



CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY

1 EXPERT GROUP ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
2 AND SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL
3 COOPERATION
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7 TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION

8 COMPILATION AND SYNTHESIS OF INFORMATION ON INSTITUTIONAL,
9 ADMINISTRATIVE, LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS THAT FACILITATE
10 ACCESS TO AND ADAPTATION OF TECHNOLOGIES

11 *Note by the Executive Secretary*

12 SECOND INFORMAL DRAFT FOR REVIEW BY THE EXPERT GROUP – DO NOT QUOTE

13 1. Introduction

14 1. Article 16 of the Convention on Biological Diversity recognizes that both access to and transfer of
15 technology among Contracting Parties are essential elements for the attainment of the objectives of the
16 Convention, and requires that each Contracting Party undertakes to provide and/or facilitate access for
17 and transfer to other Contracting Parties of technologies that are relevant to the conservation and
18 sustainable use of biological diversity or make use of genetic resources and do not cause significant harm
19 to the environment.

20 2. In order to develop meaningful and effective action to enhance the implementation of Articles 16 to
21 19 as well as related provisions of the Convention, the Conference of the Parties, by decision VII/28,
22 adopted a programme of work on technology transfer and technological and scientific cooperation.
23 Element 3 of the programme of work provides for the creation of enabling environments in order to foster
24 technology transfer and technological and scientific cooperation.

25 3. Further to the objective of programme element 3, activity 3.1.2 of the programme of work calls upon
26 the Executive Secretary, based on input from Parties and relevant international organizations, to compile
27 and synthesize information, including case studies, and prepare guidance on institutional, administrative,
28 legislative and policy frameworks that facilitate access to and adaptation of technologies in the public
29 domain and to proprietary technologies, especially by developing countries and countries with economies
30 in transition, and in particular, on measures and mechanisms that:

- 1 (a) Foster an enabling environment in developing and developed countries for cooperation
2 as well as the transfer, adaptation and diffusion of relevant technologies in accordance
3 with the needs and priorities identified by countries;
- 4 (b) Present obstacles that impede transfers of relevant technologies from developed
5 countries;
- 6 (c) Provide, in accordance with existing international obligations, incentives to private-
7 sector actors as well as public research institutions in developed country Parties, to
8 encourage cooperation and transfer of technologies to developing countries, through,
9 e.g., technology transfer programmes or joint ventures;
- 10 (d) Promote and advance priority access for Parties to the results and benefits arising from
11 technologies based upon genetic resources provided by those Parties, in accordance with
12 Article 19, paragraph 2 of the Convention, and to promote the effective participation in
13 related technological research by those Parties;
- 14 (e) Promote innovative approaches and means of technology transfer and cooperation such
15 as Type 2 partnerships, in accordance with the outcome of the World Summit on
16 Sustainable Development, or transfer among actors, involving in particular the private
17 sector and civil society organizations.

18 4. By paragraph 7 of its decision VII/29, the Conference of the Parties (COP) requested the Executive
19 Secretary to establish an expert group on technology transfer and scientific and technical cooperation,
20 which shall assist, through electronic consultations and long-distance communications as well as through
21 meetings in conjunction with the informal advisory committee of the clearing-house mechanism, in the
22 preparation of proposals on options to apply the measures and mechanisms enumerated in the previous
23 paragraph.

24 5. Further to these requests, the Secretariat send notifications 32/2004 and 52/2004 on 30 April and 11
25 June 2004 respectively, inviting Parties and relevant international organizations to *inter alia* submit any
26 information on the frameworks as well as measures and mechanisms described above. Reminders were
27 sent on 23 September 2004 by notification 78/2004 and 79/2004. As of 1 April 2005, the following
28 Parties submitted pertinent information: Canada, China, Czech Republic, European Community,
29 Germany and the Islamic Republic of Iran. In addition, information was received and used from the
30 following international organizations: bioDevelopments International Institute, the Convention on
31 International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the Global Environment
32 Facility (GEF), the Task Force on Science and Technology of the United Nations Millennium Project, the
33 United Nations Environment Programme, the United Nations Forum on Forests, the United Nations
34 Framework Convention on Climate Change, the United Nations University, the World Conservation
35 Monitoring Centre (UNEP-WCMC) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).

36 6. The present note provides a synthesis of pertinent information as requested in activity 3.1.2 of the
37 programme of work. It shall serve as a basis for the development of proposals or guidance on
38 institutional, administrative, legislative and policy frameworks that facilitate access to and adaptation of
39 technologies in the public domain and to proprietary technologies, as requested by the Conference of the
40 Parties in the programme of work.

41 7. In light of the limited number of submissions received from Parties, the secretariat collected
42 additional information, including case studies, prepared by governments, multilateral organizations and
43 the private sector. Relevant information from the thematic reports on transfer of technology and
44 technology cooperation as well as other relevant national reports submitted by Parties was also taken into
45 consideration in the preparation of this note. This additional information is accessible on the provisional
46 webpages on technology transfer of the clearing house mechanism of the Convention (www.biodiv.org),

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1 which were established in accordance with activity 2.1.1 of the programme of work on technology
2 transfer and technological and scientific cooperation.

3 8. A first draft of the document was reviewed by the expert group on technology transfer and scientific
4 and technical cooperation, by way of electronic consultations.

5 **2. *Measures and mechanisms that foster an enabling environment for cooperation as well as the***
6 ***transfer, adaptation and diffusion of relevant technologies***

7 Activity 3.1.2 of the programme of work calls for the compilation and synthesis of information, including
8 case studies, on institutional, administrative, legislative and policy frameworks that facilitate access to
9 and adaptation of technologies in the public domain and to proprietary technologies, especially by
10 developing countries and countries with economies in transition, and in particular, inter alia, on measures
11 and mechanisms that foster an enabling environment in developing and developed countries for
12 cooperation as well as the transfer, adaptation and diffusion of relevant technologies in accordance with
13 the needs and priorities identified by countries.

14 *General considerations*

15 9. According to the preamble of element three of the programme of work, creating enabling
16 environments refers to activities of Governments at national and international levels that aim to create an
17 institutional, administrative, legislative and policy environment conducive to private and public sector
18 technology transfer and to the adaptation of transferred technology and that aim to remove technical,
19 legislative and administrative barriers to technology transfer and technology adaptation, inconsistent with
20 international law.

21 10. Conceptually, such activities can be distinguished according to whether they focus on fostering the
22 *provision* of technologies or on the *reception, adaptation and diffusion* of technologies. While many
23 countries may be mainly providing or mainly receiving technologies, it has to be borne in mind that
24 individual countries may sometimes simultaneously provide and receive technologies from abroad.
25 Hence, this distinction should not be misconceived to necessarily imply a differentiation into provider
26 and recipient countries. The preamble of programme element three recognizes that enabling
27 environments are necessary in both developed and developing countries as a tool to promote and
28 facilitate the successful and sustainable transfer of technologies for the purpose of the Convention on
29 Biological Diversity.

30 11. As explained in paragraph 1₁ above, the Convention identifies a specific set of technologies as being
31 of relevance to the Convention, namely, technologies that are relevant to the conservation and sustainable
32 use of biological diversity or make use of genetic resources and do not cause significant harm to the
33 environment. As regards *the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity*, relevant technologies may
34 include “soft” technologies, such as management techniques for *in-situ* conservation (for instance
35 integrated pest management) or technologies related to the sustainable management of biodiversity
36 resources (for instance sustainable forest management or integrated water management). They may also
37 include “hard” technologies, such as those used in *ex-situ* conservation (for instance, preservation and
38 storage technologies used in gene banks).^{1/} In addition, many monitoring technologies (for instance,
39 remote sensing) are key for updated and accurate biodiversity information, which is the very basis for
40 policy-making. As regards technologies that make use of genetic resources, many modern
41 biotechnologies will fall into this category. In this connection, there is a clear connection between Article
42 16, on technology transfer, and Article 19, on the handling of biotechnology and the distribution of its
43 benefits, which will be addressed in section 5 below.

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^{1/} For the distinction between hard and soft tech, see the discussions provided in document UNEP/CBD/SBSTTA/9/7, paragraph 19.

1 12. The preamble already points to a number of relevant elements on which pertinent government
2 activities may focus, *inter alia*: national institutions for research and technology innovation; legal and
3 institutional underpinnings of technology markets both at national and international levels; and
4 legislative institutions that introduce codes and standards, reduce environmental risk and protect
5 intellectual property rights.

6 13. Governments are key actors in fostering an enabling environment for technology transfer and
7 technical and scientific cooperation. However, their activities needs to be supplemented by activities of,
8 and being undertaken in coordination with, other actors such as *inter alia* the private sector,
9 governments, indigenous and local communities, bilateral and multilateral institutions, funding
10 institutions, non-governmental organizations and academic and research institutions. Governments may
11 set a broad institutional, administrative, legislative and/or policy framework, or use means such as
12 incentives measures to create an environment conducive to technology transfer and adaptation, but these
13 other actors are also important in, for instance, providing financial resources, increasing capacities,
14 providing training and disseminating information. Moreover, high levels of awareness, motivation and
15 empowerment within the public and private sectors and in civil society will help ensure that people,
16 communities and societies are able to adapt continuously to new circumstances and technologies.

17 14. The close cooperation with the private sector is particularly important in light of Article 16 (4) of the
18 Convention, which prescribes that each Contracting Party shall take legislative, administrative or policy
19 measures, as appropriate, with the aim that the private sector facilitates access to, joint development and
20 transfer of technology for conservation and sustainable use or that make use of genetic resources and
21 does not cause significant harm to the environment, for the benefit of both governmental institutions and
22 the private sector in developing countries.

23 *Guidance developed or under development in relevant international processes*

24 15. In addition to activities at national or regional levels, international processes and institutions will also
25 play an important role in fostering an enabling environment for technology transfer and technical and
26 scientific cooperation.

27 16. Many technologies of relevance to the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity may
28 also belong to the category of environmentally sound technologies. For such technologies, important
29 international policy guidance is already provided in chapter 34 of Agenda 21,^{2/} on the transfer of
30 environmentally sound technology, cooperation and capacity-building. This chapter explains the basis for
31 action and spells out objectives, activities and means of implementation. The Commission for
32 Sustainable Development set up an Ad Hoc Working Group on Technology Transfer and Cooperation.
33 The Group identified inadequate financial resources and shortage of suitably trained manpower and
34 appropriate institutions as major difficulties in technology transfer, recommended ways to facilitate the
35 transfer of technologies in the public sector, and also recognized the crucial role of the private sector in
36 the transfer of technology. Subsequent reports produced for the Commission in 1995 and 1996 elaborated
37 on this theme, and proposed activities by Governments that would contribute to the dissemination of
38 information, capacity-building and institutional development, financial mechanisms, and partnership
39 arrangements.^{3/}

^{2/} *Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992*
(United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.I.8 and corrigenda), vol. I, resolution 1, annex II. See also
<http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/agenda21chapter34.htm>.

^{3/} See also paragraphs 105-106 of the Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable
Development, which make reference to chapter 34 of Agenda 21.

1 17. With regard to technology that makes use of genetic resources, international policy guidance was
 2 provided in chapter 16 of Agenda 21, on the environmentally sound management of biotechnology. ^{4/}
 3 This chapter identifies, for different programme areas, the basis for action, objectives, activities and
 4 means of implementation. The programme areas include: increasing the availability of food, feed and
 5 renewable raw materials; improving human health; enhancing protection of the environment; enhancing
 6 safety and developing international mechanisms for cooperation; and establishing mechanisms for the
 7 development and the environmentally sound application of biotechnology. Technology transfer is an
 8 important component of the envisaged activities. ^{5/}

9 18. As regard guidance on enabling environments more specifically, the Inter-governmental Panel on
 10 Climate Change (IPCC) identified 10 dimensions of enabling environments for technology transfer in the
 11 context of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC): (i) National
 12 systems of innovation; (ii) Human and institutional capacity; (iii) Sustainable markets; (iv) National legal
 13 institutions; (v) Macroeconomic policy framework; (vi) Social infrastructure and participatory
 14 approaches; (vii) Codes, standards and certification; (viii) Equity considerations; (ix) Rights to
 15 productive resources; and (x) Research and technology development. ^{6/} These elements are also be of
 16 relevance for creating enabling environments to promote and facilitate the transfer of technologies for the
 17 purpose of the Convention on Biological Diversity, and will be taken into consideration accordingly
 18 below.

19 19. As regards technologies that make use of genetic resources in the context of Article 19 of the
 20 Convention, the work of the Open-ended Working Group on Access and Benefit Sharing of the
 21 Convention is also relevant. This group at its third meeting, held in Bangkok, Thailand, on 14 – 18
 22 February 2005, initiated negotiations of an international regime on access to genetic resources and
 23 benefit-sharing with the aim of adopting an instrument/instruments to effectively implement the
 24 provisions of Article 15 and Article 8(j) of the Convention and the three objectives of the Convention.
 25 There seems to be a linkage to Article 19 (2), on the handling of biotechnologies and distribution of
 26 benefits, which calls upon Parties to take all practicable measures to promote and advance priority access
 27 on a fair and equitable basis by Contracting Parties, especially developing countries, to the results and
 28 benefits arising from biotechnologies based upon genetic resources provided by those Parties. They are
 29 hence relevant to item (d) of activity 3.1.2 of the programme of work on technology transfer and
 30 scientific and technical cooperation, spelt out in paragraph ^{3/} above. This issue will be further addressed
 31 in section 5 below.

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32 *Macroeconomic conditions, general institutional and policy frameworks*

33 20. It is often underlined that a number of macro-economic policy conditions play an important role in
 34 fostering technology transfer. These conditions are particularly relevant for the transfer of proprietary
 35 technology. The use of proprietary technology is often closely linked to the production and flow of
 36 commercial goods and services; hence, it is asserted that macro-economic conditions that contribute to a
 37 growing demand for these goods and services will also stimulate the transfer of associated technology.
 38 Conditions frequently referred to include: low inflation, stable and realistic exchange and interest rates,
 39 pricing that reflects the true (marginal and fully internalised) costs of material, energy, labour and other
 40 inputs, deregulation, free movement of capital, operation of competitive markets, minimum market sizes,
 41 open trade policies and transparent foreign investment policies as well as political stability.^{7/} Hence,
 42 economic policies that contribute to achieve such conditions will also foster the transfer of associated
 43 technology.

^{4/} As per footnote ^{2/}. See also <http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/agenda21chapter16.htm>

^{5/} See paragraphs 16.6 (d), 16.7 (c), 16.18, 16.25 (c), 16.38, and 16.39.

^{6/} See UNFCCC (2003), page 9.

^{7/} See UNEP-IETC (2003), page 49.

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1 21. Importantly, such policies are not only relevant on the receiving end of technology transfer. When
2 taken on the providing end, they may for instance increase the demand for certain imported goods and
3 services, which, in turn, may increase the demand for production technologies that are necessary to meet
4 the increased demand. Consider, as a stylized example, more open trade policies by a country that
5 typically provides technology. Such trade policies may also increase its domestic demand for goods and
6 services that are imported from countries that typically receive technologies. To increase production
7 accordingly, these countries may increase their demand for relevant production technologies from
8 abroad.

9 22. The dominant mechanism for technology transfer to developing countries is foreign direct investment
10 (FDI), accounting for more than 60% of the flow of technology to these countries.^{8/} Multinational
11 enterprises – the main drivers of FDI – are powerful and effective means to disseminate technology from
12 developed to developing countries, and are often the only source of new and innovative technologies that
13 are usually not available through the market. Technology disseminated through FDI generally includes
14 the ‘entire package’ including experts, skills and the financial resources to exploit the technology
15 appropriately.^{9/} In addition, it usually implies the long term involvement of the investor. FDI can also
16 contribute to technology transfer through on-the-job training and various forms of interaction among
17 local and foreign firms. Backward and forward linkages favour technological diffusion, as
18 technologically advanced foreign affiliates help their local suppliers and host country firms involved in
19 the production process to adopt new technologies and raise quality and service standards.^{10/}

20 23. The ability of the domestic investment regime to reduce the risks and transaction costs associated
21 with investment and trade will have an impact on investment and trade patterns and the types of
22 technologies selected. It has been asserted that to the extent that domestic legal institutions are deficient
23 in managing the risks associated with the transfer of technology, perverse incentives will be generated
24 that distort technology choices and supporting financial flows in ways that discourage rapid international
25 diffusion of environmentally sound technologies. ^{11/}

26 24. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), attention
27 needs in particular to be given to the broader policy and institutional frameworks for investment,
28 including public and corporate governance as well as institutional and administrative transparency. These
29 frameworks need to ensure that administrative processes will not impose prohibitive transaction costs
30 through tedious procedures relating to, for instance, licensing, tariff setting, and foreign exchange
31 controls on investors. Procedures for technology-related risk assessments provide other examples. While
32 they are needed to ensure that transferred technologies are economically viable, socially acceptable and
33 environmentally friendly, these procedures, in order to not unduly hinder technology transfer, also need
34 to be predictable and speedy, and should seek to minimize the administrative burdens that are put on
35 prospective users and providers. ^{12/}

36 25. Such macro-economic conditions, and the associated policies and legal frameworks to implement
37 these conditions, are conducive to technology transfer in general. However, by their rather general
38 nature, they are not specifically geared towards technologies of relevance for the Convention, that is,
39 technologies for conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity or that make use of genetic resources
40 and do not cause significant harm to the environment. Hence, while the implementation of such

^{8/} See UNEP/CBD/MYPOW/5, page 8.

^{9/} See OECD (2001).

^{10/} See WTO (2002), page 17.

^{11/} See IPCC (2001).

^{12/} See OECD (2002), page 5, and the related discussion in UNEP/CBD/MYPOW/5, page 9. See also paragraph

1 conditions will be necessary to foster technology transfer in general, they are arguably not sufficient to
2 foster in particular the transfer of technology in accordance with Articles 16 to 19 of the Convention.

3 *Legal, regulatory and policy frameworks pertaining to biodiversity*

4 26. The bottom line for private enterprises and financial institutions to embark on investments in
5 developing countries is their economic viability. However, investments in technologies for conservation
6 and sustainable use of biodiversity, in sectors such as water management, coastal zone management,
7 mountain management, forestry or fishery, generally do not offer high or competitive returns to investors
8 when market conditions are left unchanged. ^{13/}

9 27. Against this background, it is often argued that one of the main reasons for low demand for
10 environmentally sound technology is a poor or absent regulatory and policy framework for environmental
11 protection. ^{14/} Stronger regulations and policies can be effective instruments in promoting demand for
12 environmentally sound technologies at the receiving end, including technologies for conservation and
13 sustainable use of biodiversity. The improved enforcement of plans for biodiversity conservation and
14 sustainable use, formulated as part of national strategies, could increase the cost of non-compliance and
15 also strengthen the demand for these technologies. ^{15/}

16 28. Governments can also promote the application of standards for environmental performance and
17 create awareness about products, processes and services that use biodiversity-sound technologies through
18 means such as eco-labelling, product standards and codes. ^{16/} International initiatives can provide
19 technical support in the effective implementation of global standards and procedures set out in
20 multilateral environment agreements. For instance, one example of the innovative approaches that CITES
21 is using to achieve technology transfer and cooperation is the interactive computer-based training for
22 Customs and other border control officers. ^{17/}

23 29. In addition to stronger regulations and policies pertaining to conservation and sustainable use of
24 biodiversity, other elements of domestic law are also relevant. For instance, the legal provisions that
25 regulate land tenure have an important impact on biodiversity-related technology choices and associated
26 transfer. Technology choices by land users will *inter alia* depend on who owns, controls and manages the
27 resources both legally and in practice. Insecurity created by unclear property rights or conflicting claims
28 (e.g., state ownership vs. traditional rights) deter investment. For instance, a case from Thailand shows
29 that farmers were more likely to make capital and technical improvements on their holdings if their land
30 ownership was secure. ^{18/}

31 30. Again, such policies are not only relevant on the receiving end of technology transfer, but also on the
32 providing end. A strong, focused and well-enforced regulatory and policy framework for environmental
33 protection in general, and for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity in particular, will
34 promote the development and improvement of technologies that help to implement the policy targets set
35 out in the framework in a more effective and/or cost-efficient manner. Technology development,
36 however, is a crucial precondition for technology transfer. In fact, taking the leadership in the
37 development and implementation of such a regulatory and policy framework may eventually lead to
38 technological leadership.

^{13/} See UNFF (2003), pages 13-14.

^{14/} *ibid.*, page 20.

^{15/} *ibid.*, page 49.

^{16/} For example, it has been reported that within the Asia-Pacific region, the ISO 14000 standard is now recognized as an instrument for a successful Agenda 21 implementation. See UNFCCC (2003), page 19.

^{17/} Communication from CITES.

^{18/} See IPCC (2001), *ibid.*

1 1. The acquisition of new technologies for sustainable use and conservation of biodiversity is also
 2 constrained by limited access to capital as small-scale loan facilities as well as seed capital. The high
 3 upfront costs and long pay-back periods that are sometimes associated with conservation and sustainable
 4 use technologies may also represent impediments in an environment where access to funding is
 5 restricted. Government programmes that focus on alleviating these financial constraints and improve
 6 access to capital markets, through for instance the bundling of projects or the provision of collateral
 7 and/or performance guarantees, will therefore be other important elements of the enabling environment.
 8 International cooperation and funding, in partnership with financial institutions, will be key for the
 9 effective implementation of such programmes.

10 *Intellectual property rights*

11 Intellectual property rights are an important aspect of enabling environments for the transfer of
 12 proprietary technology. While a substantial number of technologies for conservation and sustainable use
 13 will be of a proprietary nature, this will in particular be true for most technologies that make use of
 14 genetic resources. As was already explained in earlier documentation, ^{19/} on the one hand, it is often
 15 argued that strong domestic intellectual property rights regimes encourage technology transfer, by
 16 reassuring owners of proprietary technology that their rights will be protected, and by generating
 17 incentives for research and the development of new technology ^{20/} On the other hand, it has also been
 18 asserted that (i) a strong intellectual property rights regime is not a sufficient precondition for improving
 19 the incentives for private companies to engage in the transfer of such technologies, as a number of other
 20 economic conditions also have to be met, and that (ii) for a number of reasons, stronger intellectual-
 21 property-rights regimes may actually impede technology transfer, in particular to developing countries.
 22 This claim is based on a number of arguments:

23 (a) While a strong intellectual-property-rights regime might arguably generate incentives on the
 24 side of the owner of such technology to actively search for opportunities for transferring such technology
 25 through licensing, governments and local investors in developing countries may simply not have the
 26 resources to pay related fees;

27 (b) Moreover, depending on the intricacies of the patenting system, it may substantially increase
 28 transaction costs for prospective users and thus erect potential barriers for technology transfer; ^{21/}

29 i. First, different institutions or companies may have different views on the value
 30 of a proprietary technology and the related fees to pay. Negotiations over access
 31 to technology can be long and complicated, imposing delays and administrative
 32 costs;

33 ii. Second, the proliferation of patents in biotechnology may lead to the need to
 34 negotiate multiple licenses when engaging in the development of specific
 35 product lines. Such patent thickets, and the subsequent stacking of royalties, may
 36 raise both transaction costs and the ultimate cost of the product, possibly leading
 37 to a “tragedy of the anti-commons”; ^{22/}

38 iii. Third, the so-called reach-through claims, that is, patents for research tools that
 39 claim royalty payments on any product that was developed by using this tool,

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^{19/} See the discussions provided in documents UNEP/CBD/MYPOW/5 and UNEP/CBD/SBSTTA/9/7.

^{20/} See Lesser, W. (1997), page 8; WTO (1996), pages 4-5.

^{21/} See for further discussion OECD (2002): *Genetic Inventions, Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing Practices. Evidence and Politics*. OECD, Paris, and The Royal Society (2003): *Keeping science open; the effects of intellectual property rights on the conduct of science*. <http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/files/statfiles/document-221.pdf>.

^{22/} This term was coined by Heller, M. and R. Eisenberg (1998): “Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research”. *Science* 280, 698-701

1 may also contribute to increased product development costs and may therefore
2 negatively affect technology transfer;

- 3 iv. And last but not least, blocking patents or overly broad patents are sometimes
4 feared to discourage the use of related technologies and, if granted on early,
5 foundational discoveries, to slow the pace of research and development in a
6 particular field;

7 31. Importantly, it may be the prospect alone to face prohibitive license fees and/or transaction costs that
8 may already have a chilling effect on potential users to put sufficient efforts into the identification of
9 transfer opportunities. As a result, such transfer opportunities may only be imperfectly identified.

10 32. A recent expert workshop organized by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
11 Development (OECD) Working Party on Biotechnology concluded that, while the obstacles imposed by
12 these mechanisms are sometimes substantial, actors such as firms, Governments and civil society in
13 OECD countries are rapidly reorganizing their approaches to dealing with intellectual property rights
14 protection, and often find pragmatic solutions to the problems enumerated above.^{23/} However, it
15 appears to be less clear whether and to what extent this finding also applies to the relevant actors in the
16 developing world, which typically operate under more severe constraints in terms of legal expertise and
17 capacity. Furthermore, even while it seems natural that rational actors respond to a changing legal and
18 institutional environment, this does not imply that the resulting state of the world, from an economic
19 perspective, is the most efficient one. Hence, further research is warranted to assess the importance and
20 the scope of the potential obstacles enumerated above in developing countries, and possible remedial
21 action.

22 33. Activity 3.1.1 of the programme of work on technology transfer and technological and scientific
23 cooperation calls for the preparation of technical studies that further explore and analyse the role of
24 intellectual property rights in technology transfer in the context of the Convention on Biological
25 Diversity and identify options to increase synergy and overcome barriers to technology transfer and
26 cooperation, consistent with paragraph 44 of the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, by taking the
27 costs and benefits of intellectual property rights fully into consideration. At the time of preparation this
28 note, work on the preparation of such a study, undertaken by the CBD Secretariat, UNCTAD and WIPO,
29 was still ongoing.

30 34. Several intellectual-property-rights-related mechanisms for the sharing of benefits may provide
31 important avenues for the diffusion in particular of biotechnologies. Examples include joint patents with
32 stakeholders in countries of origin of genetic resources as well as joint research programmes with
33 institutions in such countries.^{24/} Such intellectual property rights-mechanisms would seem to have a
34 large potential to play a significant role in north-south technology transfer. Countries could engage in
35 adapting their legal, regulatory and policy frameworks to encourage the use of such mechanisms.

36 35. The literature provides some proposals on other concrete measures and mechanisms for intellectual
37 property management that could foster the transfer of technologies of relevance to the Convention, and in
38 particular of biotechnologies:

- 39 • *Patent Pools and intellectual property management services*
40 A patent pool is a voluntary agreement between two or more patent owners to license one or
41 more of their patents to one another or third parties. For example, the Public Intellectual Property
42 Resource for Agriculture (PIPRA)^{25/} is an collaborative initiative of U.S universities and public
43 research institutions to bundle their licensed and un-licensed technologies (“shared technology

^{23/} See OECD (2002), *ibid.*

^{24/} See the Bonn Guidelines for Access and Benefit-sharing, paragraph 43 and annex II.

^{25/} See <http://www.pipra.org>.

1 packages”), making them more readily available to member institutions for commercial licensing
2 or for designated humanitarian or special use. As part of this effort, a database of patented
3 agricultural technologies is being developed to inform researchers on freedom-to-operate
4 obstacles at the initiation of their research. ^{26/} For developing countries, patent pools may be
5 important because companies can more easily obtain the licenses required to practice a particular
6 technology, which reduces transaction costs and facilitates the rapid deployment of new
7 applications.^{27/}

8 • *National technology transfer offices*

9 A centralized service at the national level that can facilitate external negotiations and provide
10 support to domestic institutions that lack the needed skills. These technology transfer offices
11 could also support the harmonization of material transfer agreements among public organizations
12 in order to reduce transaction costs of transferring intellectual property. For example, Indonesia
13 has established a central office for technology transfer to help negotiate access to technologies of
14 value to Indonesian agricultural research programmes. ^{28/} However, it is also said that one risk of
15 centralization is the potential to create another bureaucratic hurdle for scientists. ^{29/}

16 • *Intellectual property commercialization agents*

17 For example, BTG Ltd. (formerly known as the British Technology Group) is an institution that
18 is dedicated to the profitable commercialization of third party intellectual property in the fields of
19 health, medicine, and other biotechnologies. ^{30/} Clients include public research centers and
20 global technology companies, from start-ups to multinational companies. It functions as a
21 retainer for technology innovators, charging fees and sharing in revenues generated from its
22 services, and provides a mechanism to turn intellectual property into competitive and cost-
23 effective products, especially into the public sector health care sector of developing countries.^{31/}

24 *Strengthening of domestic research and innovation systems*

25 *Human capacity development and training*

26 36. The strengthening of domestic research capacities is an important element of an enabling
27 environment for technology transfer and adaptation. The national research and innovation system plays a
28 key role in the development of technology, in the identification of technology transfer opportunities and
29 in the provision of practical research to adapt important technologies to local socio-economic conditions
30 – a key precondition for successful technology transfer.

31 37. Public research institutions can also pay special attention to innovation for sustainable development,
32 that is, to the development of technologies with social and environmental benefits that cannot be captured
33 through the market mechanisms alone. ^{32/}

34 38. However, many developing countries face severe constraints in national scientific capacity, including
35 a lack of a critical mass of well-trained scientists, technicians and engineers, required to generate
36 scientific and technological innovation as well as to adapt and absorb technologies. Correspondingly,
37 many activities geared towards the strengthening of national research systems are related to capacity
38 building and include the training of staff at all levels as well as the enhancement of technical and

^{26/} See Krattiger (2004), page 21.

^{27/} Ibid, page 29.

^{28/} See Byerlee and Fischer (2000), p. 21.

^{29/} ibid

^{30/} See www.btgplc.com.

^{31/} See Krattiger (2004), page 26.

^{32/} UNFF (2003b), page 49.

1 institutional capacity. On the global level, the United Nations University (UNU) provides a multitude of
2 pertinent training activities. 33

3 39. On the providing end, a strong national research and innovation system will drive the process of
4 technology development – a necessary precondition for any transfer. On the receiving end, research
5 institutions that are located within the importing country will often be closer to local stakeholders and
6 technology users and their wealth of indispensable information for successful dissemination and
7 adaptation of technology. Fostering cooperation among research institutions in developed and developing
8 countries is an important activity undertaken by a number of countries. Denmark for example runs a
9 programme to enhance the research capacity of developing countries by financing twinning arrangements
10 between research institutions in these countries and its own research institutions. 34/ Canada reports that
11 it supports international collaboration for Canadian research institutions in emerging high-growth areas
12 of *inter alia* environmental technologies and genomics. It further supports local scientists, people and
13 institutions, to identify income-generating strategies and appropriate production technologies for the
14 sustainable use of the products of biodiversity, such as medicinal plants and non-timber products in
15 developing countries. 35/

16 *Research consortia*

17 40. Individual public research organizations in small and medium-sized developing countries are at a
18 comparative disadvantage in accessing biotechnology products due to substantial economies of size in
19 biotechnology research, small market size, and their weak bargaining position with respect to large
20 private companies.

21 41. However, public research institutions within the same region will often have similar goals, needs and
22 assets, which is an incentive to pool resources. As a consortium they might be in a better position to gain
23 access to technologies if they negotiate as a group and also could share the costs. Such a consortium
24 could also enhance the sharing of biotechnology tools and germplasm products among the public
25 research institutions. Regional collaboration is already occurring through programmes such as the Asian
26 Rice Biotechnology Network (ARBN) or the Latin American Biotechnology Network (REDBIO). It is
27 underlined that, in order to be effective, these consortia should have a legal basis and a strong but small
28 central unit to negotiate and possibly hold intellectual property on behalf of its members. 36/

29 *Public-private cooperation and intermediary institutions*

30 42. The domestic research and innovation system also plays a key role in a country's absorptive capacity
31 in relation to technology. One problem related in particular to public research in developing and
32 developed countries alike is that relevant research findings do not reach the potential users, or only
33 insufficiently so. Correspondingly, it is often asserted that government-to-government cooperation
34 mechanisms could be more effective in facilitating the flow of technologies to the potential final users in
35 developing countries. There is a great need to enhance the interaction between institutions of education
36 and training as well as of research and development on the one side and local industries on the other. 37/
37 The conclusion is that, to the extent feasible, the private sector should be involved in such cooperation
38 either as a direct beneficiary or as a potential intermediary, which would "package" and distribute
39 research findings to the final users. 38/

33/ See the communication from the United Nations University for details.

34/ See IP/C/W/132/Add. 4

35/ See the Thematic Report on Technology Transfer and Cooperation from Canada.

36/ See Byerlee and Fischer (2000), p. 22.

37/ See WTO (2003), page 94; UNFCCC (2003), page 16.

38/ See UNFF (2003b) page 33.

1 43. However, alliances and joint ventures between the public and private sector often face difficulties
 2 due to differences in business cultures, the lack of experience with intellectual property management in
 3 public organizations, and asymmetric negotiation skills and experiences. Intermediary institutions are
 4 often said to play a useful role in acting as a “honest broker”, which focuses on creating public-private-
 5 partnerships by facilitating fact-based negotiations of transfer agreements, providing “managed”
 6 technology transfer, and providing access to financing facilities. ^{39/} Many of the already existing
 7 alliances have been brokered through intermediary organizations such as the Agricultural Biotechnology
 8 Support Program (ABSP) and the International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications
 9 (ISAAA), for instance, the Pioneer and Applied Genetic Engineering Research Institute (AGERI)
 10 alliance in Egypt. ^{40/}

11 44. In the context of the CBD, a suitable institution could be identified at the national level which, in
 12 close cooperation with National Focal Points for the Convention and the National Focal Points of the
 13 clearing house mechanism, could act as a central consulting point on technology access and transfer for
 14 other national or international actors to turn to. This institution could act as a central gateway for the
 15 exchange of pertinent technology-related information, that is, on needs and opportunities for the transfer
 16 and adaptation of technology as well as on related capacity needs and the support available, through for
 17 instance national and international training programmes and initiatives, in building or enhancing
 18 capacities. For instance, relevant actors in developing countries, both on the providing and the receiving
 19 end, may often not have the experience, and the expertise gained thereby, of negotiating technology
 20 transfer agreements which are often legally complex. Acting as a central technology transfer office for
 21 purposes of the Convention, the envisaged institution could for instance organize related capacity
 22 building for these actors, assist them in the negotiations and/or negotiate, as appropriate under the
 23 circumstances of the individual countries, on their behalf. ⁴¹

24 45. On the international level, the International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications
 25 (ISAAA) operates primarily as a facilitator, matching available technologies to meet identified needs,
 26 brokering technologies, and building capacity by transferring knowledge and know-how between
 27 companies in developed countries and the public sector in developing countries. ISAAA also addresses
 28 other constraints in biotechnology transfer, such as regulatory and public perception issues. According to
 29 Krattiger (2004), this concept is appropriate to chart new territory and bring public and private actors
 30 closer together. It is also effective in setting new models of collaboration specific to geographic areas,
 31 technologies, industry types, or needs. However, it also demands complex institutional arrangements and
 32 significant funding. ^{42/}

33 46. The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) is another important
 34 network on the international level. It consists of a strategic alliance of countries, international and
 35 regional organizations, and private foundations supporting 15 international agricultural centres
 36 worldwide that work with national agricultural research systems and civil society organizations including
 37 the private sector. CGIAR is committed to strengthening national agricultural research in developing
 38 countries through side-by-side working relationships with colleagues in national programs, strengthening
 39 skills in research administration and management, and formal training programs for research staff.
 40 CGIAR is a potentially important “bridge” between advanced private and public research organizations
 41 and public research organizations in developing countries. ⁴³

^{39/} See UNFF (2003b): page 49; Krattiger (2004), *ibid*, page 28.

^{40/} See Byerlee and Fischer (2000), p. 19.

^{41/} See the related discussion in paragraph ³⁵ above.

^{42/} See Krattiger (2004), page 28.

^{43/} Regional organizations such as for instance the European Federation of Biotechnology (www.efb-central.org) could also be play that role of an intermediary.

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1 47. An interesting suggestion for a global initiative was recently made by a report to the United Nations
2 prepared in the context of the Millennium Development Goals. The report states that biotechnology could
3 save tens of millions of lives each year in developing countries if the technology is shared equitably. The
4 study is part of the six-million-dollar Canadian Programme on Genomics and Global Health, funded by
5 the Canadian government as well as two pharmaceutical companies, Merck & Co. and GlaxoSmithKline.
6 The report *inter alia* calls for the creation of a Global Genomic Initiative (GGI), to promote the potential
7 of genomics and to help transfer technology and basic science. This initiative would link various
8 stakeholders and make information on latest technologies freely available, so that developing countries
9 could use those resources to develop their own solutions to local problems.^{44/}

10 48. Another option to support in particular developing countries in the conclusion of technology transfer
11 agreements would consist in the compilation of standard templates for such agreements, used for instance
12 by the institutions referenced in the previous paragraphs. This compilation and analysis, which could be
13 undertaken by the Secretariat to the Convention in cooperation with the aforementioned institutions and
14 initiatives, could be used to develop international guidance that could act as reference for good/best
15 practice on technology transfer agreements.

16 49. Promoting the exchange of technology-related information at national, regional and international
17 levels, in particular on technology needs and technologies that are available for transfer, is recognized as
18 a key enabling mechanism that would facilitate the transfer of relevant technology under the Convention.
19 In fact, the particular importance of information exchange is highlighted by the programme of work on
20 technology transfer and scientific and technical cooperation by focusing on this issue in an own
21 programme element, on information systems. Activity 2.1.2 under this programme element foresees the
22 development of proposals to enhance the clearing house mechanism of the Convention as a key
23 mechanism for exchange of information on technologies and for facilitating and promoting technology
24 transfer and cooperation. Draft proposals thereon will be discussed by the informal advisory committee
25 on the clearing house mechanism in conjunction with the expert group on technology transfer and
26 scientific and technical cooperation, and will be submitted to the Conference of the Parties at its eighth
27 meeting as a separate document.

28 50. Experience at the national level seems to highlight the important role of personal contacts for the
29 successful identification of transfer opportunities and the successful conclusion of the transfer. Web-
30 based platforms may be an important tool, but will need to be supplemented by other matchmaking
31 mechanisms. For instance, matchmaking could also be facilitated by the Parties to the Convention
32 through national or regional workshops that would bring together technology providers and users.

33 3. *Measures and mechanisms that present obstacles for technology transfer*

34 51. Activity 3.1.2 of the programme of work also calls for the compilation and synthesis of information
35 on measures and mechanisms that present obstacles that impede transfers of relevant technologies from
36 developed countries.

37 *General observations*

38 52. Many of the crucial elements of an enabling environment for technology transfer that were
39 enumerated and discussed under section 2 above, are, as of today, not implemented in a satisfactory
40 manner. Hence, the absence or poor implementation of these elements can be interpreted as creating
41 obstacles that impede transfer of relevant technology from developed countries. Examples would include:
42 the existence of deficient investment regimes and weak domestic policies and regulations, negative

^{44/} *Genomics and Global Health*, commissioned by the Millennium Project of the United Nations, released 8 October 2004.

1 effects of intellectual property law, etc. To avoid duplication, the following discussion will not re-iterate
2 these elements.

3 53. Other obstacles transpire from other elements of the programme of work on technology transfer and
4 scientific and technical cooperation, namely, from the programme elements on needs assessments and on
5 national, regional and international information systems.^{45/} A general lack of awareness and information
6 on technology needs as well as on available technology and ongoing capacity development initiatives to
7 foster the transfer of these technologies, is often cited as a major barrier to technology transfer. Again, to
8 avoid duplication with activities under these other programme elements, the following paragraphs will
9 not further elaborate on these aspects.

10 54. Poor technical, scientific, institutional and administrative capacity will be in many countries another
11 important obstacle for the effective transfer, diffusion and adaptation of technology as well as technical
12 and scientific cooperation. This is an issue of cross-cutting importance, that is, the absence of adequate
13 capacity will present obstacles to the effective conduct of needs assessments and to the improvement of
14 national information systems for technology transfer, referred to in the paragraph above, and will also
15 present a key obstacle for the creation of an adequate enabling environment for technology transfer. The
16 building and enhancement of such capacity is covered in element four of the programme of work.

17 *Trade related obstacles*

18 *General observations*

19 55. In many countries, barriers to trade constitute an obstacle for the effective transfer of technology.
20 This is particularly the case where barriers affect the import of technology-intensive goods, and in
21 particular machinery and equipment. It may be objected that, under a knowledge-based definition of
22 technology, which also includes “soft” technology in form of technological knowledge and
23 information,^{46/} the mere sale to or purchase of equipment and machinery would not qualify as an
24 effective transfer of technology.^{47/} However, it has also to be borne in mind that the import of
25 technologically-intensive machinery and equipment usually comes as a package which also includes the
26 transfer of pertinent technological information and know-how, through manuals, training, long term
27 cooperation between importers and exporters, etc. ^{48/}

28 56. The World Trade Report 2003 shows that, for all technology categories, tariffs on technology
29 products tend to be higher in countries at a lower stage of development. In addition, while for low-
30 technology goods import duties in low-income countries are on average 3.4 times higher than they are in
31 high-income countries, for high-technology goods they are 8.5 times higher. That is, unlike technology
32 transfer would require, the degree of protection in low-income countries is relatively higher for high-
33 technology products. ^{49/}

34 57. As regards potential non-tariff barriers, one has to bear in mind that there is also a need identified in
35 the programme of work on technology transfer and scientific and technical cooperation to ensure that

^{45/} Programme elements one and two of the programme of work on technology transfer and technological and technical cooperation as contained in the annex of decision VII/29.

^{46/} See the explanations provided in UNEP/CBD/MYPOW/5, paragraph 15, and UNEP/CBD/SBSTTA/9/7, paragraph 19.

^{47/} Accordingly, the UNCTAD Draft Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology defined ‘transfer of technology’ as “the transfer of systematic knowledge for the manufacture of a good, for the application of a process or for the rendering of a service and does not extend to the transactions involving the mere sale or purchase of goods.” See Yusuf, Abdulqawi A. (2001), page 319.

^{48/} See Yusuf, Abdulqawi A. (2001), page 319.

^{49/} WTO (2003), page 94.

1 transferred technologies are economically viable, socially acceptable and environmentally friendly. ^{50/}
 2 The need is of particular relevance in the case of modern biotechnology that could for instance add value
 3 to the biological resources of many developing countries. ^{51/} Legal and administrative frameworks need
 4 to be in place to conduct appropriate technology risk assessments, to transform their results into decision-
 5 making, and to implement the decisions. These frameworks need to be effective while not unduly
 6 restricting the transfer of technologies that are relevant under the Convention.

7 *Tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental goods and services*

8 58. In paragraph 31 (iii) of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, trade ministers at the fourth session of the
 9 WTO Ministerial Conference, held in Doha, Qatar, on 9 –14 November 2001, agreed, with a view to
 10 enhancing the mutual supportiveness of trade and environment, to negotiations on the reduction or, as
 11 appropriate, elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental goods and services. Such goods
 12 may also include technology-intensive goods of relevance to the Convention. Hence, the negotiations
 13 have the potential to remove or alleviate an important obstacle to the effective implementation of Article
 14 16 of the Convention.

15 59. The negotiations on paragraph 31 (iii) of the Doha Declaration were assigned to the negotiating
 16 group on non-agricultural market access (NAMA), with an examination of definitional aspects and scope
 17 of environmental goods and services, as well as a monitoring role over progress, given to the WTO
 18 Committee on Trade and Environment in Special Session. Delegates identified a number of complex
 19 technical questions pertaining in particular to the definition of environmental goods. Some of these
 20 problems are also relevant for the identification of technologies for conservation and sustainable use of
 21 biodiversity, such as:

- 22 v. the multiple end-use problem, that is, the fact that some goods might be used for
 23 environmental or for other purposes, including environmentally harmful ones. For instance,
 24 night-vision goggles could be used by park services in their fight against poachers, but they
 25 may also be useful for more effective poaching;
- 26 vi. the “moving target” problem, alluding to the question how to keep preferential lists updated
 27 in light of ever-evolving goods and technologies;
- 28 vii. how to avoid a bias towards “end-of-pipe” technologies as they are easier to identify than
 29 integrated technologies for cleaner production, or for reducing and/or avoiding harm to
 30 biodiversity;
- 31 viii. how to address goods and services whose positive environmental impact is dependent on the
 32 target region; for instance, knowledge related to the sustainable management of ecosystem
 33 resources will often be applicable to specific ecosystems, climatic regions, agricultural
 34 production systems etc., but not to others.

35 60. This negotiations are however not only relevant for fostering the *direct* transfer of goods that may
 36 encapsulate technology of relevance to the Convention. Analogously to the reasoning provided in
 37 paragraph 21 above, the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers by developed countries for certain
 38 biodiversity-based goods from developing countries could foster the demand for these goods and,
 39 subsequently, the demand in those developing countries for technology for the sustainable use of the
 40 underlying biodiversity assets.

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^{50/} See element one of the programme of work.

^{51/} See also paragraph 47.

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1 *Export control policies*

2 61. Another mechanism that could possibly present an impediment to the transfer of technologies of
3 relevance to the Convention has recently been pointed out by the Sunshine Project ^{52/}, a non-profit
4 association that works on issues related to biological weapons. This association has raised the concern
5 that the current international system of export controls could be an obstacle to the transfer of
6 technologies of relevance to the Convention. Export controls are national legal and administrative
7 systems designed to limit or to prohibit transfer of certain types of technology, and specifically
8 equipment, materials and knowledge that have potential weapons uses. At the international level, an
9 informal association of 34 member countries, the so-called Australia Group, develops common control
10 lists of technologies and works to ensure that export controls are harmonized among members. The
11 Sunshine project states that export controls, possibly working in conjunction with domestic patent
12 secrecy provisions, may restrict the transfer of many biological technologies that, in addition to being
13 potentially weapons-related, could also be relevant to the objectives of the Convention. For example,
14 export controlled items such as biological manufacturing technologies and basic laboratory safety
15 equipment, may as well be used in medicine, agriculture, and other industries. ^{53/}

16 62. The Sunshine Project underlines that the number of export denials imposed each year cannot be
17 determined, because such information is not publicly available. Because of these information constraints,
18 it is very difficult to gauge at this stage whether and to what extent export controls present obstacles that
19 impede the transfer of technologies of relevance to the CBD. It is noteworthy in this context that none of
20 the submitted thematic reports on technology transfer and technological cooperation identified export
21 controls as a constraint for the transfer of technologies of relevance to the Convention. ^{54/} The Center for
22 Non-proliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, located in Washington, DC,
23 USA, is currently undertaking a research project that focuses on the effects of export controls on the
24 development in industrializing countries.

25 **4. *Measures and mechanisms that provide incentives to private-sector actors and public research***
26 ***institutions in developed countries***

27 63. Activity 3.1.2 of the programme of work also calls for the compilation and synthesis of information
28 on measures and mechanisms that provide, in accordance with existing international obligations,
29 incentives to private-sector actors and public research institutions in developed countries to encourage
30 cooperation and transfer of technologies through e.g., joint ventures or technology transfer programs.

31 *General remarks*

32 64. The provision of incentive measures is an important element of an enabling environment in particular
33 for the transfer of proprietary technologies. For such technologies, governments have by definition only
34 limited, if any, force in directly regulating or prescribing their transfer. Accordingly, many governments
35 in developed countries are undertaking activities by developing legal and financial instruments and
36 adapting tax regimes that incite and reward technology transfer. This section provides an overview on
37 these activities under different categories of incentive measures.

38 65. Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement also requires “*developed country Members to provide*
39 *incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting and*
40 *encouraging technology transfer to least-developed country Members in order to enable them to create a*

^{52/} See <http://www.sunshine-project.org>

^{53/} See Sunshine Project (2004): *Export Controls: Impediments to Technology Transfer Under the Convention on Biological Diversity*, Backgrounder #13.

^{54/} See the thematic reports on Technology Transfer and Cooperation.

1 *sound and viable technological base.”* ^{55/} Further to this requirement, developed country Members are
 2 required to provide reports on their pertinent activities to the World Trade Organization. Insofar as being
 3 pertinent for fostering the transfer of technology of relevance under the Convention, the following
 4 section also synthesizes the information provided in these reports.

5 *Incentives to private sector actors*

6 *Incentives provided by bilateral development cooperation*

7 66. An analysis of the thematic reports on technology transfer and technological cooperation, as well as
 8 of recent submissions provided by Parties to the Convention⁵⁶ shows that incentives to private sector
 9 actors to engage in technological cooperation and technology transfer are often provided in the
 10 framework of bilateral development cooperation. In particular:

- 11 • **Austria** pointed to a new co-financing instrument for development cooperation for private
 12 business partnerships, which allows macro small and medium-sized enterprises from developing
 13 countries to cooperate with Austrian companies to implement projects in their home countries.
- 14 • **In Belgium**, the Belgian Science Policy Office finances bilateral cooperation projects and
 15 finances the Belgian contribution to GBIF, which includes a capacity-building component. The
 16 ‘Belgian Coordinated Collection of Micro-organisms’ (BCCM) provides capacity building for
 17 micro-organisms. Since June 2000, the Plant Biotechnology Institute for Developing Countries
 18 (IPBO, University of Ghent) is active in training, technology transfer and plant biotechnology
 19 research. ^{57/}
- 20 • The **Czech Republic** provided a comprehensive overview of official development cooperation
 21 activities undertaken in competence of the Ministry for the Environment, a number of which
 22 include the transfer and adaptation of technology of relevance to the Convention., for instance,
 23 the implementation of biological pest control technology.
- 24 • **Canada** indicated that the Environment Canada’s Environmental Technology Advancement
 25 Directorate supported the development and application of environmental technologies in Canada
 26 and around the world. Canada also has other systems and incentives in place to facilitate
 27 cooperation between research institutions and the private sector and developing countries, and
 28 supports this type of work through its bilateral aid programme, such as the Canadian
 29 International Development Agency RADARSAT programme. Project with a strong technology
 30 transfer component include: the National Water Quality and Availability Management program
 31 in Egypt, Water Harvesting and institutional strengthening in Tigray (WHIST), Ethiopia; the
 32 Sustainable Agriculture project between Canada and China aimed at promoting environmentally
 33 sustainable agriculture practices in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region; and the Hebei
 34 Dryland project. ⁵⁸
- 35 • **China** reported that within the framework of China-Africa Cooperation Forum, Chinese private
 36 companies were encouraged to provide funds, technical support and training to some African
 37 countries in various fields, including biodiversity conservation and sustainable use. China also
 38 encourages private companies to establish joint ventures with foreign companies in the
 39 development and application of technologies for conservation and sustainable use of natural
 40 resources.

^{55/} See IP/C/28, Implementation of Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement.

^{56/} See the thematic reports on Technology Transfer and Cooperation from Austria, Canada, China, Finland, Germany, Japan, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, as well as the submissions on technology transfer from Canada, the Czech Republic, the European Communities (with information from Belgium, Germany,

^{57/} <http://www.ipbo.ugent.be> .

^{58/} Submission from the Government of Canada.

- 1 • **Finland** indicated that some Finnish private companies had been providing technical assistance
2 to some developing countries in the conservation, management and sustainable use of
3 biodiversity, including through implementing some Finnish development cooperation projects.
- 4 • **Germany** reported that since 1999, the German body responsible for technical cooperation
5 (GTZ) had been supporting private companies' long-term activities in developing countries
6 through Public-Private Partnerships. In addition to providing funds, training of local staff and
7 technology transfer are typical elements of the projects under the Public-Private Partnerships,
8 most of which deal with natural resources management and sustainable use of biodiversity. One
9 concrete initiative with a strong technology component is the German Appropriate Technology
10 Exchange (GATE). ^{59/} GATE's objectives are to improve the technological competence of
11 NGOs and other groups involved in self-help-oriented poverty alleviation and to develop
12 information and knowledge management systems for NGOs and self-help groups.
- 13 • **Japan** provided some details concerning training courses, which JICA had delivered to various
14 countries in 2001 in the fields of forestry, agriculture and coastal resources.
- 15 • **Norway** indicated that it had a number of programmes that encourage private sectors, research
16 institutions and non-governmental organizations to undertake technological cooperation with
17 developing countries, though most of them do not directly address biodiversity or environmental
18 issues alone. NORAD funds the development of environmental technologies and also works with
19 the Norwegian Export Council to encourage the private sector to undertake technology
20 cooperation and transfer through the "*Match-making Programme*".
- 21 • **Spain** reported that various programmes existed to facilitate private-sector collaboration with
22 developing countries, including collaboration with public institutions of the developing
23 countries, as exemplified by the work of the Center for Industrial Technological Development.
- 24 • **Switzerland** has a number of programmes to encourage private sector, research institutes and
25 non-governmental organizations to be involved in the development and transfer of technologies
26 for the benefit of developing countries and countries with economies in transition. One of the
27 projects funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation is the Southern African
28 Drought and Low Fertility Project, which is designed to help the members of the Southern
29 African Development Community (SADC) develop maize germplasm with tolerance to drought
30 and low soil fertility and improve maize yields and yield stability under conditions typical for
31 resource-poor farmers. The other is the Indo-Swiss Collaboration in Biotechnology, which
32 focuses on areas of agriculture and environment.

33 *Fiscal incentive measures*

34 67. Incentives for the private sector such as tax concessions, refunds or deferrals for R&D investments
35 and relating them to the commercialization of technology are often implemented with a view to enhance
36 the transfer of technology.^{60/}

37 68. In addition, the tax systems of many countries foresee tax breaks or deferrals for charitable activities.
38 It has been proposed that the related legal frameworks could be adapted to provide adequate incentives
39 for private companies to engage in the transfer of relevant technologies and related capacity-building
40 activities. Such provisions would be of particular importance if, as provided in Article 16(2) of the
41 Convention, access to and transfer of technology shall be provided and/or facilitated including on
42 concessional or preferential terms.

43 69. Such measures could also be used to generate incentives for private sector actors that engage in
44 research making use of genetic resources to implement adequate mechanisms for the promotion and
45 advancement of priority access to the results and benefits arising from the biotechnologies that result

^{59/} <http://www.gtz.de/gate>

^{60/} See Byerlee & Fischer, 2000, p. 21.

1 from such research, in accordance with Article 19(2) of the Convention. Guidelines for eligibility to
 2 research-oriented tax breaks or deferrals could be adapted to reflect the pertinent provisions and guidance
 3 of the Convention. They could also encourage the broad access to research tools (through free access or
 4 non-exclusive licenses), joint patents with stakeholders in countries of origin of genetic resources, joint
 5 research programmes with institutions in such countries, and discourage reach-through provisions. 61/

6 70. Importantly, tax incentives may not only be provided on the providing side, but also on the receiving
 7 side. For instance, pertinent legislation in Brazil states that a company that ensures the access to and
 8 transfer of technology to a Brazilian institution, public or private, and invests in research and
 9 development in Brazil, shall be able to apply for fiscal incentives for technological capacity building of
 10 industry and agriculture and for other incentive instruments, in accordance with the relevant
 11 legislation. 62/

12 *Other direct financial incentive measures*

13 71. Other financial incentive measures include the direct support of the export of certain technology-
 14 intensive goods. For instance, the Netherlands established a programme that seeks to facilitate the
 15 transfer of climate-friendly technologies to developing countries by subsidizing the purchase of climate-
 16 friendly technology from the Netherlands up to 60% of the costs (e.g. energy-efficient city busses have
 17 been transferred to Ethiopia, and windmills to China and India). 63/ Such programmes would also be
 18 applicable to technologies of relevance under the Convention.

19 72. Moreover, several countries have programmes in place to offer subsidized export credits or loan
 20 guarantees that act as insurance against risks in international transactions in order to encourage private
 21 companies to engage in high-risk export markets. This insurance constitutes an incentive for technology
 22 transfer in that it provides a certain amount of security for operations abroad and is offered by many
 23 countries *inter alia* Belgium, Germany, United Kingdom, Norway and the Netherlands. 64/ Guidelines for
 24 eligibility for such programmes could be adapted to provide incentives to such companies to engage in
 25 technology transfer for the purpose of the Convention on Biological Diversity, in a manner consistent
 26 with international obligations.

27 73. Several developed countries also provide financial support for the set-up of long-term and mutually
 28 binding technological cooperation between private firms in developed and developing countries, and by
 29 co-financing local businesses with little or no access to long-term investment capital. Such support,
 30 which is for example provided by Denmark, Germany and Norway, 65/ could also be applied to
 31 technological cooperation of relevance to the Convention.

32 *Non-monetary incentive measures for cooperation and capacity building*

33 74. A number of countries established programmes that seek to facilitate information sharing and
 34 personal contacts between private sector technology producers and potential users of these technologies.
 35 For example, the Danish “Danida’s PS Programme” provides incentives to Danish companies in the form
 36 of advisory services and support in identifying partners, study visits and examinations as well as the
 37 provision of information on technology transfer and the need to adapt and apply new technology to

61/ See OECD (2002) for a related discussion of the guidelines of the United States National Institutes of Health (USNIH).

62/ See Provisional Act No. 2,186-16, Art. 23 2001.

63/ See UNFCCC (2003), page 20.

64/ See IP/C/W/132/Add.4/Suppl.1, IP/C/W/132/Add.4/Suppl.2, IP/C/W/132/Add. 4

65/ See IP/C/W/132/Add.4/Suppl.1, IP/C/W/132/Add.4, IP/C/W/412/Add.4, and the thematic report on technology transfer and cooperation from Norway.

1 developing countries.^{66/} So-called match-making programmes are offered *inter alia* by Norway and
 2 Switzerland.^{67/} They seek to encourage private partnerships by promoting investment projects between
 3 private firms in OECD countries and counterparts in developing and transition countries. Such promotion
 4 could for instance take place by facilitating the negotiations on partnership agreements.⁶⁸

5 *Incentives to public research institutions*

6 75. Public research institutions are almost by definition mainly or exclusively funded by public monies.
 7 It therefore appears that public authorities have more leverage on the terms of reference that govern
 8 research undertaken by public institutions, when compared with the research undertaken by private sector
 9 actors. The principles and guidelines that govern the funding of these institutions could be further
 10 developed to reflect the pertinent provisions and guidance of the Convention on technology transfer. In
 11 line with what had been observed in paragraph ~~69~~, above, such updated guidelines could in particular
 12 apply to public research institutions that engage in research making use of genetic resources. The
 13 guidelines could foresee the implementation of adequate mechanisms for the promotion and advancement
 14 of priority access to the results and benefits arising from the biotechnologies that result from such
 15 research, in accordance with Article 19(2) of the Convention, and could also encourage the broad access
 16 to research tools (through free access or non-exclusive licenses), joint patents with stakeholders in
 17 countries of origin of genetic resources, joint research programmes with institutions in such countries,
 18 and discourage reach-through provisions. ^{69/}

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19 76. In many countries however this comparatively high degree of leverage will nevertheless be restricted
 20 by a number of important factors, including: (i) the high value assigned to the policy principle that
 21 governments should not interfere with research and science (freedom for research and science); and (ii)
 22 the fact that budgetary restrictions have led many governments to put public research institutions under
 23 increasing pressure to look for private co-funding and for commercialization of their research results. In
 24 such cases, the approach outlined in the previous paragraph could be usefully complemented by the types
 25 of incentive measures provided to private sector actors, as described in the previous sub-section.

26 **5. *Measures and mechanism that promote and advance priority access to the results and benefits***
 27 ***arising from technologies based upon genetic resources, and to promote the effective participation in***
 28 ***related technological research***

29 77. Activity 3.1.2 of the programme of work also calls for the compilation and synthesis of information
 30 on measures and mechanisms that promote and advance priority access for Parties to the results and
 31 benefits arising from technologies based upon genetic resources provided by those Parties, in accordance
 32 with Article 19, paragraph 2 of the Convention, and to promote the effective participation in related
 33 technological research by those Parties.

34 *General observations*

35 78. Article 19, on handling of biotechnology and distribution of its benefits, requires Parties to the
 36 Convention to take legislative, administrative or policy measures, as appropriate, to provide for the
 37 effective participation in biotechnological research activities of those Parties, especially developing
 38 countries, which provide the genetic resources for such research; and to take all practicable measures to
 39 promote and advance priority access by such Parties, on a fair and equitable basis, to the results and
 40 benefits arising from biotechnologies based upon the genetic resources provided.

^{66/} See IP/C/W/132/Add. 4.

^{67/} See IP/C/W/412/Add.2.

^{68/} See also paragraph ~~43~~ on intermediate institutions.

^{69/} See again OECD (2002), *ibid*, for a related discussion of the guidelines of the United States National
 Institutes of Health (USNIH).

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1 79. In the context of providing priority access, on a fair and equitable basis, to the benefits arising from
 2 biotechnologies based upon genetic resources, there is a linkage to the ongoing negotiations on an
 3 international regime on access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing with the aim of adopting an
 4 instrument/instruments to effectively implement the provisions of Article 15 and Article 8(j) of the
 5 Convention and the three objectives of the Convention, which are taking place in the Open-ended
 6 Working Group on Access and Benefit Sharing of the Convention. Article 1 of the Convention, which
 7 presents its three objectives, recognizes that the appropriate transfer of relevant technologies is one
 8 means to achieve the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic
 9 resources. ⁷⁰ The transfer of technology as a non-monetary means to share benefits arising from the
 10 utilization of genetic resources is also recognized in the Bonn Guidelines on Access and Benefit-sharing
 11 that the. ⁷¹/

12 80. In the context of implementing Article 19 of the Convention, it may also be useful to consider that
 13 the development of technologies that are based on genetic resources may also utilize, during the
 14 development process, traditional knowledge that is associated with the genetic resources.

15 *National legislation and guidelines*

16 81. Legislation in a number of countries addresses access and benefit-sharing and provide for the
 17 establishment of guidelines or regulations. Several of these guidelines or regulations have already been
 18 adopted (e.g. Costa Rica, India, Malawi), while others are in draft form or in planning stage. ⁷²/

19 82. Different types of actors may use genetic resources, ranging from universities, research institutes,
 20 gene banks, botanical gardens to biotechnological companies. There is frequently a need identified for
 21 different mechanisms that reflect the type of user and his objectives, needs and priorities when accessing
 22 genetic resources, including for instance the intended uses of the genetic resources, such as basic
 23 research or potential commercialization. For example, the South African Biodiversity Act requires
 24 different measures depending on whether the genetic resources are being accessed for research or for
 25 commercial purposes. ⁷³/

26 83. Brazil states in its Provisional Act No. 2, 186-16, Article 21 that “the institution that receives
 27 samples of genetic heritage components or associated traditional knowledge shall facilitate the access to
 28 and transfer of technology for the conservation and use of this heritage or of this knowledge to the
 29 Brazilian institution responsible for the access and shipment of the samples and transmission of the
 30 knowledge, or to an institution it indicates.” It specifies further in Article 22 that “the access to and
 31 transfer of technology between a Brazilian research and development institution, public or private, and a
 32 foreign-based institution, may be carried out through the following activities, among others: 1.) Scientific
 33 research and technological development, 2.) Training and capacity building of human resources, 3.)
 34 Exchange of information, 4.) Exchange between a Brazilian research institution and a foreign-based
 35 research institution, 5.) Consolidation of scientific research and technological development
 36 infrastructure, 6.) Economic use, in partnership, of process and product arising from the use of a genetic
 37 heritage component, and 7.) Establishment of joint technologically based undertaking.”

38 84. The type of actor involved is therefore likely to have an influence on the benefit-sharing
 39 arrangement. For instance, benefits from an agreement involving a private company are more likely to

⁷⁰/ Article 1 of the Convention states that: “*The objectives of this Convention, to be pursued in accordance with its relevant provisions, are (...) the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources, including by appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into account all rights over those resources and to technologies, and by appropriate funding.*” (emphasis added)

⁷¹/ See Appendix II, paragraph 2 (f).

⁷²/ See UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/3/2.

⁷³/ See South Africa National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act, 2004, art. 83-84

1 include royalties in the event of commercialization, some kind of up-front payment and possibly non-
 2 monetary benefits like training or transfer of technologies, while benefits arising out of resources
 3 collected by, for instance, botanical gardens with the sole purpose of realizing academic research, are
 4 likely to rather involve non-monetary benefits, such as (i) technology transfer, (ii) joint fieldwork and
 5 research, or (iii) provision of internships and training. It has to be in borne in mind however, that even
 6 purely academic research may (unintentionally) lead to results that can be commercialized.

7 85. According to a recent publication ^{74/} “almost without exception, every biodiversity-prospecting
 8 collection effort undertaken on behalf of companies is done through intermediaries”. These
 9 intermediaries are mainly botanic gardens, research institutions and universities with expertise in
 10 collection techniques, taxonomy and other relevant fields. It has been suggested that the importance of
 11 such intermediaries may need to be considered by governments in the development of their access and
 12 benefit-sharing regimes.^{75/}

13 86. A number of measures and mechanisms that were discussed in previous sections will also contribute
 14 to promote and advance priority access for Parties to the results and benefits arising from technologies
 15 based upon genetic resources provided by those Parties, in accordance with Article 19(2) of the
 16 Convention. For instance, it was discussed in section 4 above how incentives could be generated for
 17 private sector actors (paragraph ^{69/}) and public research institutions (paragraph ^{75/}) to engage in pertinent
 18 activities, through the development or revision of guidelines that govern eligibility for tax breaks or
 19 deferrals, or for funding.

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20 *Information exchange and development of guidance at the international level*

21 87. In addition, reference was also made to the importance of identifying or establishing suitable national
 22 institutions that could inter alia promote the enhancement of capacity or, as appropriate, the enhanced use
 23 of existing expertise in the negotiation of technology transfer agreements for the sake of benefit sharing
 24 in accordance with Article 19 (see the discussion in paragraph ^{44/} above). A compilation and analysis of
 25 existing templates or standard transfer agreements, envisaged in paragraph ^{48/} above, and the subsequent
 26 development of international guidance thereon, could also contribute to enhance the capacity of in
 27 particular developing countries in this regard.

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28 *Project-based activities*

29 88. The literature, the thematic reports and the recent submissions provide information on a number of
 30 project-based activities that promote access for Parties to the results and benefits arising from
 31 technologies based upon genetic resources provided by those Parties:

- 32 • One successful project concerning the effective participation in biotechnological research
 33 activities is a joint venture between the multi national company Dupont and the Applied Genetic
 34 Engineering Research Institute (AGERI), an Egyptian public research institute. The project aims
 35 to jointly develop Bt maize, whereas AGERI gains access to expertise to develop the local strain
 36 of Bt (the innovation) and to train its staff. Dupont in turn, has access to the new Bt strain for use
 37 in markets outside of Egypt. ^{76/}
- 38 • Austria reported on a research project on sweet potato germplasm diversity assessment, under
 39 which unlimited use of all results for the CGIAR system and partners in developing countries is
 40 ensured. Moreover, it has drafted a proposal of a Virtual Training Center for Capacity Building
 41 (VTCCB) in cooperation with CGIAR centres and the international capacity programme on
 42 conservation and use of biological diversity for development, between the International Plant

^{74/} See Laird (2002).

^{75/} See UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/3/2.

^{76/} Beyerlee and Fischer (2000).

1 Genetic Resources Institute (IPGRI) and the Austrian Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry,
2 Environment and Water Management. ^{77/}

- 3 • The United Kingdom reports that the training of developing country scientists in the application
4 of new technologies for the conservation and utilization of genetic resources takes place in
5 various institutions including universities, Kew, the John Innes Centre in Norwich and CABI (an
6 intergovernmental organization that obtains competitive public funding). The commercial
7 company of the Macaulay Institute has undertaken training of Chinese scientists in nature
8 conservation and range management. In combination with Institutes in several Central Asian
9 countries, new systems of production, which conserve biodiversity of rangelands, have been
10 developed. Current work in South America is developing systems with local organizations for the
11 sustainable management of vicunas.

12 **6. Measures and mechanisms that promote innovative approaches and means of technology**
13 **transfer and cooperation such as Type 2 partnerships**

14 89. Activity 3.1.2 of the programme of work also calls for the compilation and synthesis of information
15 on measures and mechanisms that promote innovative approaches and means of technology transfer and
16 cooperation such as Type 2 partnerships, in accordance with the outcome of the World Summit on
17 Sustainable Development, or transfer among actors, involving in particular the private sector and civil
18 society organizations.

19 *General remarks*

20 90. Partnerships can achieve many of the 10 dimensions of enabling environments described in
21 paragraph **Error! Reference source not found,** above, particularly in terms of joint R&D and human
22 and institutional capacity development. Case studies reflect that partnerships involving a broad range of
23 actors ranging from universities and R&D institutions to government entities, private companies and
24 NGO's are important for enhancing technology transfer.

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25 91. The partnerships can take on diverse forms and involve a range of players. Private sector participants
26 can include technology developers, assessors, suppliers, users and investors, while those from the public
27 sector might be central government departments, agencies, intergovernmental organizations and local
28 government. Networks can usefully bring together players who play similar roles in the technology
29 transfer process, and wish to share experiences and information through the exchange of best practices,
30 lessons learned and case studies as well as protocols, criteria, benchmarks and performance data on
31 specific technologies.

32 *Type 2 Partnerships*

33 92. One important outcome of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) have been so
34 called Type 2 partnerships. Those are voluntary multi-stakeholder initiatives that are specifically linked
35 to the implementation of commitments outlined in the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, Agenda 21
36 and/or the Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21.^{78/} It is the partners themselves that
37 govern the partnerships through a mutually agreed mechanism. The governance mechanisms may vary
38 from partnership to partnership but could be built along the lines of existing other partnerships like the
39 Global Alliance on Vaccine and Immunization (GAVI), the Consultative Group on International
40 Agricultural Research (CGIAR), or the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI). Type 2
41 partnerships require no formal selection process and interested parties can get together and launch
42 implementation initiatives to achieve the goals of sustainable development.

^{77/} Thematic report on technology transfer and cooperation from Austria.

^{78/} E/CN.17/2004/16, page 3

1 93. The distribution of registered partnerships by thematic focus shows that some areas have very few
2 registered partnerships. These “underrepresented” thematic areas include *inter alia*: biotechnology,
3 desertification, drought, marine resources and mountains.

4 94. One partnership that relates to technologies of relevance to the Convention is an initiative involving
5 the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (ICGEB, Italy) to promote
6 sustainable biotechnology and agriculture in Africa. ^{79/} This initiative pursues *inter alia* (i) the protection
7 and exploitation of genetic resources; (ii) the identification of research priorities; (iii) procedures for risk
8 assessment and management, national legislation(s) and public information. Results of the research
9 performed in the national institutes will be transferred, on a favourable basis, to other countries
10 participating in the initiative.

11 *International partnerships, networks and joint R&D programmes*

12 95. A number of networks have been active in sensitizing the private sector in the developed world to
13 sustainable business options in the developing world. In addition to Type 2 partnerships, several new
14 partnerships were launched at the WSSD including *inter alia* the UNDP-GEF Technology Transfer
15 Network and UNEP’s Global Network on Energy for Sustainable Development. The former addresses the
16 issue of access to knowledge by facilitating information exchange, finance and investment in sustainable
17 products and services *inter alia* in the agriculture, water and forestry sectors, while the latter is focusing
18 on various thematic areas of energy, including renewables and access to the poor. ^{80/}

19 96. Another partnership initiative is the World Business Council for Sustainable Development
20 (WBCSD), a coalition of 170 international companies with the commitment to sustainable development
21 via economic growth, ecological balance and social progress. The WBCSD’s key activities include *inter*
22 *alia* capacity building, climate, water, energy and sustainable livelihoods. ^{81/} One example of a WBCSD
23 partnership activity is a cooperative timber supply program called the Forestry Partners Program^{82/}
24 developed by Aracruz Celulose ^{83/} in 1990. Under this program, partnerships are formed with local
25 farmers to develop new, sustainable timber plantations that provide alternative planted sources of timber
26 for the company’s pulp mill, and a new source of income for the farmers and local communities. In
27 addition, seedlings of native tree species are also provided for use in protected reserves. The program
28 aims to help local farmers earn a better living, make better use of under-productive and fallow land, and
29 benefit from a viable and profitable alternative to traditional crops by supplying know-how and partial
30 financing.

31 97. Yet another example of a global partnership is the international research cooperation network in the
32 area of science and technology (CYTED), which links 21 Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking countries
33 from Europe and Latin America. This programme, which is supported by several international
34 organizations, involves different models of cooperation between universities, R&D centres and
35 enterprises. Its primary objective is to establish cooperation in research and technology development and
36 the transfer of R&D results to the productive sector. It includes sectoral activities relevant to areas such
37 as energy conservation and biodiversity. ^{84/}

38 98. The Climate Technology Initiative (CTI) launched in 1995 is a voluntary initiative by 23 OECD/IEA
39 member countries and the European Commission to support the technology-related objectives of the

^{79/} <http://webapps01.un.org/dsd/partnerships/search/partnerships/22.html>

^{80/} See UNFCCC (2003)

^{81/} See <http://www.wbcsd.ch>

^{82/} See <http://www.wbcsd.ch/Plugins/DocSearch/details>.

^{83/} See <http://www.aracruz.com>

^{84/} See UNFCCC TP/2003, page 21

1 UNFCCC. It generally aims at facilitating the more rapid development and diffusion of climate-friendly
2 technologies and practices through partnerships among OECD countries, developing countries,
3 multilateral organizations and the private sector. ^{85/} Synergies with the objectives of the Convention on
4 Biological Diversity may in particular result from the work of the CTI on technologies for adaptation to
5 climate change.

6 *Public Private Partnerships*

7 99. The establishment of partnerships involving public and private key players brings complementary
8 capacities and helps to share advantages and to gain mutual benefits. One increasingly important example
9 of such relationships is public-private partnerships. These are being seen increasingly as an effective
10 means to leverage public funds, thereby overcoming budget restrictions, while also harnessing the
11 efficiency of the private sector and allowing it to operate more effectively through changes in public
12 policy that create more business opportunities. For the private sector, it is increased business
13 opportunities for providing better products, better services and sustainable technologies that also matters.
14 Through effective and equal partnerships, the advantages of the private sector are combined with the
15 social responsibility, local knowledge, environmental awareness and job generation concerns of local or
16 national governments.^{86/} The public and private sectors bring specific skills and assets that often provide
17 the potential for alliances that exploit complementarities.

18 100. Assets of the private sector include large research and development resources to fund long-term
19 projects; a diverse range of organizations from small biotechnology companies to large multinational
20 companies that have extensive and increasingly collaborative research links with the public sector,
21 particularly universities; dynamism, managerial efficiency, entrepreneurial spirit, knowledge of, and
22 expertise in, marketing and distribution systems; knowledge of technologies; access to global financial
23 markets; and the advantages of economies of scale.

24 101. The public sector can provide the private sector with knowledge of pathways for local market
25 access, applied infrastructure and access to local genetic resources. Furthermore, partnerships with the
26 public sector are likely to improve the public image of biotechnology and of the private company
27 involved.

28 102. However, it is important that public and private partners recognize the differences in their values
29 and culture. Considerable time and patience is needed to bridge these cultural divides and establish
30 mutual trust and confidence. The overall goal should be to build partnerships that optimize the
31 comparative advantages of the public and private sectors to achieve mutual objectives.

32 103. It has been pointed out that joint ventures and co-operations between governments and firms may
33 prove useful not only in channeling concrete private investments into technology but may also contribute
34 to alter other firms' risk perceptions in the medium and in the long run, thus contributing to an increasing
35 and more stable private sector involvement. ^{87/} With regard to the transfer of technology of relevance
36 under the Convention, this observation may also be relevant with regard to technology risk assessments
37 that are needed, according to the programme of work on technology transfer and scientific and
38 technological information, to ensure that the transferred technologies are economically viable, socially
39 acceptable and environmentally friendly. ^{88/} Conducting technology transfer within partnership
40 agreements will ensure that these objectives are duly taken into account from the very first stages of the
41 transfer process, and will thus also contribute to stabilize the expectations of the involved businesses. In

^{85/} See UNFCCC (2003), page 21

^{86/} See UNEP-IETC (2004).

^{87/} See UNFCCC (1999).

^{88/} See programme element 1, preamble and activity 1.2.1.

1 addition, partnership agreements provide scope for reducing the general political and economic risks
 2 associated with foreign direct investment, and are therefore preferred to FDI when these risks are
 3 relevant. ^{89/}

4 104. Technology partnership programs can be fostered in conditions where government institutions as
 5 well as science and technology centers are sufficiently strong to form a mutually beneficial partnership
 6 with private enterprises. While these partnerships should eventually develop and operate independently,
 7 public sector support is often necessary to establish the basic framework for collaboration. ^{90/} Examples
 8 of such partnership programs of relevance for technology transfer under the Convention include:

- 9 • Technology partnership programs such as the UK Technology Partnership Initiative (TPI), a
 10 government initiative that aims to link companies and organizations in developing countries with
 11 UK companies and other organizations, which provide both technologies and services, as well as
 12 the information and advice they need to deal with their environmental problems. ^{91/}
- 13 • Public private partnership programmes such as offered by the *Deutsche Investitions- und*
 14 *Entwicklungsgesellschaft* (DEG German investment and development society) that aim to
 15 provide structural support to the private sector in countries that are developing or undergoing
 16 reform. DEG supports specifically target business partnerships between German (or other EU)
 17 investors and local firms in developing countries and cofinances pre-investment and investment-
 18 tied projects. These include projects to protect the environment including the support of training
 19 schemes, such as the qualification of suppliers. ^{92/} An example is the DEG-backed German-
 20 Egyptian joint venture ATOS that developed a pilot project, in which plants are cultivated and
 21 seeding and harvesting times as well as extraction procedures are tested. ^{93/}
- 22 • Several CGIAR centres have developed joint-ventures with private companies. ^{94/}

23 105. Public-private partnerships may also play an important role in the development of innovative
 24 funding mechanisms for technology transfer. As explained in paragraph ^{1/} above, banks and other lending
 25 institutions seem at present to be reluctant to finance the transfer and uptake of technologies for
 26 conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. This issue can be addressed through the promotion of
 27 institutions, arrangements and mechanisms that can provide innovative financing, including micro-
 28 financing, green finance, secured loans, and/or leasing arrangements.

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29 106. In general terms, initiatives that could be undertaken by public-private partnerships include
 30 (comprehensiveness is not claimed):

- 31 • strengthening scientific and technical education and research institutions in order to help address
 32 technology needs;
- 33 • discouraging restrictive business practices and promoting open markets and fair competition in
 34 biodiversity technology related markets, including the promotion of good practices in this regard,
 35 through for instance the development of international standards and guidelines;
- 36 • increasing the certainty and responsiveness of legal systems and reduce regulatory risk by
 37 reforming administrative law and ensuring that public regulation is accessible to stakeholders and
 38 subject to independent review;
- 39 • encouraging capital flows that support technology transfer and scientific and technological
 40 cooperation through the use of innovative specialized credit instruments and capital pools;

^{89/} See WTO (2002), page 33.

^{90/} UNFF (2003b), page 49

^{91/} See thematic report on technology transfer and cooperation from the United Kingdom.

^{92/} http://www.deginvest.de/english/home/range_service/ppp/index.html

^{93/} See http://www.deginvest.de/english/home/range_service/ppp/index.html

^{94/} See Beyerlee and Fischer (2000), page 14.

- 1 • expanding research and development programmes aimed at improving access to technologies that
- 2 are needed in developing countries and adaptable to local conditions;
- 3 • improving systems for the collection, assessment and sharing of specific technical, commercial,
- 4 financial and legal information.

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