|
| Submission |
| ID |
|
5303 |
| Submitting Entity |
|
UNEP |
| Submitted for |
|
Seventh Meeting of the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice (SBSTTA 7) |
|
| Main Information |
| Title |
|
The Botswana Tribal Grazing Land Policy: A Property Rights Study |
| Description |
|
The study establishes that the privatization of rangelands through the Tribal Grazing Land Policy has not been very successful in reducing overuse and bringing about increased productivity. It further establishes that the privatization has brought increased inequity by maintaining dual land rights. Though there has been some attempt to charge rents for the exclusive rights, the charges levied were too low. |
| Web Link |
|
/doc/meetings/sbstta/sbstta-07/official/sbstta-07-11-en.pdf |
|
| Additional Information |
| Authors |
|
N. H. Fidzani |
| Source |
|
Study is taken from: Rietbergen-McCracken, J; H. Abaza (2000): Economic Instruments for Environmental Management. United Nations Environment Programme, Earthscan Publications, London. |
| Countries |
|
Botswana |
| Ecosystems |
|
Agricultural Biodiversity
Dry and Sub-Humid Lands Biodiversity |
| Regions |
|
Africa |
| Incentive Measures |
|
Environmental Funds / Investments
Indirect Incentives (property rights, market creation)
Negative Incentives (taxes, levies,...) |
| Keywords |
|
Extraction levies/pricing
Strengthening property rights (land tenure, ...) |
| |
| |
