 6) Assistance in establishing an electronic information system; and 7) Assistance in promoting public information and public participation. The EC has provided $1.7 million funding from its PHARE programme to support this project over the period of November 2002 to November 2004.

3. *Capacity-building opportunity JRC/WHO Joint Manual on Analysis of Food Samples for the Presence of GMOs*

The EC and the World Health Organisation have collaborated since 2000 in the organization of training courses on detection techniques for GMOs in foods. The aim is to provide analytical biotechnology skills to food control laboratory staff and to promote the use of validated and harmonized methods for detecting, identifying and quantifying GMOs. As part of this joint effort, training courses have been in held in the WHO European Region, including Central and Eastern European economies in transition.

A manual has been developed to assist relevant laboratory personnel with a good level of analytical knowledge, but with no or little expertise in this specific domain to become accustomed with molecular detection techniques, and to help them adapt their facilities and work programmes to include analyses which comply with regulatory instruments in the field of biotechnology. The specific objectives of the project are 1) to provide theoretical and practical information on the methodologies and protocols currently used and 2) to assist in the diffusion and dissemination of skills in GMO detection and quantification, taking into account the context of the different working environments and individual needs.

4. *EC-JRC Training Course on Analysis of Food Samples for GMOs; October/November 2003; Godolo, Hungary*.

The objective of the training course was to assist the staff of control laboratories to become accustomed with molecular detection techniques, and to help them to adapt their facilities and work programmes to include analyses to comply with worldwide regulatory acts in the field of biotechnology. The course is intended to teach molecular detection techniques to laboratory personnel that have a good level of analytical knowledge, but that have no or little expertise in this specific domain. The areas covered include:

a) DNA extraction from raw and processed materials;
b) Screening of foodstuffs for the presence of GMOs by simple Polymerase Chain Reaction and by nested Polymerase Chain reaction;
c) Quantification of GMOs in ingredients by real-time Polymerase Chain Reaction;
d) Quantification of GMOs in ingredients by the Enzyme-linked Immunosorbent Assay.

The October 2003 course was open especially to the EU Accession Countries in the context of the enlargement of the EU, including East European economies in transition.

5. *European Network of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) Laboratories*

The EC's Joint Research Centre has acted as a catalyst for bringing national GMO laboratories together by establishing the European Network of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) Laboratories. The

Network develops methods for tracing GMOs and provides free electronic access to this information to all interested parties, including from developing countries and economies in transition.

6. *EC Research Funding*

EC research funds provide opportunities for capacity building-related research, particularly under the Sixth Framework Programme for EU research, Priority 5 "Food quality and safety" and "Research for policy support". During the reporting period two international cooperation projects were supported on GM oilseed breeding and Bt cotton management, both with Chinese partner organisations. International cooperation will continue to be a priority for Food, Agriculture and Biotechnology research under the Seventh Framework Programme (announced in April 2005) and will provide further opportunities for promoting capacity building.

France:
France made it possible for 7 delegates from Africa to attend the 2nd meeting of the parties in Montreal in June 2005.

Germany:
Within the framework of the German Biosafety Capacity Building Initiative, the following projects receive support:

- Africa Regional: Support of the AU in matters of biosafety
- China: Biosafety Capacity Building in China: Data Management, Promoting Expertise and Awareness Raising, http://bch.biodiv.org/database/record.aspx?id=8430
- Algeria: Civil Society Participation in Algeria´s biosafety process, http://bch.biodiv.org/database/record.aspx?id=7038
- Peru: Study on the following subject-matter: Towards the implementation of a biosafety regime in Peru: Applying the precautionary principle, consumers´ rights and liability , Partner organization: Sociedad Peruana de Derecho Ambiental (SPDA)

Hungary:

- Improvement of the legislative framework (including the ratification and the proclamation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety)
- Expansion of the administrative framework
- Strengthening the cooperation between the decision makers and stakeholders
- Establishment of the Hungarian Biosafety Clearing House (under http://biodiv.kvvm.hu)
- Financial support for scientific institutions
- Organisation of conferences and trainings stakeholders

India:
A GEF – World Bank Capacity Building Project on biosafety is under implementation. The project is developing national capacities in biosafety required to: (i) strengthen the legislative framework and operational mechanisms for biosafety management in India; (ii) enhance capacity for risk assessment and monitoring; (iii) establish the biosafety database system and Biosafety Clearinghouse Mechanism; (iv) support a network for research, risk assessment, and monitoring; and (v) establish the Project Coordination and Monitoring Unit (PMU). The development of national capacities in these areas will enhance the national capabilities for implementation of the biosafety issues.

A Biosafety Newsletter is also being brought out for dissemination of information on biosafety (copy enclosed). The details of the project could also be seen at
http://www.envfor.nic.in/divisions/csurv/biosafety/default.htm

Indonesia:

- Survey for state of the art of biotechnology and biosafety, 2002
- Establish the embryo of Indonesian Biosafety Clearing House, 2002
- Training for High School Teachers, namely: public awareness on biotechnology and biosafety (2002)
- Training for decision makers and assessors on risk assessment and risk management of genetically engineered products (2002)
- Updating the Guideline for the Assessment of Environmental Risk for Genetically Engineered Products in four series i.e. : General Guideline, Guideline for Plants, Guideline for Food and Guideline for Feed (2002)
- National Seminar on Bioethical Aspects of Genetic Engineering in Islamic Perspectives (Mar 2003)
- National Seminar on Biotechnology for the Welfare of Humankinds (April 2003)
- Workshop on Improvements of Procedures for Environmental Risk Analysis (April 2003)
- Workshop on Biosafety and Food Safety of Living Modified Organisms (April 2003)
- Formulate Government Regulation on Biosafety of Genetically Engineered products (2001-2004), acted in May 2005

Iran (Islamic Republic of):
During the action plan, different workshops were performed by related organizations. A series of workshops for finalizing NBF were performed by National Institute for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology. At present time National Biosafety council and ministerial committees are being formed considering the outlines on NBF.

Japan:
Japan has been contributing to two projects "the Building Capacity for the Effective Participation of Parties in the BCH" and "the Development of National Biosafety Frameworks" through financial contributions to the Global Environmental Facility (GEF).

Japan has been implementing a capacity-building project on biosafety in the Asian region through contributions to the trust fund of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

Lao PDR:
Lao PDR has completed the UNEP/GEF project on the Development of Lao National Biosafety Frameworks in December 2004.

Latvia:

Assistance within the *project "Implementation of biosafety frameworks in pre- accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe*" (2001-2003**),** which was funded by the MATRA programme of the Dutch Government. The training workshops were intended for Governmental officials and experts of institutions and organizations who were involved in the implementation of biosafety regulations in Latvia.

7. *OECD workshop "Risk assessment of novel foods and feeds*"(2001).

8. *Project "Baltic Biosafety"* (2002-2004) in collaboration with Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (Swedish EPA), with Baltic Environmental Forum (BEF) funding support. The project aimed at capacity-building of Baltic biosafety frameworks particularly focusing on contained use of genetically modified microorganisms (GMMs), transboundary movements of LMOs and release of genetically modified (GM) plants.

9. Training workshops: *UNEP-GEF and CBD-BCH regional workshops for Central and Eastern European countries.*

10. *UNEP-GEF funded project "Development of National Biosafety Framework for the Republic of Latvia***"** (2003-2004**).** Latvian Food centre (LFC) was the legal entity appointed as Project National Executing Agency. In implementing the project activities, several trainings for risk assessors and risk managers have been conducted as well as the gaps and future needs have been identified for successful implementation of National Biosafety Framework in future.

11. Collaboration within *EC Joint Research center European Network of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) Laboratories (ENGL).*On 2004, the Veterinary Medicine Diagnostic center (Food and Veterinary Service, Ministry of Agriculture) became a member of ENGL.

12. Assistance within the *project "Strengthening of State Food Control and Supervision System with training assistance***"** (2005- 2006), which is funded by Transitional Facility Programme for Latvia. There are several workshops for risk assessors (on general principles and methodology of the environmental risk assessment) and risk managers (inspectors of Food and Veterinary Service) on practical aspects of GMOs control and monitoring will be conducted.

Lithuania:
The following capacity-building projects/activities were supported and undertaken by the MoE of the Republic of Lithuania since 2001:

- Development of approximation and transposition programs for EU legislation concerning GMOs in candidate countries to the EU;
- Scientific & technical initiative (meetings, workshops, seminars) under the regional project "Baltic Environment Project" (BEF), i.e.:
  - Collaborative international meeting on "Development of national Laws and necessary regulations under the laws on GMOs" (01-02');
  - International workshop on "Implementation of EU-GMO legislation: handling requests & enforcement mechanisms" (2002);
  - Training workshop on "Implementation of Biosafety regulations";
- Sub-regional technical co-operation project, initiated by SEPA, "Baltic Biosafety", targeted to train & educate civil servants of the Baltic (LIT, LAT, EST) countries (2003-end of 2004), i.e.:
  - 1st Baltic Biosafety workshop on "Contained use of GMMOs" (2003 spring);
  - 2nd Baltic Biosafety workshop on "Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety" (2003 autumn);
  - 3rd Baltic Biosafety workshop on "Genetically modified plants and their products" (2004' spring);
  - 4th Baltic Biosafety workshop on "Traceability and Labelling of GMOs" (2004' autumn);
- Regional TA project "Implementation of Biosafety frameworks in pre-accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe", funded by the Ministry of Environment of the Netherlands (2000-2002);
- EU Phare Twinning light project "Action Plan for strengthening of institutions in Chemicals Management & GMOs in Lithuania" (2002 autumn-2003 spring), when several practical workshops & training courses were organized, focusing on legal assistance, advice and institutional capacity-building was provided;
- EU Phare project "Strengthening of institutional capacity to implement EU requirements on chemicals & *GMOs management*, IPPC and climate change" (2003-2004), under one of the component seminars on safe handling of GMOs issues were held; National Veterinary Laboratory was supplied with relevant laboratory equipment for qualitative and quantitative detection of certain GMOs' (i.e. maize corns and soy food & feed, and their derivatives).
- The National Biosafety framework was drafted and prepared by the team of national and international consultants during the UNEP-GEF project (2002-2004) "Development of the NBF for Lithuania", a part of the UNEP-GEF Global Project, aimed to assist countries to ratify and prepare for the implementing of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. The relevant additional information and project-related documents could be found at:
  http://www.unep.ch/biosafety/partcountries/LTcountrypage.htm
  http://www.unep.ch/biosafety/development/Countryreports/LTNBFrep.pdf

Mexico:
During the implementation of the GRF project, the Mexican government organized four capacity building workshops on biosafety for different government officials in the Ministries of agriculture and environment including the PROFEPA, at the national level. These efforts have been used and extended further without the direct participation of the GEF. With co-financing from the GEF project two laboratories for the identification and detection of LMOs were developed in SEMARNATA and SAGARPA. Data bases and risk analyses methodologies have been strengthened as well as internal coordination for the implementation of the Cartagena Protocol and the decision making process. A biosafety law for LMOs has been approved by the congress and regulations and standards for its implementation are in progress.

Moldova:
The following legislative and normative acts have been elaborated and approved:
1. The Law on biosafety (no. 755-XV of 21.12.2001). This Law has been harmonized with EU Directives.
2. The national authority responsible to contact the Secretariat on biosafety problems has been nominated (Government Resolution no. 194 of 25.02.2003)
3. The National Biosafety Committee and its Regulation of activity have been created and operates as the national inter-ministerial responsible authority (Government Resolution no. 603 of 20.05.2003)
4. The Regulation on authorization of activities connected with production, testing, use and distribution of GMOs has been approved (Government Resolution no. 1153 of 25.09.2003)
5. Regulation on informing and consulting the public on GMOs has been elaborated and approved (Order of the Ministry for Environment, Construction and Territory Development no. 19 of 10.02.04)
6. The National Biosafety Testing Center was established by joint Order of the Ministry for Environment, Construction and Territory Development and Ministry of Education no. 28/61 of 18.02.04

Norway:
- Assistance to build capacity for the implementation of the National Biotechnology and Biosafety Policy and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (BCH Record ID 8447). Phase 1 of this project was not initiated as a consequence of the Action Plan.
- GenØk's Biosafety Capacity Building Programme (BCH Record ID 7289), including Record ID 7445, i.e. GenØk/UNEP biosafety capacity building course: Holistic Foundations for Assessment and Regulation of Genetic Engineering and Genetically Modified Organisms. (Genøk would be the correct institution to comment on to which extent the activities under GenØk's Biosafety Capacity Building Programme has been initiated specifically to implement the Action Plan).
- In addition to the ongoing projects; a phase II of the cooperation with Zambia (Record ID 8447) will presumably start in July 2006.
- Preliminary discussions on biosafety cooperation has also been held with Tanzania.

Poland:
The polish government has prepared and introduced national legislation (The Act of 22 June 2001 on Genetically Modified Organisms) and regulations on LMO-s related issues. Since 2001 the bill has been amended 2 times to adapt it to EC legislative in connection with Poland's membership in EU. At present the Minister of the Environment draws up the new act "Law on genetically modified organisms" This project will ensure full implementation of the European Community law on following issues:
- status and running of facilities,
- the contained use of genetically modified microorganisms,
- the contained use of genetically modified organisms,

- the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms, covering the field testing of GMOs,
- the placing on the market of GMOs as well as products containing or consisting of GMOs,
- coexistence of genetically modified plants with conventional planting,
- access to information on GMOs and public participation,
- criminal responsibility.

Slovenia:
See point 2.

Sweden:
Sweden has, through its development agency Sida (Swedish International Development Cooperating Agency), initiated a number of projects aiming at enhancing the capacity of developing countries to handle modern biotechnology, particularly in southern and eastern Africa. We believe that capacity-building is more than only increasing the capacities of Governments and authorities. Capacity-building is also about elevating the awareness and participation of the public through education, research and information in the field of modern biotechnology, biosafety and biotechnology policy. Below follows a list of programme/ projects supported by Sida.

1. East African Regional Programme and Research Network for Biotechnology, Biosafety and biotechnology policy Development (BIO-EARN) has been in operation since 1999 and aims at building capacity in Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda). The BIO-EARN Programme has three main objectives:

- Building biotechnology, biosafety and biotechnology policy capacity
- Facilitating regional collaboration
- Stimulating the dialogue between policy makers and scientists

The Biotechnology Advisory Centre (BAC), an integrated part of the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) is responsible for the overall management of the programme. The major goal is to develop an East African R&D platform and infrastructure that can in the long run contribute to improved livelihoods, alleviation of poverty and improved environment. Below follows a short description of major Programme outputs and its development impact:

Biotechnology Capacity Building

- *The BIO-EARN programme will produce at least 18 East African PhD* students: The development of highly educated and trained researcher that are able to adapt and develop the technologies of the gene revolution to country needs and opportunities will, potentially and in the long run, have a clear development impact in the region. The BIO-EARN PhD students have been trained in an interdisciplinary thinking and will be able to greatly contribute to R&D work supporting sustainable developments in the region. All the BIO-EARN research projects are focused on East African needs and problems in the field of agriculture, environment and industrial biotechnology. It is too early to consider their impact.
- *The BIO-EARN programme has improved the ability of eleven East African R&D institutions to carry out advanced biotechnology R&D:* The BIO-EARN Programme has, through human capacity building, 1/ infrastructure support2, policy and networking support been able to greatly strengthen eleven East African R&D institutions. As a result, these institutions are now more able to carry out advanced biotechnology R&D relevant to their own national needs. They are also much more able to engage in regional and international research collaboration, which will be increasingly important to

1/ Apart from PhD students a large number of faculty staff at East African institutions has been trained.

2/ All East African institutions have received a significant infrastructure support. Procurement of equipment has improved infrastructure significantly at the various East African BIO-EARN research institutions. Procurement for roughly 12 MSEK worth of equipment roughly KSEK600 per institution) has been made since end of 1999.

ensure sustainability, quality and impact of future research efforts in the region. All the BIO-EARN research projects are focused on East African research problems.

Biosafety Capacity-Building

- *The BIO-EARN Programme has greatly improved ecological risk assessment capacity in the region*: Prior to the Programme, there where virtually no East African expertise available for biosafety risk assessment. The BIO-EARN MSc courses and PhD programme, involving three PhD students, have improved the ecological risk assessment capacity in the region significantly. A platform for sharing risk assessment data has also been developed. A common risk assessment/management decision support material[3] is also under development enabling scientifically sound decisions whether or not approving future GM crops.
- *The BIO-EARN Programme has greatly improved biosafety regulatory implementation in the region*: Six regional biosafety workshops, involving more than 150 individuals have improved the ability of biosafety regulatory officials in committees and agencies involved to implement biosafety regulations and carry out biosafety assessment. These workshops have also enabled individuals from countries (Ethiopia and Tanzania) lacking biosafety regulatory structures to effectively participate in the development of national and institutional regulatory structures. The Programme has also contributed to improving exiting regulatory structures in Kenya, through a detailed implementation study. This study, together with a forthcoming Ugandan study will also benefit Tanzania and Ethiopia in their design of biosafety frameworks.
- *A BIO-EARN Biosafety Resource Book,* developed by the biosafety regulatory officials in the region will also facilitate biosafety regulatory implementation in the region. The resource book was printed and distributed in February 2004. It fills an important need in the region and will greatly facilitate the capacity-building process and biosafety harmonization not only in East Africa, but hopefully also in other parts of the world. In short, the BIO-EARN resource book will;
  - be a catalyst in initiating national training programmes;
  - be a very helpful research/teaching tool in national workshops;
  - increase the self-sufficiency of developing country authorities and support their internal training efforts;
  - assist and guide inexperienced regulatory authorities (and the NBC's) through their first decision making processes;
  - Serve as platform for future biosafety information exchange.
- *The BIO-EARN Programme has facilitated regional biosafety information sharing and harmonisation of biosafety regulatory frameworks:* The workshops, seminars and common projects have developed a regional platform for biosafety information sharing. For example, the BIO-EARN capacity-building activities have catalysed of drafting biosafety guidelines in Ethiopia and Tanzania is beginning and action significantly. This process has also benefited from the information exchange within the network, making it possible to share the experiences of Uganda and Kenya. The above mentioned, BIO-EARN Biosafety Resource book, will also facilitate regional information sharing.

Biotechnology Policy Development/Awareness raising

- *The BIO-EARN Programme has created awareness among policy makers and scientists on key biotechnology issues:* The programme has helped to expose policy makers and scientists to new policy areas not covered by traditional institutions of higher learning and on which information and guidance were lacking. Some of the conclusions and recommendations from the workshops and training course on biotechnology and public policy held in 1999, have been included in the biotechnology policy framework proposals in the region. Individuals and material from the BIO-EARN Programme have been heavily used in the policy making process in all four countries.

3/ Regional polled dispersal files/genes files making prediction of impact of various GM crops easier.

- *The BIO-EARN programme is supporting biotechnology product development and technology diffusion in the region:* The BIO-EARN Programme is assisting East African countries and BIO-EARN network institutions to develop biotechnology products for the market. This includes an institutional ability, to interact with private sector, NGOs or other actors involved in product development. Four county background studies and a synthesis study on ongoing product development partnerships in the region have been published. These studies together with the recommendations made on regional policy BIO-EARN seminar on product development in biotechnology 4/ will facilitate future biotechnology product development in the region.

- *The BIO-EARN Programme is building institutional capacity in intellectual property management*: The BIO-EARN Programme is assisting Network institutions to develop structures and policies for management of Intellectual Property. This will stimulate product development partnerships and more efficient product development in the region. It will also enable Eat African institutions to collaborate with attractive partners world wide facilitating the technology transfer process in the region.

Facilitating Regional Collaboration

- *The BIO-EARN programme has stimulated regional collaboration and sharing of knowledge and experiences*: A large number of regional workshops and seminars and collaboration in the various research projects have greatly increased regional collaboration. For example, Ugandan policy makers have been assisting Tanzania in developing the proposal for policy framework for biosafety guideline drafting. The ability to share experiences and develop future collaborative projects has therefore strengthened the basis for scientific and policy collaboration in the region.

Stimulating the Dialogue between Policy Makers and Scientists

- *The BIO-EARN programme has stimulated the dialogue between policy makers and scientists in the region:* As a consequence of BIO-EARN programme activities, East African researchers have been encouraged to communicate with high-level policy makers. A number of national awareness meetings and site visits have facilitated the dialogue between policy makers and scientists on how to best use biotechnology R&D for country development purposes.

Potential opportunities for collaboration with other initiatives
The programme has been evaluated by two external evaluators in 2004. The evaluation report highlights some of its achievements, as well as point to some aspects to be considered for the future. The report advises on continued funding of continued efforts in building capacity for biotechnology and biosafety in the region. It advises on a careful consideration of some key aspects such as ownership and need to create synergy with national, regional and international initiatives in the region in the same and related fields (stock should be taken of new and emerging initiatives and opportunities for cooperation and synergies be discussed before a proposal is drafted).

Bilateral Research Co-operation
Sida is also through bilateral projects strengthening technological and research capacities in various developing countries such as Bolivia, India, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe. These projects have generally aimed at increasing co-operation and exchange between scientific research institutes in Sweden and these countries, as well as resulted in *inter alias* the establishment of a an Institute for molecular biology and biotechnology in Sri Lanka.

Support to Non-governmental organizations

4/ The title of the workshop was "Bridging the gap between ideas and the market", and was held in Entebbe, Uganda, 12-14 November 2003.

As mentioned above Sweden considers increased public awareness in the field of biosafety to be of great significance. Sida is therefore supporting a number of civil society organisations, particularly such organisations operating in the developing world. Below is a non-inclusive list over NGOs getting biosafety and genetic resources related support from Sweden:

a) The Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (SSNC) – North/South Programme,
b) GRAIN (Genetic Resources Action International). The support to consist of three projects: Harnessing Diversity, The Gaia-GRAIN project: supporting, biodiversity-related activities in Africa and beyond and The ISD/Gaia Biosafety project
c) Third World Network – Biosafety and Biodiversity Programme
d) CBDC (Community Biodiversity Development and Conservation Programme)
e) There is also a core support to the CGIAR-institutes and ACTS (African Centre for Technology Studies) which are both involved in several biotechnology and biosafety projects.

On top of that, Sida is also supporting the publication and distribution of the journal" Biotechnology and Development Monitor" published by the University Van Amsterdam, the Netherlands.

Decision has been taken to continue to support BIO-EARN during the period 2006-2009 of at most MSEK 77, of which at most MSEK 16,2 during 2006, at most MSEK 19,5 during 2007, at most MSEK 20,2 during 2008 and MSEK 21,1 during 2009.

Sudan:
UNEP-GEF project

UK:
Due to the experiences from the program Sweden would like to stress the need to have a bottom –up approach. Countries and regions need to build up their own research capacity and institutional frameworks in order to assess their own needs and possible impact of GM technology. Many biotechnology research initiatives are largely focused on GM products to the field/market (concentrated on ag-biotech) and are short-term in nature. These initiatives are not likely to be successful in building long-term capacity in biotechnology and in the implementation of related policies.

Tajikistan:
Designation of National Focal Points and National Competent Authority: - Development of National Biosafety Framework, including
mechanisms for handling requests, risk assessment, monitoring and enforcement and public awareness and participation:

Thailand:
The capacity-building activities include; 1) Institutional capacity building 1.1 Legal and regulatory framework 1.2 Technical and scientific
infrastructure 2) Human resources development and training 3) Participation in Biosafety Clearing House

United States of America:
The U.S. supports the following capacity building projects:
1- Program for Biosafety Systems (PBS): PBS is a 5-year, $15 million biosafety capacity building project supported by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented by an international consortium led by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). PBS works at the national level in Indonesia, Philippines, Ghana, Nigeria, Mali, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi and South Africa, and at the regional level in East and Southern Africa. (Record ID #8599, www.ifpri.org/themes/pbs/pbs.htm)

2- South Asia Biosafety Program (SABP): SABP is a 3-year, $2 million biosafety capacity building project supported by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented in a partnership between the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and Agriculture and Biotechnology Strategies (AGBIOS). SABP works in India and Bangladesh. (Record ID # 9700, www.agbios.com/sabp_main.php)

3- BCH Template Project: Working in cooperation with the UNEP-GEF Biosafety Clearinghouse capacity building project, the U.S. has made available a template for national websites and databases that is interoperable with the international BCH and will provide technical support to those countries who wish to use the template. This project is supported by the U.S. Geological Survey and the U.S. Department of State, which have jointly obligated $510,000. (Record ID #7079, usbiotechreg.nbii.gov/capacity.asp)

Zimbabwe:

- Development of a biotechnology policy
- Development of a biotechnology Act
- Setting up on institution to manage research, development and application of LMOs
- Providing funding for biosafety

Organizations:

United Nations University, Institute of Advanced Studies:

- Assessment of Ongoing Initiatives to Build Capacity for Biosafety and Biotechnology will contribute information to countries, donors, regional and international organizations that may assist in prioritization under the Action Plan Framework. The draft assessment has been provided to Mr. Erie Tamale of the CBD Secretariat. A description of the assessment is available at www.ias.unu.edu/research/biosafety
- The UNU-IAS offers scholarships to doctoral and post doctoral level, including to students from developing countries, on issues of relevance to biosafety policy.
- UNU-IAS from time to time provides ad hoc training workshops on related issues. For example, "Capacity Development for the Integrated Approaches to Biosafety of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs): Southeast Asia Workshop" in 2001 or "High Level Dialogue on Trade, Biotechnology and Sustainable Development", 21 February 2004, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, or "South-East Asia Workshop on Trade, Biotechnology and the Environment", 22-24 April 2003 in Hanoi, Vietnam.
- Production of relevant publications aimed at helping developing countries. Examples include:
  - *Food and Nutrition Biotechnology: Current Achievements, Prospects and Perceptions*, by Albert Sasson. This report on biotechnology, food and nutrition is a consolidation of knowledge in potentials, opportunities and developmental processes in applying biotechnology for improvements in human nutrition. Tokyo, UNU-IAS, 2005, 36 pages.
  - *Industrial and Environmental Biotechnology: Current Achievements, Prospects and Perceptions,* by Albert Sasson. This report discusses the so-called 'white' biotechnology, or industrial and environmental biotechnology, a broad and expanding field that includes making enzymes with a variety of industrial uses that include the manufacture of bioplastics and biofuels and using micro-organisms and plants for the treatment of wastes and abatement of pollution. Tokyo, UNU-IAS, 2005, 28 pages.
  - *Capacity Development on Access to Genetic Resources, Benefit-Sharing, and Biosafety in Central Asia and Mongolia*. An updated version of a previous report presenting regional and national overviews on the state of biodiversity, access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing legislation, and the protection of traditional knowledge in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Tokyo, UNU/IAS, 2004, 44 pages
  - *Trading Precaution: The Precautionary Principle and the WTO*, by Sabrina Shaw and Risa Schwartz, forthcoming.

Global Industry Coalition:
We have a number of completed projects listed on the BCH – see records 8528, 198, 311, 313, 315, 4848. In addition, we partially funded a workshop on the BCH right before COP-MOP/2. We also work with various Parties to ensure their postings on the BCH are complete and accurate.

5. From your perspective, please indicate on the scale below the level of progress towards achieving the following outcomes (based on the criteria and indicators of success that were adopted by the COP-MOP in decision BS-I/5): *NA= Not applicable; 0=Not achieved; 1=Partly achieved (<50%); 2=Largely achieved (>50%); and 3=Fully achieved (100%).* For each item in bold, please give an overall assessment.

Capacity-building outcome (criteria & indicator of success)	Level of achievement5					
	Replies	NA/ NR6	0 (No)	1 (Partly)	2 Largely	3 (Fully)
A. IMPROVED INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY						
(i) Effective legislative and policy frameworks in place						
a) Biosafety regulatory frameworks (including policies, laws and regulations) in place	30 65%	16 35%	1 3%	8 27%	13 43%	8 27%
b) National biosafety frameworks harmonized with other national policies, frameworks and programmes	30 65%	16 35%	0 0%	13 43%	8 27%	9 30%
c) National biosafety frameworks consistent with the Protocol	29 63%	17 37%	1 3%	5 17%	10 34%	13 45%
d) Stakeholders satisfied with the national biosafety frameworks	27 59%	19 41%	2 7%	6 22%	16 59%	3 11%
e) Other (specify):	5 11%	41 89%	0 0%	3 60%	2 40%	0 0%
(ii) Appropriate administrative frameworks in place						
a) Clearly defined institutional mechanisms for administering biosafety, including competent national authorities, and responsibilities among agencies in place	30 65%	16 35%	2 7%	8 27%	11 37%	9 30%
b) Desired number and quality of staff in national institutions dealing with biosafety in place	29 63%	17 37%	3 10%	14 48%	12 41%	0 0%
c) Notifications are handled and decisions taken within the timeframes specified in the Protocol	20 43%	26 57%	7 35%	7 35%	2 10%	4 20%
d) Systems for managing biosafety records and for maintaining institutional memory in place and operational	29 63%	17 37%	8 28%	9 31%	10 34%	2 7%
e) Mechanisms for inter-institutional coordination (e.g. steering committees) in place and operational	29 63%	17 37%	4 14%	8 28%	11 38%	6 21%
f) Other (specify):	2 4%	44 96%	1 50%	0 0%	1 50%	0 0%
(iii) Improved technical, scientific, and telecommunications infrastructures						

5/ It should be noted on developing countries and countries with economies in transition responded to this question. Accordingly, the percentages in the last four columns are calculated against the total number of developing countries and countries with economies in transition that participated in the survey (31).

6/ This includes the number of those who said the question was "not applicable" (NA) as well as those that did not respond to the question, i.e. non-responses (NR).

Capacity-building outcome (criteria & indicator of success)	Level of achievement5					
	Replies	NA/ NR6	0 (No)	1 (Partly)	2 Largely	3 (Fully)
a) Desired quantity and reliability of office equipment and facilities in institutions dealing with biosafety in place	28 61%	18 39%	4 14%	10 36%	9 32%	5 18%
b) Required number of facilities for biosafety research (e.g. laboratories, greenhouses, etc) and equipment for LMO detection in place and operational	29 63%	17 37%	10 34%	11 38%	7 24%	1 3%
c) Reliable telecommunication infrastructure, including internet access, in place	29 63%	17 37%	4 14%	8 28%	10 34%	7 24%
d) Other:	2 4%	44 96%	0 0%	0 0%	1 50%	1 50%
(iv) Enhanced funding and resource management						
a) Required amount of funding for biosafety activities received or provided	28 61%	18 39%	4 14%	14 50%	9 32%	1 4%
b) Desired funding for biosafety activities coming from national budgetary allocation	28 61%	18 39%	8 29%	12 43%	8 29%	0 0%
c) Resources earmarked for biosafety are used for the intended activities and in a cost-effective manner	25 54%	21 46%	2 8%	5 20%	9 36%	9 36%
d) Other (specify):	3 7%	43 93%	0 0%	3 100%	0 0%	0 0%
(v) Enhanced mechanisms for follow-up, monitoring and assessment						
a) Mechanisms for monitoring and reporting of implementation of the Protocol in place and operational	27 59%	19 41%	3 11%	9 33%	14 52%	1 4%
b) Other (specify):	5 11%	41 89%	1 20%	2 40%	2 40%	0 0%
B. Improved human resources capacity development and training						
a) Desired number of national experts trained in diverse specialized biosafety-related fields attained	30 65%	16 35%	4 13%	19 63%	6 20%	1 3%
b) Local experts being used in undertaking activities related to the implementation of the Protocol	29 63%	17 37%	2 7%	14 48%	8 28%	5 17%
c) Other (specify):	3 7%	43 93%	0 0%	3 100%	0 0%	0 0%
C. Improved capacity for risk assessment and other scientific and technical expertise						
a) Risk assessments and biosafety research being carried out locally	29 63%	17 37%	9 31%	10 34%	6 21%	4 14%
b) Local expertise used in undertaking or reviewing risk assessments	28 41%	18 39%	8 29%	6 21%	10 36%	4 14%
c) Other (specify):	1 2%	45 98%	0 0%	0 0%	1 100%	0 0%
D. Improved capacity in risk management						
a) Risk management strategies for LMOs with identified risks in place	28 41%	18 39%	9 32%	13 46%	5 18%	1 4%
b) Rate of implementation of risk management strategies and measures developed to prevent or mitigate identified risks	26 57%	20 43%	8 31%	13 50%	4 15%	1 4%
c) Other (specify):	1 2%	45 98%	0 0%	0 0%	1 100%	0 0%

Capacity-building outcome (criteria & indicator of success)	Level of achievement5					
	Replies	NA/ NR6	0 (No)	1 (Partly)	2 Largely	3 (Fully)
E. Improved public awareness, participation and education in biosafety at all levels						
a) Desired level of public awareness of the Protocol realized	30 65%	16 35%	3 10%	13 43%	12 40%	2 7%
b) Desired number, scope and variety of measures to promote awareness of biosafety and the Protocol achieved	34 74%	12 26%	6 18%	16 47%	10 29%	2 6%
c) Desired rate of stakeholder involvement in decision-making and in the development and implementation of national biodiversity frameworks achieved	30 65%	16 35%	3 10%	13 43%	12 40%	2 7%
d) Desired level of public access to biosafety information, including through the BCH, attained	29 63%	17 37%	8 28%	14 48%	6 21%	1 3%
e) Other (specify):	1 2%	45 98%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	1 2%
F. Improved information exchange and data management including full participation in the Biosafety Clearing-House (BCH)						
a) Desired level of exchange of relevant biosafety data and information attained	28 41%	18 39%	7 25%	10 36%	10 36%	1 4%
b) Information required under the Protocol provided to the BCH	27 59%	19 41%	5 19%	9 33%	13 48%	0 0%
c) Systems for data management and information exchange in place	28 41%	18 39%	8 29%	12 43%	8 29%	0 0%
d) National infrastructure and capability to access the BCH in place	27 59%	19 41%	8 30%	5 19%	11 41%	3 11%
e) The BCH responds to the information needs of different stakeholders	25 54%	21 46%	7 28%	9 36%	8 32%	1 4%
f) Other (specify):	2 4%	44 96%	0 0%	0 0%	2 100%	0 0%
G. Increased scientific, technical and institutional collaboration at sub regional, regional and international levels						
a) Mechanisms for regional and international collaboration in biosafety in placed and operational	30 65%	16 35%	8 27%	12 40%	9 30%	1 3%
b) Desired bilateral and multilateral collaborative biosafety initiatives in place	29 63%	17 37%	9 31%	13 45%	6 21%	1 3%
c) Desired level of participation in regional and international collaborative mechanisms and initiatives achieved	30 65%	16 35%	8 27%	16 53%	5 17%	1 3%
d) Regional or sub-regional biosafety advisory mechanisms and centres of excellence in place and being taken full advantage of	29 63%	17 37%	14 48%	11 38%	2 7%	2 7%
e) Regional or sub-regional biosafety websites & databases in place and being used	27 59%	19 41%	14 52%	6 22%	5 19%	2 7%
f) Mechanisms for regional or sub-regional coordination and harmonization of biosafety regulatory frameworks in place	29 63%	17 37%	13 45%	8 28%	5 17%	3 10%
g) Mechanisms for promoting south-south cooperation in biosafety issues in place and engaged	23 50%	23 50%	11 48%	8 35%	4 17%	0 0%
h) Desired amount and availability of international technical guidance on implementation of the Protocol achieved	28 41%	18 39%	6 21%	14 50%	5 18%	3 11%

Capacity-building outcome (criteria & indicator of success)	Level of achievement5					
	Replies	NA/ NR6	0 (No)	1 (Partly)	2 Largely	3 (Fully)
i) Other (specify):	2 4%	44 96%	1 50%	1 50%	0 0%	0 0%
H. Improved access to and transfer of technology and know-how						
a) Enabling frameworks for technology transfer in place	28 61%	18 39%	12 43%	10 36%	6 21%	0 0%
b) Desired relevant technologies transferred	26 57%	20 43%	11 42%	13 50%	2 8%	0 0%
c) Other (specify):	2 4%	44 96%	1 50%	0 0%	1 50%	0 0%
I. Improved identification of LMO shipments as required by the Protocol						
a) National measures and systems for identification of LMO shipments in place	27 59%	19 41%	10 37%	9 33%	5 19%	3 11%
b) Modern LMO identification techniques being used	27 59%	19 41%	11 41%	8 30%	5 19%	3 11%
c) Identification systems and measures effective in ensuring safe handling, transport and packaging of LMOs	24 52%	22 48%	13 54%	5 21%	4 17%	2 8%
d) Other (specify):	1 2%	45 98%	0 0%	0 0%	1 100%	0 0%
J. Socio-economic considerations being addressed	16 35%	30 65%	3 19%	8 50%	5 31%	0 0%

6. Was external funding, expertise or other type of assistance used in reaching the above outcomes?	Yes	No	NA
	27 (59%)	8 (17%)	4 (9%)

Non-responses (Government): 7 (15%)

7. If you have answered "yes" to question 6 above, please indicate the source and type of assistance received and for which elements or specific activities *(Please attach additional documents if available or provide a website where they can be obtained)*. (*Comments were received from 30 respondents (65%)*

Armenia:
UNEP/ GEF "Development of National Biosafety Framework for Armenia" Project.

Belarus: (Did not answer question 6)
The UNEP-GEF Project "Development of the National Biosafety Framework for the Republic of Belarus" was successfully fulfilled. See final report on the project: http://biosafety.org.by

Belize:
The UNEP/GEF Project "Development of a National Biosafety Framework" has been a major driving force for the workplans and activities in biosafety

Bosnia and Herzegovina:
UNDP office in Slovakia
GMO quantification equipment (RealTime PCR)

Bulgaria:
UNEP-GEF Biosafety Project on the implementation of the national biosafety framework
http://www.unep.ch/biosafety/partcountries/ImpBulgaria.htm; Type of the assistance – funding, expertise.

Cambodia: (Did not answer question 6)
Draft national law on biosafety, National Biosafety Framework and additional reports, which can be downloaded from the website: www.cambodiabiosafety.org

Cuba:
- Proyecto Piloto sobre Bioseguridad (1998)
- Proyecto Apoyo a la implementación de un marco nacional de Bioseguridad en Cuba (2002-2005)

Ethiopia:
1. UNEP -GEF Project
2. German funded African Union biosafety project
3. Swedish Funded BIO-EARN Programme

Finland:
Expert cooperation in the EU and in other international fora.

Gabon:
Assistance du PNUE/FEM pour le projet développement du Cadre National de Biosécurité.

Guinea:
GEF for the Development of the National Biosafety Framework.

Hungary:
Hungary received financial resources from the UNEP-GEF for the development of the national Biosafety Clearing House (Hungarian Biosafety Website).
Scientific and institutional collaboration
Information exchange by participation on international meetings and conferences.

India:
A medium sized GEF-World Bank Capacity Building Project on Biosafety is currently under implementation.

Indonesia:
In 2002 to 2004 Indonesia received a financial support from UNEP-GEF to develop a biosafety policy, institution, regulatory framework and a system for handling request to be in conformity with the provisions of the Cartagena Protocol. The financial support covers 5 (five) components: national project personnel component (National Project Personnel, consultants, administrative support, and travel), sub contract component (sub contract to governmental agencies and sub contract to private firms), training component, equipment and premises component (expendable equipment, non-expendable equipment, premises), and miscellaneous component (operation and maintenance equipment, reporting cost, sundry).
The members of Biosafety and Food Safety Technical Team and senior scientists have been trained in biosafety and food safety Risk assessment, and risk communication by various donors (e.g. ISNAR,

FAO, and USAID through PBS and ABSPII). The training courses have been conducted in several countries such as Canada, India, Italy, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and USA. ASEAN Secretariat and ILSI conducted Workshop on Safety and Risk Assessment of Agriculture Related GMOs on August 31-September 2, 2004 in Jakarta.

Iran (Islamic Republic of):
UNEP-GEF fund for development of National Biosafety Framework

Lao PDR:
1. UNEP – GEF project
2. ASEAN subcommittee on Biotechnology

Latvia:
Funding received within the UNEP-GEF project "Development of National Biosafety Framework for the Republic of Latvia" supported the development and strengthening of the capacity for the implementation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. Information could be obtained thorough the project developed website: www.biosafety.lv

Liberia:
The funds were provided by GEF through UNEP for development of Liberia's National Biosafety Framework.

Lithuania:
According to the provisions of Article 22, CPB on Capacity-building, Lithuania, as a country with an economy in transition, has benefited from the cooperation of technical and scientific seminars for safe usage and management of biotechnology, trainings for risk assessment and risk management on Biosafety, and training for enhancement of technological and institutional capacities in Biosafety. Lithuania has received different types of financial, technical and scientific assistance.
As it was indicated and described answering the question No. 4 (pls. find above), there were several sources and types of external assistance received by the MoE during 2000-2004, i.e.:

- Legal expertise and experience for approximation & transposition of EU Acquis on GMOs in candidate EU countries;
- Exchange of scientific expertise and administrative experience during the regional meetings, workshops and seminars (BEF), provided by the specialists & experts from Nordic EU countries;
- Exchange of specialists & experts (EU/non-EU) during the EU Phare (Twinning) project on Institutional Capacity building activities;
- The National GMOs Laboratory has been established and equipped within the premises of the National Veterinary Laboratory to the National Food and Veterinary Service at the beginning of 2004, thus introducing relevant modern methods of laboratory practices. The samples for laboratory analysis (GM food products, GM plants, grains, seeds, etc.) are being carried out employing the best laboratory practices of the EU, using the approved methodology and standard work procedures. The main supplies of the equipment and standardization of the required procedures was completed using the European Union PHARE funds of the project (No. LI 01.06.01) "Strengthening of Institutional capacity to implement the European Union Requirements on Chemicals and Genetically Modified Organisms' management, IPPC and Climate Change";
- UNEP-GEF financial assistance combined with national co-financing for drafting of constituent parts of NBF for Lithuania. In particular, the latter activities included formation of national administrative and regulatory management system, organization of national & sub-regional seminars, issuance of manuals, methodological materials, leaflets for public information and participation.

During the implementation of the UNEP-GEF project on the Development of National Biosafety Framework for Lithuania (project No. GFL/2716-02-4546), there were envisaged and implemented

nationally several means for promotion and facilitation of public awareness, education and participation: organization of GMOs related seminars/workshops; National public awareness Conference (with press-conference, press-release, interviews (radio and TV, local and national mass media); development of testing phase of national GMOs database (nBCH); publication of relevant materials (booklet for CPB, manual & guidebook for safe application of GMOs, etc.).

Mexico:
Project on Biosafety from the GEF implemented with the UNDP and complemented with national funding from the Mexican government approved specifically from the congress to execute biosafety activities.

Moldova:
1. The UNEP/GEF Project "Development of the National Biosafety Framework in the Republic of Moldova". The Project financed by UK Embassy in the Republic of Moldova "Support for Development of the national Biosafety Framework in the Republic of Moldova"

Norway:
Bilateral cooperation between Zambia and Norway, see record ID 8447

Poland:
1. Project GFL/2716-02-4531 "Support for the Implementation of the National Biosafety Framework for Poland" financed by United Nations Environment Programme/Global Environment Facility. Objective: legislative and regulatory framework, administrative framework, risk assessment, risk management, information sharing and data management including full participation in the Biosafety Clearing-House, awareness, participation and education at all levels including for decision makers, stakeholders and general public.

Detailed information provided on the website at: http://www.ihar.edu.pl/gf2716/przedmiot_en.php

2. The Twinning project PL2001/IB/EN/03 „Biological Safety System in Poland" financed by PHARE. Objective: project inception, legal assessment and review, decision making, inspection, establishing accredited laboratories, establishing an electronic information system, public participation and public awareness. Detailed information on the website at: http://www.twinning-biosafety.de

Slovakia:
1. *Matra Project* funded by Government of Netherlands; **"**Implementation Of National Biosafety Frameworks In Pre-Accession Countries Of Central And Eastern Europe", (1999 – 2001)
2. *UNEP-GEF project* "Development on National Biosafety Framework for Slovakia", (2003 – 2004)
3. *PHARE-Twinning project* funded by European Commission "Monitoring System in Slovakia", (2004-2005)

Slovenia:
Development on National Biosafety Framework for Slovenia (GFL/2716-02-4547); Enforcement of legislation on GMOs in Slovenia (PPA03/SL/7/6, NL/SI) TAIEX (Technical Assistance Information Exchange Office); Twinning Light Project 'Development of Information and Reporting Systems - SL02/IB/EN/01/TL' bilateral project with Austria, to support development of environmental information system, where also GMOs are included.; MATRA project 'Enforcement of legislation on GMO in Slovenia' is focused on improving routine and practice for processing/handling/administering of notification for contained use and deliberate release of GMOs.; SI was included in MATRA project 'Implementation of national biosafety frameworks in pre-accession countries of CEE'.

Sudan:
UNEP-GEF project for development of national framework

Tajikistan:
UNEP-GEF Project for Development of National Biosafety Framework

Thailand:
UNEP-GEF Global project on NBFs
FAO Project on GM Crops

Zimbabwe:
Some resources provided under the UNEP/GEF support for development of biosafety frameworks. Support used to meet some costs associated with the development of the national policy on biotechnology; the National Biotechnology Authority Bill; training of trainees and some public awareness and IT infrastructure.

Organization:
- PPRI: Dutch Govt. GEF

8. If you have answered "no" to question 6 above, what were the reasons?	(a) Unavailable (b) Difficult to access (c) Expensive to engage (d) Not necessary (e) Not applicable (f) Other (specify):	2 (4%) 3 (7%) 1 (2%) 2 (4%) 7 (15%)

Non-responses (Government): 31 (67%)

9. Please summarize the experience gained and lessons learned by your Government or organization during the implementation of the Action Plan. (*Comments were received from 35 respondents (76%); 11 respondents (24%) did not answer the question).*

Armenia:
It was developed National Biosafety policy.
It was clarified Biosafety Regulatory system for the implementation of monitoring and public awareness.

Belarus:
The capacity building activities in field of biosafety in Belarus carried out in full accordance with the Action Plan: the draft national biosafety framework has been developed and the plan of its implementation has been prepared. This achievements was possible mainly due to assistance of UNEP and GEF (in frames of the UNEP-GEF project "Development of the National Biosafety Framework for the Republic of Belarus"). Hope that such fruitful cooperation and assistance will be available in future

Belize:
The National Committee formed to over see the development of the NBF are composed of regulatory and private sector personnel that are committed to biosafety but have very busy work schedules . The National Committee finds that most of the required activities are effectively accomplished through the formation of a core group (subcommittee) that looks at the issues, synthesizes them for the wider body to make decisions on. Delays in getting the biosafety capacity survey completed in a timely manner has caused the project to overshoot the work plan deadlines set by the National Committee and has given the Committee

an insight as to how best to accomplish further workplans and how to deal with the requirements needed during the implementation phase .

Bulgaria:
As a country in the process of developing a national biosafety legislation and with no experience in the field of transfer, handling and use of LMOs resulting from the modern biotechnology, we consider the Action Plan very useful as providing a clear scheme to be followed. Developed on the base of the Government submissions regarding capacity-building needs and gaps, the Action Plan is very objective, although the existence of differences between the countries. Assessment of the present situation concerning LMOs in Bulgaria had been done, and as a consequence was avoided duplication of the efforts made in the frame of on-going projects and the twinning project, which
will start by the end of the year.

Cambodia:
1. Harmonize national policy on biosafety with Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
2. Gain institutional capacity to develop framework for biosafety and biotechnology handling
3. Gain coordination at the national level
4. Promote public understanding in Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and risk from LMOs
5.Develop mechanism for RA and RM

Chad:
Le Tchad a mis sur pied le Point Focal biosécurité et a initié un projet pour l'élaboration de son cadre national mais malheureusement est parmi les pays qui ne doivent pas bénéficier de l'aide extérieure jusqu'à 2006. Les ressources du pays étant limités, il est pratiquement difficile d'évoluer sans compter sur cette aide extérieure. La volonté est là mais les moyens de mise en œuvre du Protocole font défaut.

Cuba:
Desarrollo del marco jurídico y administrativo.
Desarrollo de los Recursos Humanos de la Autoridad Nacional.
Desarrollo de los mecanismos de control para el cumplimiento de la legislación.
Desarrollo de las capacidades para el intercambio reinformación.
Identificación de las necesidades de creación de capacidad y prioridades.
Elaboración de un Plan de Implementación para el Protocolo de Cartagena.

Egypt:
Without implementation support from the GEF, progress will be extremely slow

Ethiopia:
- Understanding of the biosafety protocol obligations.
- Harmonization of biosafety framework with national and regional ones,
- Improved awareness on biosafety issues.
- Improved access and transfer of information.

European Community:
There is no specific experience, so far, related to the implementation of the Action Plan for the reasons mentioned above (Q 1 and 2). However, one of the apparent difficulties for the EC as potential donor of capacity-building activities is that biosafety concerns are, in general, not prioritized in country strategy papers of potential recipient countries, although they could be addressed under the general funding lines for EC development cooperation.

Particularly relevant appear to be training courses and materials related to detection and identification of LMOs and dialogues between government officials to exchange experience in implementing domestic biosafety frameworks.

Finland:
The institutional capacities were in place to a great extent before the adoption of the Action Plan. However, assistance of capacity building activities is still in the planning phase in Finland.

Guinea:
Not applicable.

Hungary:
The effective implementation of the Action Plan is hampered by financial constrains and also the lack of enlargement of the biosafety staff.

India:
Capacity building exercises gave an insight to the needs and gaps of the public awareness at the farmer's and enforcement level. The training of the technical personal also needs to be carefully selected and trained to address various issues of biosafety.

Indonesia:
During the implementation of the action plan, we found that coordination amongst stakeholder, financial resources, infrastructures, qualified personnel and the ability to access new information technology such by the internet is very important. Therefore to achieve effective implementation of the Action Plan, a strong government commitment to provide facilities, funding and continuous support to human resources development is a must.

Iran (Islamic Republic of):
During the action plan some collaboration between different related ministries and organizations created. A good number of biotechnologists and stakeholders got familiar with Biosafety and Cartagena Protocol. The required laws and regulations were discussed and their drafts were prepared and the required administrative system for performing biosafety activities was discussed and is being implemented.

Lao PDR:
Lao National Biosafety Framework has been established and we need to have a financial support to implement it in all aspects.

Latvia:
During the implementation of the action plan activities the effectiveness and adequacy of existing capacity at national level were assessed. There were identified gaps in the national biosafety framework as well as activities should be taken for improvement in the future.

Liberia:
The Action Plan has served as a guide and reminder in the implementation of the Protocol.

Lithuania:
The recent consecutive national preparatory activities to implement the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety have enabled, facilitated and supported national institutions (competent authorities) to concentrate, develop & strengthen internal capacities to prepare the requisite constituent parts of the NBF in Lithuania:

- Designation of national focal points and relevant competent authorities, strengthening their institutional, administrative and technical capacities and capabilities;

- Development of national regulatory framework (transposing the main requirements of the EU Acquis and Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety), incl. the frame Law on GMOs & drafted pieces of secondary legislation;
- Development of administrative system to handle notifications, including risk assessment and requests for authorization in decision making;
- Introduction of proposals to be included into the national environmental monitoring program and respective enforcement mechanisms;
- Organization of broader participatory framework, based upon existing regulations on public information and participation (national seminars, trainings); technical set up of a national Biosafety database (nBCH), which has been used for topical Biosafety information management and dissemination;
- Communication of the aggregated identified national Biosafety capacity-building needs and priorities, and their review to the CBD Secretariat.

Mexico:
Many of the activities in the action plan required the coordination of different competent authorities at the national level, this was particularly achieved during the formulation and implementation of the GEF project. During the implementation of the GEF project activities identified for the Ministry of Health were not approved by the financing agency. We learn that we should all be included since many issues on biosafety have to do with human health and it is one of the subjects that the general public is worried about. More cooperation is needed between parties and institutions on information sharing. Specifically, methods for detection and identification of particular events of LMOs is necessary

Mozambique:
Some pubic awareness activities; Development of the Draft National Biosafety Framework

Nigeria:
Largely the action plan has not bee achieved due to lack of capacity i.e. lack of legal framework, funds and the need to have enough time to put in place all relevant structures. There is largely also lack of awareness on the part of the public.

Norway:
Cooperation project with Zambia (record ID 8447) has not been finalized and evaluated yet. We will come back to this question when we have gained more experience with implementing the Action Plan.

Poland:
We acquired knowledge on how to enable public access to biosafety information, including through the Registers providing at the national Database and the BCH. Our country introduced suitable legislative frameworks to ensure public awareness and participation encompassing living modified organisms intended for deliberate release into environment. Implementation of the Action Plan delivered us information on capacity for risk assessment and scientific expertise indispensable for applications clarification. The polish Government made decision to prepare legislative and regulatory framework conformed to standards required by the Protocol.

Slovakia:
The main experiences were gained in the field of: policy making on the state administrative level, public information, building of legislative and administrative structures and international cooperation.

Slovenia:

Action plan gave us very broad subject list to consider during development of national biosafety system for implementation of CP. It proved to be useful check point to use. It is not specific enough to support the implementation efforts within the country.

Sweden:
The achievements of BIO-EARN in Phase I & II are presented in the answer to question 4 above.

Tajikistan:
During last 3 years the base for Cartagena Protocol implementation was established. For further capacity-building the needs assessment was conducted with participation of all stakeholders and the project proposal for implementation of the National Biosafety Framework of Republic of Tajikistan was developed for submission to UNEP-GEF.

Thailand:
Thailand has not yet fully implemented the Action Plan.

United States of America:
Capacity building efforts are challenged to assist countries with a wide range of needs to improve countries' capabilities to meet their obligations under the Protocol. In order to prioritize activities, we would urge that consideration be given to the differing needs of Parties in terms of the type and number of LMOs that are likely to be imported in the near term. For many Parties, there will be very few imports of LMOs for environmental release in the next 5-10 years. In the near term, the majority of LMO imports will be for food, feed or processing (LMO-FFP) or for research purposes. By incorporating these timelines into capacity building efforts, countries may pursue an incremental approach to development of biosafety frameworks, as they gain experience with the technology and regulating the technology.

Zimbabwe:
The implementation of the Action Plan requires inputs from all stakeholders at both national and international levels. Critical challenges are faced in trying to provide adequate funding for all the components of the Action Plan. A regional approach to development and implementation of biosafety frameworks promotes collaboration and harmonisation. Capacity for risk assessment, risk management and communication remain the challenge because of limited resources.

Organizations:

UNU-IAS
Although the above questions are directed primarily to national focal points, the UNU-IAS Assessment on Ongoing Efforts to Build Capacity for Biosafety and Biotechnology involves four country visits and a desktop review that will discuss trends observed on many of the issues raised above. (UN University, Institute of Advanced Studies).

Global Industry Coalition
It is our experience that Parties are in significant and immediate need of capacity building assistance in a number of areas that will allow them to comply with their Protocol obligations. It is concerning that the majority of Parties are not in compliance with their obligations over two years after entry into force of the Protocol.

PPRI
It is crucial to: (i) have needs assessment carried out by independent experts before any activity starts; (ii) assess whether similar projects have been carried out or planned; and (iii) assess whether earlier projects did or did not achieve the objectives and what the reasons were for this. Furthermore, capacity building is only meaningful if there is a demonstrated willingness of the Govt. involved to ensure continuity.

10. What critical capacity-building elements (needs or gaps), which are not addressed in the current Action Plan, would you strongly recommend to be included? *(Please list in the order of priority)*. (*Comments were received from 22 respondents (48%); 24 respondents (52%) did not answer the question).*

Armenia:
- Having laboratories and equipments for scientific researches
- Monitoring responsibility in Biosafety field.

Belarus:
We think, that all the main capacity-building elements are addressed in the current Action Plan

Belize:
- Training of laboratory personnel in LMO detection methods
- Risk Assessment/Risk Management practicals

Cambodia:
- Individual and Institutional RM and RM expertise and tool
- LMOs detector facilities
- Legal framework development
- Harmonization of biosafety framework development
- Exchange of information regarding the LMOs release into the environment

Ethiopia:
Development and/or strengthening of Institutional technical capacity.

European Community:
The Action Plan as it currently stands seems comprehensive in its coverage. Gaps in implementation seem to stem primarily from deficiencies at national level (see Q 11 below).

Guinea:
Not applicable.

India:
- Strengthening of biosafety laboratories with adequate equipments & training.
- Public awareness at the grass-root level

Iran (Islamic Republic of):
- Teaching and training a few experts are needed strongly. Performing a few workshops with the duration of 1 to 3 days were not enough. In those workshops some general knowledge about biosafety was gained which is more suitable for public and some stakeholders. Training a few experts for different parts of Protocol especially risk assessment and risk management is very necessary. I suggest that instead of performing many workshops some budget is allocated to train some experts in specific subjects in longer and more specific workshops on biosafety.
- Capacity building for inter-institutional activities.
- Capacity building for regional and sub-regional collaboration through meetings, regional workshops and networking

Lao PDR:

- Human Resource Development and Infrastructure on Biotechnology and Biosafety Issues.

Latvia:
All key elements needed for successful implementation of the Cartagena protocol on Biosafety are included in the Action Plan.

Lithuania:
The MoE, acting as the National Competent Authority, has reviewed the effectiveness and adequacy of existing interim capacities developed in Lithuania during the period of 2001-2005 and has identified the following priority Capacity- building activities, which need to be addressed onwards:
- Further development and training of human resources in diverse specialized Biosafety-related fields;
- Enhanced synergies for scientific, technical and institutional collaboration at (sub) regional and international levels, thus further promoting the co-ordination of capacity-building initiatives;
- Effective and efficient information exchange and data management (further development of nBCH) ensuring further thematic information sharing throughout the Biosafety Clearing House mechanism;
- Detection, testing, quantitative analysis and monitoring of GMOs (tools and support materials);
- Set up of appropriate documentation systems for GMOs shipments, i.e. scientific and technical co-operation mechanisms with other Parties' of CPB responsible institutions concerned;
- Support for calculation and assessment of cost-benefit analysis, review of ethical considerations and relevance of GMOs in addressing societal needs, e.g. food security and nutritional requirements, etc.

Mexico:
Inclusion of human health issues counting training for risk assessment would strengthen public recognition of the Cartagena protocol.

Mozambique:
All relevant elements included but the there was very little progress in the implementation

Nigeria:
- Public awareness
- Institution Capacity
- Ability to detect GMOs
- Strengthening BCH office

Norway:
See comment to question 9

Poland:
- Confidential information – in the context of public participation and need to provide open policy on LMOs.
- Illegal transboundary movements of LMOs - emergency measures and measures to prevent and penalize in case of contravention of domestic and international regulations.

Slovenia:
Ensuring strong national political support in terms of setting biosafety high on the priority list and commitment of all involved competent authorities.

United States of America:
Though addressed in the current Action Plan, the ability to carry out decisions under the Protocol is a key area where capacity building efforts should be focused, and this should be a priority of capacity building efforts. In particular, capacity building in risk assessment and the ability of countries to access and use

the Biosafety Clearinghouse are central to effective implementation of the Protocol. The recently released draft report of the evaluation of GEF support reinforces the need to support more in-depth training in risk assessment. The BCH is an important source of technical information to assist countries with risk assessment under AIA and in handling LMOs for food, feed or processing. Capacity building efforts should focus on ensuring that developing countries have access to, and are able to supply information to the BCH, and can make use of this information in decision-making.

Organizations:

UN University, Institute of Advanced Studies
See question 9.

Global Industry Coalition
As more governments develop regulatory systems and engage in science-based risk assessments following entry into force of the Protocol, they require concrete and reliable information about biosafety research. Awareness of the nature and results of the extensive and growing body of biosafety research will be critical to build capacities necessary for effective implementation of the Protocol, including a number of key capacity building elements of the Action Plan such as legislative and policy frameworks, monitoring and assessment mechanism, human resources development and training, and information exchange and data management.

PRRI
See answers 1 and 3 to question 9

11. In your view what, if any, are the main constraints that have hampered the effective implementation of the Action Plan? *(Comments were received from 33 respondents (72%); 13 respondents (28%) did not answer the question).*

Armenia:
The absence of fund mechanism and lack of experience.

Austria:
Not enough trainers, limited timeframe of projects, no follow-up programs or long-term support

Belize:
- Full time dedication to Biosafety
- Information on Regional updates in Biosafety

Bulgaria:
The main constrains we find at the national level – namely the strong need of strengthening of the institutional, administrative and financial capacity. Although providing with priorities and timeframes, Action Plan is not implemented effectively because of the lack of resources, which cannot be overcame in a relatively short period of time. The insufficiency of funds, determines the gradually increase of the administrative capacity, in order to get the necessary training and experience.

Cambodia:
- Capacity development
- Law enforcement
- Poverty reduction
- Lack of understanding in risk from LMOs

Chad:
Les contraintes se résument au manque quasi total de moyens de mise en œuvre du protocole

Cuba:
Limitaciones financieras para desarrollar la capacidad completa para la implementación del Protocolo. Falta de experiencia y claridad a nivel internacional en algunos temas como la implementación del artículo 18 y la evaluación de riesgos.

Egypt:
Absence of funding from GEF

Ethiopia:
Starting low capacity in human resources and in equipment.

European Community:
Existing constraints appear to include:
- Level and quality of information on capacity-building in BCH
- Lack of donor initiatives to support biosafety capacity-building in areas not covered by UNEP/GEF-projects
- Low level of coordination/ synergies amongst existing initiatives outside UNEP/ GEF projects
- Low priority to biosafety issues in country strategy papers of potential recipient countries.

Guinea:
Not applicable.

Hungary:
Mainly financial constrains and the need on the enlargement of the biosafety staff hampered the effective implementation of the Action Plan.

India:
The Capacity Building Project is still under implementation

Indonesia:
Yes, there are. Lack of coordination amongst stakeholder, limited of officer capacity, lack of stakeholder knowledge on the existing regulatory regime on biosafety and limited budget from our government to implement the action plan are the main constraints that have hampered the effective implementation of the action plan.

Iran (Islamic Republic of):
- These kind of action plan has to get executive power from the performing government. Also progress of the action plan has to be supervised by the provider of budget more precisely.
- Lack of management of expertise for inter-institutional activities.
- Lack of communication among regional states.

Lao PDR:
Funding resources

Latvia:
The main constraints that have hampered the effective implementation of the Action Plan were identified in the draft for development of National biosafety framework and mainly related to the lack of

administrative capacity on national level in practice implementing established framework and human resources development.

Liberia:
Lack of financial and technical capacities

Lithuania:
The following listed issues should be taken into account in order to mitigate and eliminate possible obstacles and constraints for the effective implementation of an Action plan:
- Ownership: each capacity-building effort and initiative should have a clear dimension of a country's demands driven;
- Timing: each capacity activity should be considered in terms of well-tuned timing on case by case basis;
- Stakeholders: the capacity building activities should be taken into account on WHO, HOW and WHEN should be involved on a case by case basis;
- Tools employed: each individual capacity building method should be tailored according to the concrete contemporary capacity-building needs identified by the national competent authority (-ies).

Mexico:
- Environmental and socio-economic complexity of the country.
- Stakeholders with confronted points of view, pressure for different approaches on biosafety.
- Major exporters of LMOs are not parties of the Protocol.
- Lack of information for monitoring and insufficient human resources

Moldova:
During the implementation of the provisions of the Protocol the following difficulties have been faced:
- The weak integration of Protocol requirements in the sector policies
- The scientific researches don't cover the entire spectrum of biosafety, often the acquired information is broken up and can't serve as an argument to elaborate recommendations according to the present requirements
- The lack of understanding of the complexity of problems regarding the biosafety
- Lack of action by the responsible organs in the implementation of the respective activities
- Lack of highly-qualified specialists in the field
- Insufficient financial support
- Lack of a monitoring and control system for GMOs

Mozambique:
Adequate funds, technical and human resources and infra-structures

Nigeria:
Funding

Norway:
See comment to question 9

Poland:

- Insufficient funding for biosafety activities coming from the national budgetary - it arises from limited financial resources in the polish budget. Government and society are favourable to biosafety but economic conditions don't let allocate enough money for all relevant purposes.
- Not many local experts being used in undertaking activities related to the implementation of the Protocol – there are properly educated and experienced experts who are able to undertake biosafety activities but it involves considerable expenses.

Slovakia:
Influence of socio-economic and political considerations

Slovenia:
Lack of resources – mainly human.

Sudan:
Funding sources

Tajikistan:
- Lack of finance resources and required expertise.
- Lack of specific literature on Russian.

Zimbabwe:
- Availability of financial resources
- Poor telecommunication infrastructure

Organizations:

UNU-IAS
See answer to question 9

Global Industry Coalition
Again, better coordination of efforts is required. (GIC)

PRRI
The lack of political will of donors to redirect their activities when they know that other governments or organisations are already doing similar work in a certain recipient country.

12. What measures would you propose to address the constraints and gaps encountered in the implementation of the Action Plan? *(Comments were received from 29 respondents (63%); 17 respondents (27%) did not answer the question).*

Armenia:
The adoption and improvement of legislative field

Austria:
"train the trainers" programs, funding for long term co-operation, incentives for experts going to the countries

Belize:
- Support to include Biosafety as an essential component in the Competent Authority workplans
- More collaborative work with regional competent authorities/focal points on biosafety issues

Bulgaria:
At the moment we consider most of our constraints and gaps addressed by the on-going GEF-UNEP Project for the implementation of the biosafety legislation and the starting Twinning Project. Bulgaria has started to increase the administration, involved in the field of LMOs, and the subsequent training is envisaged in the frames of these two projects.

Cambodia:
- Mainstreaming LMOs policy into national policy and sectoral policy
- Propose investment projects for capacity development of relevant agencies
- Public awareness and participation in LMOs release into the environment

Chad:
Nous souhaitons vivement de revoir le cas du Tchad pour lui permettre de se mettre au meme diapason que les autres Etats signataires du Protocole de Cartagena

Cuba:
- Extender el mandato del GEF hacia el completamiento de las capacidades necesarias para la implementación del Protocolo.
- Lograr un mayor apoyo financiero en la colaboración regional y subregional para el uso y desarrollo de las capacidades de cada región.

Ethiopia:
- Training
- Establishment of laboratories

European Community:
Raising level of attention to biosafety and related capacity-building needs in both donor and recipient countries.

Guinea:
Not applicable.

India:
- Intensive public awareness and participation process
- Effective Biosafety Clearing House
- Biosafety laboratories/institutions need to be adequately equipped and trained

Indonesia:
Several capacity building requirements in the area of biosafety especially to implement the Cartagena Protocol are set to enhance the capacity for effective implementation at local and national level. For the budget constraint, we propose to GEF, FAO and other donors to support our activities.

Iran (Islamic Republic of):
- Training and providing guidelines or inter-institutional activities.
- Organizing regional meetings. Workshops and so on.
- Providing guidelines for regional collaborations.

Lao PDR:
Lao National Biosafety Law should be adopt by Lao National Assembly and should be implement by all related regulations and technical guidelines.

Latvia:
For the effective implementation of the action plan the main measures should be devoted to the strengthening the capacity of competent authorities in practice:
- improving the knowledge of legal as well as technical requirements of experts in the field of biosafety and risk assessment;
- elaborating effective methodical skills to promote quality in the different levels of authorization processes, monitoring and control;
- reviewing financial resources allocated for expertise in the process of risk assessment;
- improving the knowledge of experts in the field of biosafety in respect to monitoring of environmental effects of using GMO;
- developing infrastructure for GMO detection; and
- enhancing the coordination mechanisms for capacity building initiatives at the national level.

Liberia:
Timely consideration to address capacity- building needs should be given to parties that qualify to receive such assistance to avoid gaps implementation of the Action Plan.

Lithuania:
More attention should be paid for coordinating of relevant measures at national level consequently planning the following measures of (sub) regional and international initiatives and activities:
- to coordinate and harmonize legislative and regulatory mechanisms (i.e. international rules and procedures) in the field of Liability and Redress;
- to make attempts in unifying procedures of Risk Assessment and Risk Management according to the requirements of the CPB to the CBD and respective EU Directive 2001/18/EC;
- to consider relevant modalities of developing standards with regard to accompanying documents necessary for identification, handling, packaging and transport services of GMOs.

Mexico:
Maintain sources of funding for activities that are not achieved yet or partially achieved
To involve local communities interested in generating knowledge on monitoring mechanisms
Information sharing on methods for detection and identification of LMOs.

Mozambique:
Mobilisation of resources

Norway:
See comment to question 9

Poland:
Main constraints in the implementation of the Action Plan (financial) depend on domestic policy. When the new act "Law on genetically modified organisms", including among other regulations on public participation, comes into force it shall make possible the increasing of our budgetary means for education including for average citizens. It is a feedback. More public awareness = effective pressure on government to adapt financial framework for other critical and expensive capacity-building elements.

Slovenia:
Hiring additional temporary support until effective implementation is achieved (Estimation for SI: 2-3 years, 2 additional people). We would need to find additional financial source for that.
We have benefited a lot from sharing experiences with other countries. Many times goals were achieved quicker by learning from the experiences of other with operational biosafety systems in place.

Spain:
To improve the level of effectiveness of identification systems and measures in ensuring a safe transboundary movements of LMOs: Control accompanying documentation, specially for shipments.

Sudan:
Funding for implementation phase of the national framework.

Tajikistan:
finance support from donors organizations and developed countries. Conducting of trainings and workshops.

Zimbabwe:
More resources should be made available for the effective implementation of the Action Plan.

Organizations:

UNU-IAS
See answer to question 9

Global Industry Coalition
We would recommend that more coordination of existing capacity building effort is required and recognize the efforts of the coordination committee in this respect.

PRRI
Agreement at political level (COPs/MOPs). (PRRI)

13. In general, what other revisions and improvements to the Action Plan, if any, would you propose and what existing opportunities could be taken into account? *(Comments were received from 18 respondents (39%); 28 respondents (61%) did not answer the question).*

Armenia:
Public awareness and improvement of specialists

Belize:
More involvement with focal points in the development of action plans for future work

Cambodia:
Mechanism for information flow and participation of LCDs in the international arena for biodiversity and biosafety issues

Chad:
Le cadre n'étant pas mis sur place, il est difficile de proposer quoi que se soit pour reviser telle ou telle partie;

Egypt:
GEF as well as the ES Regional Commissions of the UN should catalyze regional coordination

Germany:

Based on the information provided in the questionnaires and the results of the reviews that were realized during the last months, and taking into consideration the needs and gaps identified by the parties, the future action plan should focus on a set of key priorities.

Guinea:
Not applicable.

Iran (Islamic Republic of):
- As it was mentioned earlier training at PhD level or longer duration workshops has to be considered in the allocating of action plan budget.
- Organizing practical Biosafety workshops.
- Organizing GMO detection training courses.
- Providing facilities and procedures for GMO detection.

Lao PDR:
The first should be adopt, the second should be implement and the third must be revise.

Latvia:
The Parties should be more active for taking the opportunities offered by the CBD to improve their national biosafety frameworks. There should be developed and strengthened the national system for active and effective participation on CBD activities.

Mexico:
In relation to identification of LMOs, mechanisms for access to information are crucial for implementing several provisions of the Cartagena protocol

Mozambique:
Improvement of the implementation mechanisms and strategies

Norway:
See comment to question 9

Poland:
We haven't got any other revisions and improvements to the Action Plan.

Thailand:
Consider the practicality with the appropriate timeframe

Organizations:

UNU-IAS
See answer to question 9

Global Industry Coalition
The Action Plan tends to blur the line between capacity building for biosafety in general and biosafety for LMOs that may have an adverse effect on the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. Ensuring an adequate level of biosafety for genetically modified crops is only a small part of biosafety – many biosafety concerns, including pathogens in food and contamination of drinking water for example, must also be addressed by governments as part of biosafety (though they are not relevant to the Biosafety Protocol).

PRRI

Continuous, independent review of the quality and results of capacity building projects by people/organziations who are not involved in capacity building themselves.

B: THE COORDINATION MECHANISM

14. Has your Government or organization established mechanisms to coordinate different biosafety capacity-building activities?	Yes	No	NR
	24 (52%)	16 (35%)	6 (13%)
If yes, please briefly describe them (Please attach additional documents, if available, or provide a website where they can be obtained). *(Comments were received from 27 respondents (59%); 19 respondents (41%) did not answer the question).*			

Austria:
We have just started to assess possibilities (e.g. with GTZ Germany)

Belarus:
The National Co-ordination Biosafety Centre was established according the Resolution No. 963 of June 19, 1998 of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus. In accordance with the Resolution No. 734 of 5 June 2002 of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus "On Measures for Implementation of the Provisions of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity", the Institute of Genetics and Cytology of the NAS of Belarus, performing the functions of the National Co-ordination Biosafety Centre, was designated as the national focal point, responsible for liaison with the Secretariat of the Protocol. The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection (in the part of the functions related to release of living modified organisms into the environment) and the Ministries of Health Protection and Agriculture and Food (for the issues of using living modified organisms in economic activities) were designated as competent authorities.

Belize:
Competent authority coordinates biosafety activities with CBD focal point and ministry of agriculture and uses opportunities to put the biosafety agenda in agricultural health and food safety for a held nationally and internationally. Website being developed

Bulgaria:
In the GMO Act are foreseen a number of joint activities involving different competent authorities. These include decision-making and inspection. http://bch.biodiv.org/database/record.aspx?id=8409

Cambodia: (answered No)
No, but developed a proposal for capacity building of NBF implementation

Cuba:
Estas actividades se coordinan a través de la Autoridad Nacional y el Punto Focal para el Protocolo de Cartagena.

Egypt:
An inter-ministerial committee was established by the Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs

Ethiopia:

In the National Capacity building Need Self Assessment Project some aspects of biosafety capacity building needs have been included.

European Community:
Capacity-building activities relating to biosafety are coordinated between different services of the European Commission through consultation amongst services involved.

Finland:
The development aid projects are coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Guinea:
National Competent Authority
National Coordinating Committee
National Focal Point

Hungary:
The Ministry of Environment and Water is responsible for the operation of the Hungarian Biosafety website, for the improvement of the legislative framework regarding the Protocol, for the enlargement of the administrative framework regarding the Protocol, for the strengthening the cooperation between the decision makers and stakeholders. The Ministry of Environment and Water also provides financial support for certain scientific institutions for biosafety research.

Iran (Islamic Republic of):
A National Biosafety Council has been formed. In the next step ministerial committees will be formed.

Lao PDR:
The National Focal Point and competent national authority to Cartagena Protocol has been nominated and act as secretariat to National Committee on Biosafety.

Latvia:
In accordance with National regulation all issues related to biosafety should be discussed and agreed by the GMO working group composed from the representatives of responsible ministries and non-governmental institutions. Besides, the government mandate was given to the Monitoring Council of GMOs and Novel Foods to coordinate the issues related to risk assessment and other scientific and technical expertise in the field of biosafety.

Lithuania:
The MoE has established several administrative instruments and institutional mechanisms (consultative-coordinating bodies) to steer different Biosafety Capacity-building activities on national level. Those are the national consultative committees on GMOs issues: (1) GMOs' Steering (Regulatory) Committee (SC) and (ii) GMOs' Experts Committee (EC).

The GMO SC is a political advisory body for the development and enactment of national administrative and regulatory system with respect to Biosafety issues. The Committee consists of wide range members appointed by relevant state authorities (ex. Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Health, State Food and Veterinary Service, National Bioethics Committee, NGOs, etc.).

Among the main tasks of GMO SC (Regulatory management Committee) is to advise national competent authorities, responsible for implementation of an enforcement of drafted legal acts, EU regulations and Directives, international binding Agreements (CPB to the Convention on Biological Diversity); to initiate development and discussions on strategic biotechnology and Biosafety regulatory programs in

environmental protection, health care, agriculture, etc. The GMO EC is a consultative advisory body with a clear task to act as advisor to the Competent Authorities giving an advice in handling and scrutinizing notifications and requests for the contained use, experimental releases of GMOs at national level, deliberate release into environment and/or placing to the market of GMOs.

Mexico:
The CIBIOGEM and inter-ministerial commission on biosafety coordinates different activities related with LMOs. The recently approved Law of Biosafety enforces the creation of additional mechanisms that are I construction.

Mozambique:
National Biosafety Working Group (GIIBS)

Poland:
In Poland the central governmental administrative authority competent on GMOs related issues is the Minister of the Environment. He cooperates with the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development competent on issues of commercial cultivation of transgenic plants and coexistence between GM and non-GM agricultural planting and the placing on the market GM feed and the Chief Sanitary Inspector responsible for food and of food products containing, consisting of or produced from GMOs. In practice the cooperation consists in mutual reviewing and giving opinions on documentation by all authorities responsible for different domains related to GMO issues. The authority which plays main role at the moment (for example Chief Sanitary Inspector in relation to applications on GM food) gathers and takes into consideration comments from other. Such consultations enable us to provide coherent policy on GMOs.

Spain:
"Programa Araucaria": cooperación española para la conservación de la biodiversidad y el desarrollo sostenible en Ibero América: http://www.aeci.es/9-Proyectos/Araucaria/index.htm

Tajikistan:
Establishment of National Biodiversity and Biosafety Center and National Biosafety Commission.

UK:
The UK as a donor country to the Global Environment Facility has contributed US $190.07 million to the GEF 3 settlement. UNEP-GEF is currently running a global Development project assisting 123 countries to develop a draft national biosafety framework (NBF). Using a country-driven process, the global project will help each participating country to set up a framework for management of living modified organisms (LMOs) at the national level, allowing them to meet the requirements of the Cartagena Protocol and to promote regional and sub-regional collaboration and exchange of experience.

United States of America:
As a major supporter of biosafety capacity building efforts, the U.S. strongly supports coordination of our efforts with other bilateral and multilateral efforts, to avoid duplication and maximize efficiencies. To this end, the project managers for UNEP GEF and World Bank GEF projects both serve on the PBS External Advisory Board, , which provides oversight and guidance to this U.S. supported capacity building project, and we maintain regular communication, both directly and through our implementing partners, with other capacity building projects.

Organizations:

UNU-IAS

The Assessment mentioned above gathers information about existing coordination in capacity building that should provide data informing donors and others about gaps in coordination that currently exist. (UN University, Institute of Advanced Studies). We have created an Ad Hoc Group of experts on Biotechnology to address the issue of GMO, particularly in diagnostic and vaccines for infectious animal disease and zoonoses. We have also elaborated basic paper on the interaction between the Convention on Biological Diversity and the World Organisation for Animal Health, Rev. sci. tech. Off. Int. epiz., 2005, 24(1), 19-30 by C. Sendashonga, R. Hill and A. Petrini. (World Organisation for Animal Health)

Global Industry Coalition
GIC has established an inventory of biosafety capacity building efforts which we share widely within the private sector. This is used when considering new capacity building efforts to identify gaps and ensure coordination of efforts.

PRRI
In a case of a new biosafety capacity building activity, we 1) ask the country contact person what projects have been going on or are planned, 2) check the BCH, 3) check via Google.

15. How has your Government or organization participated in the following elements of the Coordination Mechanism, which was established by the COP-MOP in decision BS-I/5 (Annex IV)?	**Contributed information / attended**	**Used information from**	**Not applicable**	**No answer**	**Contributed and used information from**
a. Liaison Group on Capacity-Building for Biosafety	4 (9%)	9 (20%)	13 (28%)	18 (39%)	2 (4%)
b. Capacity-building databases	3 (7%)	15 (33%)	7 (15%)	16 (35%)	5 (11%)
c. Biosafety Information Resource Centre	4 (9%)	15 (33%)	10 (22%)	17 (37%)	0
d. Biosafety Capacity-Building Network	2 (4%)	10 (22%)	11 (24%)	21 (46%)	2 (4%)
e. Coordination meetings	7 (15%)	9 (20%)	11 (24%)	17 (37%)	2 (4%)
f. Reporting mechanism	6 (13%)	5 (11%)	12 (26%)	18 (39%)	4 (9%)

16. Has your Government or organization encountered any constraints/ limitations in participating in any of the elements of the Coordination Mechanism?	Yes	No	NA	NR
	11 (24%)	18 (39%)	7 (15%)	10 (22%)

17. If yes, please elaborate. *(Comments were received from 12 respondents (24%); 34 respondents (76%) did not answer the question).*

Austria:
Time constraints, other priorities

Cuba:
Ha existido falta de experiencia y de información en cuanto a este tipo de herramientas, lo que no nos ha permitido su mayor explotación.

Egypt:
Lack of necessary national infrastructure does not allow for use of information generated by meetings and obtained from the CBD site

Ethiopia:
Infrastructure and technical capacities limitations

Guinea:
Lack of financial sources

Lao PDR:
About funding problems.

Liberia: (answered No)
Our inability to fully participate has been due to lack of capacity.

Mexico:
Limited number of personal to operating several activities

Slovenia:
SI would like to see SI experts present more often in liaison groups.

United States of America:
The U.S. is interested in participating in the Liaison Group on Capacity Building for Biosafety, in order to better coordinate our projects with others.

Zimbabwe:
Infrastructure and resource constraints

Organisations:

PRRI
Yes, but minor, mostly related to the fact that searching something in the database is not easy, and I always use Google to check.

18. Have you found the following Coordination Mechanism elements, which you have participated in, useful?	**Yes**	**Not very useful**	**Somewhat useful**	**Not applicable**	**No answer**
a. Liaison Group on Capacity-Building for Biosafety	8 (17%)	2 (4%)	4 (9%)	13 (28%)	19 (41%)
b. Capacity-building databases	14 (31%)	2 (4%)	9 (20%)	7 (15%)	14 (30%)

c. Biosafety Information Resource Centre	11 (24%)	2 (4%)	9 (20%)	8 (17%)	16 (35%)
d. Biosafety Capacity-Building Network	8 (18%)	2 (4%)	5 (11%)	12 (26%)	19 (41%)
e. Coordination meetings	13 (28%)	2 (4%)	1 (2%)	12 (26%)	18 (39%)
f. Reporting mechanism	8 (17%)	2 (4%)	6 (13%)	11 (24%)	19 (41%)

19. Please provide suggestions for improving the implementation and effectiveness of the Coordination Mechanism. *(Comments were received from 11 respondents (24%); 35 respondents (76%) did not answer the question).*

Chad:
Il faudrait absolument que le cadre national de mise en œuvre du Protocole de Cartagena soit mis en place et opérationnel.sans cela tout s'avère impossible à réaliser

Ethiopia:
Creating appropriate opportunity and building capacity for effective participation.

European Community:
Enhance level and quality of information on capacity-building in BCH; seek to achieve broader level of participation of project partners from both donor and recipient side at coordination meetings.

Finland:
Information should be updated regularly in the databases.

Germany:
The search modus in the capacity building projects database cannot really identify the projects implemented or planned in one country. If you search the records e.g. for Algeria, 43 records are found, but already the second and the third search results do not address capacity building activities in Algeria. Therefore, the search modus does not work very effective and should be improved

India:
The Project Coordination Unit in the MoEF of the GEF-World Bank Biosafety Capacity Building Project need to be involved in the Coordination Mechanism process.

Lao PDR:
Funding should be made available.

Sweden:
The primary goal of the coordination meetings is to facilitate the sharing of knowledge, views and operational experience between different organizations regarding their biosafety capacity building activities. Sweden believes that is it important that there are possibilities for meetings there both donor organizations and receiving countries are participating. That is needed for a good dialogue.
Another important aspect is possibility for regional cooperation and south-to-south dialogue.

United States of America:
Coordination mechanisms put into place by the Secretariat should be cost-effective, minimally burdensome and of high quality. We note that some of the information resources are out of date, incomplete and/or appear to be minimally used. With the wealth of existing information resources, the Secretariat should carefully consider the value and utility of various components of the coordination mechanism.

Zimbabwe:
Broader stakeholder representation is key.

Organizations:

PRRI
The problem is not with the coordination mechanisms itself, but with the fact that still organisations and Governments do not fill in the information. Have no real suggestions how to improve that other than asking someone who knows the field to chase people and fill it in.

C: THE ROSTER OF EXPERTS

20. Have you ever accessed or used the roster of experts for any purpose?	Yes	No	NR
	18 (39%)	23 (50%)	5 (11%)

21. Has your country nominated experts to the roster? 7/	Yes	No	NR
	20 (43%)	17 (41%)	5 (17%)

Organizations (4): NA

22. If you answered yes to question 20, how often and for what purpose? *(Comments were received from 18 respondents (39%); 28 respondents (61%) did not answer the question).*

Armenia: Was invited experts two times for risk assessment and risk management and regulatory system.

Belarus: Ones (to provide the information on the nominated national experts

Belize: Once to provide training and share experience on Risk Assessment /Legal framework of the New Zealand Biosafety model

Finland: We are in a process to nominate experts to the roster

Hungary: Occasionally only

India: This is in the process.

Japan: 1-2 times/year. To refer for nomination from the other countries.

7/ It should be noted that organizations cannot nominate experts to the roster so the number of responses to this question relate to Governments only and the percentages are calculated against the total number of Governments that responded (42).

Lao PDR: According to external project activities

Latvia: The roster of experts nave been accessed to explore what kind of expertise is available through BCH if needed. There were used the expertise offered by the Latvian experts.

Liberia: Risk assessment

Mexico: Not very often only to corroborate the inclusion of information.

Moldova: For getting informations

Tajikistan: Not often

Zimbabwe: Specialized consultancy work

Organizations:

UNU-IAS: To become familiar with numbers and type of experts available, as part of information collecting exercise.

PRRI: Mostly out of interest to see what types of experts are on there.

23. If you answered no to question 20, why have you not accessed or used the roster?	**No.**	**%**
a) I have no need to access or use the roster	18	39%
b) I would like to access or use the roster but I do not have internet access to the Biosafety Clearing-House or a hard copy of the roster	4	9%
c) Other: please specify	4	9%
d) No response (NR)	19	41%

The other reasons specified included the following:

Bulgaria: Up to the moment there was no need of using the roster.

Lithuania: Lithuania has employed local expertise from the national roster of experts on several cases. Thus, it was no need to access the international roster of experts yet.

Slovenia: We have cooperated with some of the experts listed in Roster of experts but through other project or on informal manner. We were very satisfied by their expertise.

Sudan: Acceded recently 11.09.2005, No applications

24. Are you aware that there is a fund available that will pay for the use of experts from the roster for developing country Parties and Parties with economies in transition?	Yes	No	NR
	28 (67%)	9 (21%)	5 (12%)

Organizations (4):
Yes: 3 No: 0 Non-responses: 1

25. Have you ever wanted to seek expert advice through the roster,	Yes	No	NR

but did not because of lack of funds?			
	6 (14%)	28 (67%)	8 (19%)

Organizations (4):
Yes: 0 No: 2 Non-responses: 2

26. Please comment on limitations to your use of the roster (tick all that apply):	**No.**	**%**
a) No limitations – the roster fulfils our needs.	8	19%
b) It is too early to seek expertise because we are still developing our national biosafety framework.	11	26%
c) There is not enough information on the experts listed in the roster to enable us to understand their expertise.	8	19%
d) The roster does not contain the expertise that we need.	1	2%
e) Other comments:	4	10%
Non-responses	15	36%

The specific comments made in response to this question are as follows:

Belize: We need to understand the mechanisms of how to access the Roster of Experts and who pays for such expertise.

India: India has been neither a party of import or export of LMOs. Therefore, one need to seek advice from ROC has not arisen.

Iran (Islamic Republic of): We have developed NBF but we are at the preliminary stages.

Lithuania: Lithuania has employed local expertise from the national roster of experts on several cases until recently. Thus, it was no need to access the international roster of experts yet.

27. Do you think that your Government may have increased need for expertise through the roster in the future?	Yes	No	NR
	26 (62%)	10 (24%)	6 (14%

28. Please provide any suggestions you may have for improving the roster, or for increasing awareness and use of the roster?

Armenia: System for handling notifications or requests for permits, monitoring and enforcement, public involvement, education, awareness raising and information.

Austria: Review its composition; establish clear criteria for the selection of experts.

Belize: Give examples of how developing countries have used the roster to provide some guidance as to what ways other countries can access the roster to their benefit

Cambodia: Cooperation; Coordination; Decision-making and planning

Cuba: Se debe especificar aún mas la información que aparece acerca de la experencia práctica de los expertos.

Ethiopia: Ethiopia is still developing its biosafety framework. There are no GMO trails in the country, and no GMOs are imported. Therefore, the biosafety system is only preparing for the future, in case the future uses GMOs in Ethiopia.

European Community: Spread leaflets at COP/MOP, organize side event, invite experts who have been asked for help to present the specific case to Parties at COP (e.g. by a presentation to plenary)

Lao PDR: Public Awareness and Participation

Latvia: Obviously, there should be increased interest to use the offered expertise, particularly to complement the national expertise when implementing activities related to risk assessment, human resources development and training in the future.

Lithuania: The MoE of the Republic of Lithuania, acting as the National Competent Authority for cross-thematic Biosafety sector, may have increased further need and interest for expertise from the roster of international experts.

Mexico: To ID experts that have been resolving problems with the implementation of specific provisions of the Cartagena Protocol.

USA: The U.S. has not nominated any experts to the roster. We recommend that the Secretariat establish criteria for selection of experts to be named on the roster, which would be subject to review. This would provide further confidence to potential users of the roster that experts are qualified to provide the expertise that is being sought.

Organizations:

Global Industry Coalition: The primary objective of the roster must remain to help Parties build their national and regional capacities in order to make informed, science-based decisions using the best assistance and advice possible. It is clear that a quality control system is required to monitor nominees to the roster in order to ensure that resources are being invested in individuals with the knowledge and demonstrated expertise to assist countries in their areas of need. Without such a system, the roster is seriously limited in its utility to countries in need of particular expertise. The GIC encourages Parties to consider creating such a system the roster so that countries using this roster do not have to bear the burden of sorting through the list to determine which experts truly have the required expertise. Such a system could include, for example, nomination forms that require a curriculum vitae of the nominee that provides detailed information on the nominee's relevant experience, as well as a listing of references who can vouch for an expert's applied experience in order to ensure that individuals nominated for the roster have a proved track record of experience in their area of specialty. Also, given the limited resources available to administer the roster and provide funding to experts where necessary, a measure of accountability could be created to evaluate the utility of consultations in terms of whether the requested support was provided. Lastly, in order to improve confidence in the objectivity of the roster of experts, the results of these consultations could be made public through the BCH for review by all interested Parties.

PRRI:
- Establish proper criteria as to what constitutes appropriate expertise for the different areas (perhaps even include an independent screening)
- Establish proper guidelines for the modus operandi for expert support and for the reporting of the expert support

- Place those reports on the CBD site (publishing is a very powerful tool to ensure some quality)
- Let independent experts review the job done by the experts consulted.

D: GENERAL COMMENTS

29. Please provide any other comments or recommendations not covered above.

Armenia:
Establish law, create system of management and regulatory mechanism, and develop administrative, institutional and scientific capacities to control and manage the import export, obtaining and use of LMOs.
Involve Armenia into bilateral and multilateral regional and international cooperation.

Belize:
The Government of Belize is committed in developing a NBF that is reflective of the realities of our nation. The parties involved has signaled their interest in having full participation of the public and the competent authority identified to take the leading role in the implementation of the Biosafety framework is keen to utilize the mechanisms established by CDB and its partners to help ensure that the NBF follows the principles of the Cartagena Protocol.

Cambodia:
Cambodia wishes to have an expert on biosafety, RA and RM. But we have not seen the proposal on Capacity building of NBF implementation yet.

Chad:
Le Tchad est un pays enclavé et pauvre. Les moyens font cruellement défaut pour mettre enplace son cadre national de biosécurité. Nous ne comptons que sur l'aide extérieure ne serait-ce que pour permettre de démarrer le système. Nos regards en ce moment sont tournés vers le Secrétariat de la Biodiversité pour lever la mésure de non assistance

Ethiopia:
Ethiopia is still developing its biosafety framework. There are no GMO trails in the country, and no GMOs are imported. Therefore, the biosafety system is only preparing for the future, in case the future uses GMOs in Ethiopia.

Guinea:
To facilitate the implementation of National Biosafety Frameworks in developing countries as well as their participation to the different meetings.

Indonesia:
In order to achieve effective implementation of the Action Plan, support financial resources from multilateral and bilateral donors and other donors to developing countries is very important. As a developing country, we hope that mechanisms and rules to get financial resources from the donors can be simplified and faster.

Japan:
It seems to be difficult for Biosafety Experts to give assistance needed for long time binding because they have their own duties.

Latvia:

We would very much appreciate the CBD secretariat work for bringing different kind of support (technical and financial) in the process of development of National biosafety framework.

Norway:
Please note that the answers to questions 5 and 6 above refers to our experiences with a bilateral cooperation project with Zambia (record ID 8447). Our input is based on our understanding of the outcomes of this project so far, but a more thorough evaluation of the project should be carried out in cooperation with Zambia before final conclusions on the outcomes can be drawn.

Sweden:
Due to the experiences from the program Sweden would like to stress the need to have a bottom –up approach. Countries and regions need to build up their own research capacity and institutional frameworks in order to assess their own needs and possible impact of GM technology. Many biotechnology research initiatives are largely focused on GM products to the field/market (concentrated on ag-biotech) and are short-term in nature. These initiatives are not likely to be successful in building long-term capacity in biotechnology and in the implementation of related policies.

United States of America:
As a major supporter of biosafety capacity building efforts, the U.S. strongly supports approaches that are efficient, sustainable and relevant to the needs of countries at different stages of technology development, incorporating several key points:

- Consideration of the use of existing legislation and regulation in the short term. By carefully considering existing legal authorities, the possibility of creating duplicative structures and authorities would be minimized, and the ability to draw upon expertise and capacity from ministries with existing authority would be improved.
- Encouragement of cross-governmental coordination. Due to the range of issues involved in implementation of regulatory frameworks for biotechnology, the involvement of all relevant ministries in the development of regulatory systems is critical to ensuring broad support and effective implementation.
- Access to high quality scientific expertise. The quality of technical advice, on scientific and legal matters, is of utmost importance to the success in developing capacity to implement science-based regulatory systems for biotechnology. The Secretariat should strive to ensure that capacity building efforts are adequate staffed to provide high quality expertise.

Organisations:

UNU-IAS:
As mentioned, many issues raised in this questionnaire are focused upon in the desktop review provided to the Secretariat, and will be further elaborated upon in reports of country visits under this assessment.

Global Industry Coalition:
We would like to be kept informed of all activities of the Convention in particular those related to biosafety in GMO's (World Organisation for Animal Health). Other comment on the roster have already been included in Section C.
