Transforming or Tinkering? New Forms of Engagement between Communities and the Private Sector in Tourism and Forestry in Southern Africa

Caroline Ashley
William Wolmer

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Through work in southern Africa this research programme has explored the challenges of institutional, organisational and policy reform around land, water and wild resources. The case study sites have been in Zambezia Province, Mozambique, the Eastern Cape Wild Coast in South Africa and the lowveld area of southeastern Zimbabwe. Three broad themes have been explored:

- How do poor people gain access to and control over land, water and wild resources and through what institutional mechanisms?
- How do emerging institutional arrangements in the context of decentralisation affect poor people’s access to land, water and wild resources? What institutional overlaps, complementarities and conflicts enable or limit access? What new governance arrangements are required to encourage a livelihoods approach?
- How do the livelihood concerns and contexts of poor people get represented in policy processes concerning land, water and wild resources in local, national and international arenas? What are the challenges for participation in the policy process?

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Summary

In South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique there are a plethora of policy statements, approaches and initiatives that are seeking to commercialise tourism and forestry assets, while simultaneously incorporating some element of community involvement. Despite important differences, similar overall assumptions concerning the role of the private sector, communities and government are reflected in these policy approaches. The common theme is to promote ‘pro-poor growth’ by encouraging private sector activity in using forests, wildlife and wild resources, and, to varying degrees, to enhance the benefits to the poor deriving from this. Using detailed case studies this paper examines these approaches, explores the driving forces and assesses their impact on the livelihoods of the poor. The case studies suggest that the new forms of interaction between communities and the private sector are highly varied in their impacts on the poor. There are too many unsuccessful examples to suggest that ‘making markets work for the poor’ happens easily or automatically. While some of the poor are earning or will gain cash incomes and economic opportunities, there is inequality in these opportunities, and insufficient attention paid to the participation of the poor in decision-making and to the trade-offs with other livelihood priorities. For the market to be helpful in alleviating poverty there needs to be a more level playing field; a recognition that markets are intensely politicised and easily captured by elites; and a willingness on behalf of the state to intervene in markets and address the issue of equity with redistributive mechanisms where necessary.
Introduction

Major shifts in policy with regard to economic growth, wild resources, community development and rural development are taking place in southern Africa. Within an overall drive for economic growth, there is an emphasis on various ‘pro-poor’ or ‘pro-empowerment’ elements. Forestry and wildlife resources are being privatised and commercialised. The management of natural resources by local residents is being encouraged to take on new, often more commercial, forms. There are significant and instructive similarities and differences in the rhetoric, practice and impact of these trends in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. But in all three countries a common feature is that these policies are leading to new and increased interactions between rural residents and the private sector.

There are a number of policy approaches that seek to link private sector tourism and forestry operations with community or local involvement, usually with an emphasis on ‘pro-poor’ commercial investment. There are also a number of ad hoc arrangements that have sprung up. These initiatives encompass a wide variety of concepts of varying degrees of familiarity. Alongside community based natural resource management (CBNRM), Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), and community-private partnerships, these include: the involvement of historically disadvantaged individuals (HDIs), the promotion of small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs), community tenure and leasing, wildlife-based land reform, Transborder Natural Resource Management (TBNRM), neighbour outreach schemes, wildlife endowment schemes, contractual national parks, and corporate social responsibility. All of
these approaches have different emphases but they share a common theme: to encourage private sector activity in using forests, wildlife and wild resources, and, to varying degrees, to enhance the benefits to the poor deriving from this.

Given the extent of policy rhetoric about ‘win-win partnerships’ and ‘making markets work for the poor’, it is important to examine critically these new community-private sector interactions and to learn from experience. The purpose of this paper is therefore to explore the new arrangements that bring the rural poor and private investors together in managing tourism and forestry, and to assess their value to the poor. Specifically, the paper aims to:

- Map the new policy approaches and the envisaged roles for the private sector and communities.
- Explore the driving forces and the interests of different actors underpinning these approaches.
- Review what is happening on the ground: documenting new roles and institutional arrangements in tourism and forestry; the progress, obstacles and ambiguities to date; and comparing outputs with stated policy intentions.
- Draw lessons from case studies and from comparisons between models, sectors and countries, to explore the costs and benefits for rural livelihoods, the constraints on a ‘pro-poor’ impact, and the extent to which the interests of the poor are represented.

Our main concern in all this is with the implications for local livelihoods of these emerging arrangements. This raises a range of important questions: are poor people losing control over the commons, and thereby access to natural resources, to the private sector? Or are they gaining returns from profitable investment? Are they entering the private sector themselves, or seeing assets snatched away before they can establish themselves? Are they seeing popular demands ignored or deflected by being wrapped up in the cosy language of ‘win-win partnerships’ and joint-ventures, or are they genuinely influencing market-driven approaches for the better? Which types of arrangement offer greatest pro-poor potential? Perhaps not surprisingly, the case studies in this paper do not reveal uniform ‘either/or’ answers, but they shed light on the key challenges, trade-offs and implications for current policies.

We examine the changing articulation between the private sector and communities in relation to two sectors in three countries. These are tourism in South Africa and Zimbabwe and forestry in South Africa and Mozambique. These arenas were chosen to illustrate the cross-sectoral

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1 Both the ‘community’ and the private sector of course are heterogeneous and highly varied categories. Here community is used as shorthand for local residents with varying degrees of individual and collective action; and the private sector ranges from well-established international corporations making 20 year investments to individual entrepreneurs engaged in short-term harvesting of resources with zero investment.
and cross-national similarities and differences. One comparison of particular contemporary salience is that between the recent experiences of South Africa and Mozambique, on the one hand, and Zimbabwe on the other.

The paper first briefly reviews the policy context on growth and natural resource management, the regional context specific to southern Africa, and the host of policy approaches towards private-community commercialisation of natural resources. The heart of the paper then examines what is happening on the ground by drawing on case studies grouped according to the land rights involved. This enables comparisons to be drawn between approaches playing out in different geographical spaces, with different degrees of community power. The paper concludes with a summary, lessons, and recommendations.

Policy approaches to community and private sector interaction

International and regional thinking and policy trends

The policy emphasis in southern Africa partly reflects international thinking on growth and natural resource management. Four policy trends, in particular, underlie the growing emphasis on private-sector community interactions:

i. **A focus on private-sector led growth.** The need for growth underpins international thinking on development in Africa. The international consensus and World Bank orthodoxy is that this should occur via the market and private-sector investment.\(^2\) This thinking is seen most obviously in the policies of the South African and Mozambican governments. It is present, although currently less dominant, in Zimbabwe where the emphasis on state-led development and smallholder agriculture, the anti-imperialist rhetoric, and international political isolation, have distanced the government from the neoliberal market orthodoxy prevalent elsewhere.

ii. **Pro-poor growth.** Within the overall emphasis on economic growth, there is a strong sub-theme that calls for this growth to be ‘pro-poor’, or inclusive of the disadvantaged. In World Bank and DFID terminology it’s about ‘making markets work for the poor’ (DFID

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\(^2\) See for example, World Bank, (2000), the agenda of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD 2001), and other analysis such as Fafchamps (2001). The key targets of this approach are to liberalise markets and encourage investment, including foreign direct investment, while ensuring fiscal restraint and monetary stability. However, there is also (increasing) recognition that a considerable role for the state is still required, and that attention must be paid to institutional development, market development, and sequencing of liberalisation.
2000), and in South African terminology it is ‘Black Economic Empowerment’. The former is particularly concerned with expanding opportunities for employment (for example, for un-skilled or semi-skilled labour) and small enterprise for the poor; while BEE is more focused on increasing the share of non-white participation in the economy at every level, from share-owning and senior management to procurement and small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs).

iii. The commercialisation of wild resources. Wildlife, forests and wilderness areas are no longer viewed merely as subsistence resources for rural households, nor as simply areas of rich biodiversity for the concern of conservationists. They are now seen as commercial assets on which enterprise, investment and growth should be built. This trend has a long history in Zimbabwe which has a well-established – but currently beleaguered – wildlife industry; it is occurring in Mozambique; and is most clearly seen in South Africa, the country which is perhaps most active of all in explicitly seeking growth through tourism, and implementing large-scale forestry commercialisation.3

iv. A growing role for local people in managing natural resources. Southern Africa has long been at the forefront of attempts to promote community based natural resource management (CBNRM). CBNRM has acquired the status of conventional wisdom in the region – most recently spreading to small-scale initiatives and policies in Mozambique. CBNRM has increasingly embraced entrepreneurial activities, particularly community tourism.4 But CBNRM is no longer the sole, nor even the dominant, approach for increasing local participation in natural resource management: public-private partnerships, pro-poor tourism, and contractual national parks, for example, all include the idea that local residents should have more participation in managing wild resources than in previous eras, when wildlife and forests were the clear preserve of the state. However these approaches vary considerably in the extent and type of local participation or control, and the underlying social, economic, or conservation orientation.5 In South Africa, in particular, there is more emphasis on ‘black economic empowerment’ and on community-private partnerships in natural resource use, which only sometimes incorporate the management principles of CBNRM.

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3 In South Africa it is referred to as forestry ‘commercialisation’ rather than ‘privatisation’ because the forested land is not actually sold off by the state. Access to the land and its timber is leased to private companies on a long-term basis.
4 The need to generate tangible benefits from CBNRM via enterprise was already highlighted in SADC-wide CBNRM discussions in 1995 (Steiner and Riboy 1995), and a number of initiatives to support community tourism or community-private partnerships has flourished, including the establishment of a regional Community Tourism Association in 2002.
5 For example, managers of conservation areas have shifted, sometimes reluctantly, to increased involvement of both private operators and local residents in their reserves as a necessary strategy for generating funds and shoring up political support.
These policy trends are not always in harmony, but in the tourism and forestry sectors they have become inter-twined and underpin many of the new arrangements involving the private sector and rural poor. Indeed, these arrangements appear particularly strong in the tourism and forestry sectors in southern Africa, because both sectors are currently seen as having investment potential, and both have a history of some consideration of social issues.

Tourism is increasingly recognised as a massive global industry and potentially key opportunity for some developing countries including those in Africa. It is often seen as a sector that has not achieved its potential and needs government leverage to attract private investment. Within international tourism debates there is a strong sub-element relating to responsible, sustainable, ethical, and eco- and pro-poor tourism. While all such terms are open to dispute, they are worth noting as they include an element of ‘community benefit’ though rarely have a core focus on poverty and people.

In the forestry sector, privatisation is a popular theme (Landell-Mills and Ford 1999) and particularly so in South Africa. Also, paralleling the focus on community-based wildlife management in recent decades, ‘community forestry’ and ‘social forestry’ approaches have come to the fore as forestry policies have been revised in many developing countries. More recently, many NGOs and donors in the international community have focused on new ways of engaging with the private sector over sustainable forestry: for example through certification (Bass et al. 2001), and in relation to global warming debates on tradable permits.

Southern African contexts

The recent turbulent history of southern Africa – involving colonialism, socialism, apartheid, war, statist economics, economic liberalisation, independence, democracy, and political turmoil – strongly influences the way in which international trends take shape in the region. There are three key contextual facts that help explain the current policies and practices in relation to community-private sector interactions. These are political upheaval and pressure for a more progressive agenda; economic pressures and expectations; and the political and economic salience of land rights and land reform.

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6 Tourism is the world’s largest industry according to oft-cited WTTC data (1996), UNCTAD (2001) and Christie and Crompton (1999) emphasise that though tourism in Africa is small in international terms, from an African economic perspective it is a very important current or potential economic sector.

7 A focus at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, at the UN’s Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) 7 in 1999, and the focus of many other events, such as the 2002 International Year of Eco-tourism, and private sector codes of conduct.

8 For an analysis of the difference between these and ‘pro-poor tourism’ that does focus explicitly on the poor, see www.propoortourism.org.uk.
Political upheaval and pressure

South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique have all experienced political turmoil in the last two decades, and now face pressures (although to differing extents) for policy to be more progressive than in previous eras. South African democratization in 1994 created a political imperative to address inequalities, to implement land reform, and create a structurally different economy and polity. There had to be a new way of doing things. Business must deliver results locally, and the excluded should be included and consulted. ‘Transformation’ of the economy became a watchword and Black Economic Empowerment the means (essentially preferential treatment based on colour to redress their historical disadvantage). The sharp spatial divides between black, coloured and white areas had to go, but at the same time the centre had to devolve some centralised authority to the regions. Democratization also led to an equally strong imperative to generate economic growth in order to meet the pent-up demands for a decent standard of living (see below). The tension between these two priorities – growth and social justice – and the search to combine them, pervades all policy issues.

Mozambique emerged from tumultuous decades of anti-colonial and post-colonial war with the establishment of peace in 1992, a new Constitution in 1990, and elected government under FRELIMO since 1994. Given the much greater poverty than in South Africa, the need to overcome the massive disruption and displacement of the war years, and the considerable influence of international donors, there is a greater emphasis on laying the foundations for growth rather than transformation. The radical socialist elements of FRELIMO’s agenda were abandoned long ago. Nevertheless the need to combine progressive policies with conventional economic management can be seen, for example, in the constitutional protection of citizen’s land rights.

Zimbabwe has been politically turbulent since the emergence of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) – a broad-based coalition drawing support from groups as disparate as the trade union movement and white commercial farmers. This was formed in 1999 and became the first credible contender for power in what until then had been a de facto one party (ZANU(PF)) state. The political violence preceding the 2000 parliamentary election segued into a drawn out campaign for the 2002 presidential election and was accompanied by the well publicised occupations of commercial farms, a lot of radicalised political rhetoric in the anti-imperialist and, to a lesser extent, anti-globalisation mould from ZANU(PF). This seemed to imply a rejection of the structural adjustment policies of the eighties, and a return to a more state-led approach emphasising redistribution not just growth.

Economic pressures and demands

The economies of the three countries all suffer from high inequality and demands for growth that out-strip performance. The South African democratic transition raised massive expectations that the new
government would address the lack of land, education, housing, water and other essential services experienced by the poor majority. However, the economy has experienced slow growth and massive industrial retrenchments, resulting in rising unemployment. The government’s commitments to limited fiscal deficits and the burden of a swollen public sector has left little scope for public investment. Hence the emphasis is on mobilising private sector investment as the means to generate growth, and particularly to create employment. The ambitious Reconstruction and Development Plan (Republic of South Africa 1994a; 1994b), prioritising substantial new investments and a Keynesian approach, was soon supplanted by the Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy (Republic of South Africa 1996), which emphasised fiscal restraint and an enabling macro-economic framework. However, within the search for investment-led growth, there is a strong emphasis on policies that encourage transformation and BEE, and hence a high-level of state manipulation of the market environment.

Box 1: Inadequate resources in the face of high expectations and high unemployment

South Africa’s core problem is lack of resources, as described by Professor Mazibuko, Chief Director of Policy, Research, Planning and Strategic Development in the Office of the Premier of the Eastern Cape:

The Government came in with a backlog to do good: pressure for historical re-engineering. There is no area, apart from land, where we still face great policy challenges. The pressure is to raise resources from everywhere. It is not for the love of the private sector, but for mobilising whatever resources exist for specific development projects.

Source: Interview with Professor Mazibuko, December 2001.

Mozambique’s economy has experienced relatively high growth in recent years at around 8% in real terms, but starting from a very low base, and with much of the growth concentrated around Maputo, which accounts for 40% of the nation’s GDP. The United Nation’s Human Development Index ranks Mozambique as one of the poorest nations. It is estimated that 96% live in absolute poverty, 61% (and 74% of women) are illiterate, and 92% lack access to potable water (Government of Mozambique 2001). Thus the needs for investment in basic education and health care throughout the rural parts of the country are simply more than can be met in the short term. The economy is dependent on donor funding, which is equivalent to 60% of the government budget. The

9 The ANC had already shed much of its radical economic agenda when it came to power promising strategies for growth to business and the international community. Peet (2002) describes this as a drastic ideological reorientation from emphasising growth through redistribution to redistribution through growth. GEAR, however, is seen as the categorical buy-in to economic orthodoxy on promoting investment, while trimming government spending. Debates about this strategy have grown (Adelzadeh 1996; Kepe et al. 2001).
Government is following a fairly conventional economic strategy, involving a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and investment and export promotion, but nevertheless, many elements of state regulation from the colonial and socialist era remain in place.

Zimbabwe’s economy has been, if anything, more turbulent than its politics in recent years. The economy took a downturn in the mid nineties when the World Bank/IMF’s Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) – designed to liberalise an economy that was seen as inefficient and overprotected – precipitated de-industrialisation, and soaring debt, interest rates, and inflation (Bond and Manyana 2002). Economic deterioration accelerated in 1997. A currency crash was triggered in part by the government’s decisions to award unbudgeted payouts to liberation war veterans and breathe new life into the land redistribution issue (ibid.). By 2000, the government had officially dumped ESAP in favour of a stated policy emphasis on indigenisation and redistribution – particularly in relation to land. However hyperinflation, severe shortages of foreign currency, fuel and even basic commodities, together with the ongoing political violence and ZANU(PF)’s reawakened socialist rhetoric, did not make for an environment conducive to policy encouraging market-led growth. Zimbabwe has been condemned internationally as much for its economic self-sabotage, seen as inimical to the wider agenda of economic renaissance for Africa, as for its political repression.

**Land reform**

A further crucial dynamic in southern Africa is land reform, which is a key political and economic issue. Land is seen as the key resource that was expropriated (by colonialists/white settlers/apartheid government) and from which inequality in other assets and income derives. But redress is not a simple issue.

In South Africa, there are three tenets to land reform:

- **restitution** based on claims over land from which people were moved after 1913. There is still a massive backlog of claims to be adjudicated. Several claims on land inside National Parks have been, or are being, resolved (the first being the Makuleke claim in Kruger National Park) leading to a new type of contractual park in which the community is the land-owner, known as the ‘Makuleke model’.

- **resettlement**, to reverse the 30:70 ratio between black-owned and white-owned land. This is done through state acquisition of land at market rates, and a range of land grants to fund settlers’ investments. The emphasis has shifted from resettlement for subsistence use to resettlement for larger-scale commercial use (that is, to commercial black farmers).

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10 Including periodic threats by President Mugabe to extend the seizure of private assets from farms to other companies.
• **tenure reform**, to give greater security of tenure in ‘communal areas’.

This remains unresolved (a bill is out for discussion) and lack of security remains a massive constraint to development in the former homelands (Lahiff 2003b).

Though implementation is very patchy (Lahiff 2001, 2003b), the assumption is that as the black majority gain access and rights to land, they also gain access to the benefits of economic activity that occurs there – including, of course, tourism.

The Zimbabwean ‘land question’ has gained a high profile in recent years in large part because of the notorious farm ‘invasions’, ‘squatting’ or ‘self-provisioning’ (according to different perspectives). The land question is inextricably bound up with the country’s political struggles but is rooted in a genuine sense of frustration at the slow pace of land reform. The farm invasions were quickly followed by a ‘fast-track’ quick and dirty formal land reform process earmarking the majority of commercial farms for resettlement. Land reform, in this context, has meant the compulsory acquisition of relatively large, privately owned commercial farms (including game ranches and wildlife conservancies) and their redistribution to smallholders primarily for the purpose of dryland cropping under the slogan ‘land is the economy, the economy is land’.

The Zimbabwean government has tended to focus on the need for land redistribution with little consideration of the restitution of specific land claims (as in South Africa). However, the invasions have in some cases constituted a ‘self-restitutive process’ as communities have occupied ancestral land (whether commercial farms or national parks) on which they had a claim. This may open up options for the Makuleke model of restitution to be implemented in Zimbabwe.

In Mozambique, boundaries between communal, private and government-controlled land are slightly different and less rigid. While displacement from land and lack of land rights are key issues, boundaries are more a product of colonial land-use, nationalisation, war, and concessioning (for example, resulting in demarcation of large farms/plantations), rather than apartheid divisions. Previous categories were government land (for example, protected reserves, although all reserves contain residents); multiple use land (where communities live, also used by the private sector, most similar to communal land in South Africa), and productive areas (for concessions and licences). No land is classified as commercially owned, as all land was nationalised. Under the new Land Law, all land remains owned by the state, but within that, there is land leased to companies, land that is delimited by communities, other land where communities live and have rights, and reserves or protected areas where people also live. Boundaries between these are contested as there are overlapping claims.

Measures to strengthen rural people’s land rights are found in the Constitutional Amendments of 1990, and the Land Law of 1997. The
Constitution confirms people’s rights to land where they live. However, these are occupational rights only. Thus the long-standing practice of government issuing commercial land-rights (forestry licences, tourism concessions, agricultural plantations) can continue and is not devolved to residents. However, the land law requires consultation with residents on allocation of land to third parties, and the forestry and wildlife law also lays out (somewhat different) procedures for consulting with land-users. The Land Law also lays out a process of delimitation and registration of community land rights, which in theory greatly strengthens the community by defining the land and membership involved at any site, making it more possible to translate constitutional rights into power (Norfolk et al. 2003).

**Box 2: Tenets of land reform**

In South Africa:
- Restitution via land claims on ancestral land
- Resettlement: of black farmers on formerly white purchased land
- Tenure reform: to codify tenure, e.g. of communal residents, farm workers

In Zimbabwe:
- Self-provisioning, squatting, invasion (may include restitution element)
- Redistribution: fast track land reform by government

In Mozambique:
- Constitutional recognition of residential land rights
- Delimitation process for a community to define its land area
- Rights of residents recognised in specific Acts: land law, forestry law

In summary, political upheaval, unmet economic needs, and demands for land reform strongly influence the way in which the South African, Zimbabwean and Mozambican governments are pursuing (or not) investment-led growth policies, and the ways in which they are encouraging (or not) interactions between private sector and communities in tourism and forestry. The South African government is trying to reconcile two imperatives – growth and social justice – by encouraging private investment *and* economic participation by the poor. The Mozambican government is trying to create a market-based economy virtually from scratch. And the Zimbabwean government seems to be explicitly rejecting the role of the private sector in rural development and of wildlife utilisation as a sustainable land use option for smallholders in its emphasis on small-holder land reform and anti-globalisation rhetoric. Yet as we shall see, the Zimbabwean situation contains many ambiguities and approaches that encourage investment and private-community partnerships, in wildlife management and tourism.
Southern African policies promoting private-community commercialisation of natural resources

In South Africa and Mozambique, a wide array of provincial governments, national governments, NGOs and donors’ policies are geared towards encouraging private investment in tourism or forestry and promoting public-private or private-community partnerships. In Zimbabwe, there are also measures that encourage private investment, despite other strong messages that threaten it. Before examining how these policies and approaches play out in practice, we outline the array of initiatives relevant to the tourism and forestry sectors currently underway in the region.

Spatial Approaches: SDIs and TBNRM

South Africa’s Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs) are focused on zones where there is regarded to be economic potential, which can be ‘unlocked’ and leveraged through planning and investment. Some of these, particularly the Wild Coast SDI and Lubombo SDI, rest on tourism as a key sector. The government sees its role as providing the public investment and investment packaging needed to attract private investment, whilst simultaneously encouraging BEE. BEE is pursued through direct support to community enterprises and communities entering private partnerships, and through setting incentives for investors to develop their own BEE proposals. SDIs emerged in the mid-nineties as an instrument of GEAR (Jourdan 1998). They were initially all administered by the Department of Trade and Industry and had a high political profile. Since then, some have been handed to the Department of Environment and Tourism (DEAT) or other institutions, funding has been reduced, and they may already be on the wane (Crush and Rogerson 2001). Some are regarded as having had some successful economic impact, particularly the Maputo Development Corridor (ibid.) but others, such as the Wild Coast SDI, have achieved nothing on the ground and come in for damning criticism (Kepe 2001b; Kepe et al. 2001; Ashley and Ntshona 2003).

Another important new spatial approach to fostering private sector involvement in natural resource management in the region is variously known as Transboundary Natural Resource Management (TBNRM), Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs), Transfrontier Parks (TFP), and Peace Parks. In essence these all refer to bi- or tri-lateral agreements on conservation initiatives straddling national boundaries in the interests of opening up previously segmented ecoregions to migratory species and tourists. Allied to ecological arguments is a similar logic to that underpinning SDIs, revolving around the – potentially pro-poor – development potential brought by new private sector opportunities. Economies of scale and regional marketing are seen as particularly important benefits to attract tourism investment. These are still in the early stages of development and have also gained mixed reviews.11 Even

11 See van der Linde et al. (2001); Griffen (1999); Katerere et al. (2001); Wolmer (2003).
the Zimbabwean government has signed six TBNRM agreements, which would appear to indicate a willingness to contemplate private sector-driven, conservation-orientated development initiatives – at least on the part of some in government.

**Tourism development strategies**

In South Africa, a host of policies and initiatives are aimed at developing tourism products, incentives and skills. The White Paper on Tourism (DEAT 1996) focuses on tourism as an engine of growth. Its approach tallies with the wider thinking on enabling growth and BEE, emphasising that ‘tourism should be government led, private sector driven, community based, and labour conscious’ (ibid.). Initiatives focused on pro-poor elements include Responsible Tourism Guidelines, Tourism Law Reform, training and capacity-building programmes and tourism marketing to help small entrepreneurs. All reflect the themes of encouraging investment, assisting the private sector, shifting away from Government role in direct provision, with an emphasis throughout on BEE as well as on environmental sustainability. South Africa Tourism, the Government co-ordination and marketing body, is talking of the need for 40% of tourism spending to go to HDI enterprises in the foreseeable future (Ashley and Poultney 2002).

It is not only government that is focusing on tourism opportunities. In 1999, leading tourism businesses came together in the ‘Cluster Consortium’ to define obstacles to tourism growth and seek practical linkages that would progress the industry (DEAT et al. 1998). The private sector’s Tourism Business Council of South Africa recently produced a report auditing progress in achieving transformation in the industry, and many companies have their own transformation and empowerment policies. Communities are also demonstrating their growing determination to gain a share of the action with the formation of a new Community Tourism Action for Southern Africa (COTASA 2002).

This interest in tourism is not surprising as tourism was one of the economic sectors that particularly stood to benefit from the reversal of South Africa’s international fortunes, from pariah to favoured destination. Though the window of opportunity was not fully capitalised upon, and the growing crime rate and recent events in Zimbabwe have constrained growth, a strong narrative has emerged that tourism offers a route to economic growth that is particularly suited to southern Africa’s natural assets and international comparative advantage. This is particularly strong in South Africa’s Department for Environment and Tourism (DEAT) and is also evident regionally, for example in discussion over transfrontier initiatives. But at the same time, tourism is widely recognised and talked about as a ‘white man’s industry’ – in which a white elite caters to (‘pampers’) the leisure interests of the rest of the elite (or ‘pleasure periphery’, see King 2001). Despite the growth of

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12 See Crush and Rogerson (2001), for a good overview of how tourism policy has changed since the Transition and for details of the initiatives.
community tourism, evidence indicates that the formal tourism sector in South Africa remains exclusively a white-owned industry (Rogerson 2002a and 2002b). Thus the effete nature of the product and the racial imbalance in ownership can lead it to be perceived as a less important industry for national development than, for example, industrial production or agricultural processing, and have led to a strong emphasis on the need for transformation.

Box 3: Economic importance of tourism

In South Africa:13
- 5.8 million international tourists per year (SA Tourism 2001a).
- Tourism is the third largest sector of the economy (after manufacturing and mining), contributing 8.2% to GDP, and is the fourth largest generator of foreign exchange (DEAT 1999).
- The industry is growing: 37% increase in international visitors from 1994 to 1999 (SATOUR 1999), while contribution to exports rose from 5.2% of total exports in 1988 to 13.2% in 1999 (DEAT 1999). It is reported (by DEAT 1999) to be the economic sector of most growth. Since 9/11, SA has been one of the few countries to experience continued tourism growth.
- Domestic tourism is very significant, accounting for an estimated 67% of the South African tourism industry (but not included in visitor and export figures above, SA Tourism 2001b).

Tourism in Zimbabwe:14
- 20-40% annual growth from late 1980s to late 1990s.
- In 1999: 1.4 million tourists; tourism accounted for 12.4% of GDP and 8.5% of employment. Growth was predicted to average 4.8% per year from 1999–2010.
- But since 2000: c. 5,000 jobs lost and 120 tour operators closed down.

Zimbabwean tourism experienced a massive growth in the late 1980s and 1990s and was the fastest growing sector of the economy (see Box 3 above). Despite lacking a master plan for tourism development, during this period, Zimbabwe shared the South African emphasis on tourism as an engine of growth, and the need to both encourage public-private partnerships and enhance community participation. But as in South Africa the tourism sector is white dominated and has also, at times, been perceived as ‘self-indulgent’ and of less national importance than obviously ‘productive’ and food security supporting agriculture. This is most vividly illustrated in the ongoing controversy over the establishment of the wildlife conservancies in the southeast of the country (Wels 2000; Wolmer et al. 2003); and most recently by the designation of commercial game ranches and conservancies for resettlement. In the face of adverse

media coverage of the country the Zimbabwean tourism industry has completely collapsed since 2000. But in the wake of the 2002 presidential elections there have been attempts to revitalise tourism and – particularly – safari hunting (hunters, it is hoped, will return faster than holiday-makers).15

**Commercialisation of government forestry and tourism assets**

In the past, governments owned and operated forestry plantations, hotels on state land, and tourism resorts inside protected areas. Today, such assets are being handed over to the private sector through privatisation or commercialisation. This is partly driven by the wider shift to privatisation, but also by a combination of other motives in each case.

**Forest privatisation in South Africa**

Since 1994, there have been a number of national government initiatives to restructure the forest industry, including commercialisation of plantations, development of certification for sustainable forest management, community management of woodlots, and promotion of small and medium forestry enterprises. The commercialisation process has, in particular, involved a restructuring of the roles of companies, communities and government. It focused first on the largest and most commercially viable plantations, known as Category A forests. These are generally plantations of 100% pine covering thousands of hectares (ha). After a commercialisation process of some years, the first four packages were leased to the preferred bidders in mid 2001. In the wider scheme of South African privatisation (for example, of telecommunications) this was a relatively small one, but in international forestry terms, the 2001 packages represented the largest tract of land ever privatised (Bethlehem 2001). As explored above, the commercialisation process had to balance competing policy objectives: disposing of state assets, bringing in revenue from the sale, catalysing investment and forest sector growth, protecting workers, and encouraging BEE (Bethlehem 2001; Foy 2001). Some pro-poor commitments were set by government, such as the commitment to no retrenchments for three years, but most were left to the bidders to develop for themselves, in the knowledge that one criterion in the adjudication of bids would be the strength of their BEE policies.

**Commercialisation of tourism resorts**

SANParks runs all South Africa’s National Parks. Formerly, all operations within Parks were done by the state, including the provision of commercial services to tourists. The last few years have seen a commercialisation process, in which concessionaires are granted rights to use defined areas of land and infrastructure, and to develop tourism facilities. The first round of commercialisation took place in 2000, and a second round in 2001. The main incentive driving commercialisation is the strong pressure to move towards financial self-sufficiency of parks.

given competing demands on state expenditure, protected areas are low down the priority list. In addition, and within the core function of nature conservation, commercialisation also serves the objectives of promoting investment and providing economic opportunities to emerging entrepreneurs and neighbouring communities. Again, socio-economic considerations have been part of the criteria for allocating bids.

A similar process of commercialisation is being undertaken at Provincial level. For example, the Eastern Cape Development Corporation (ECDC) is commercialising the string of hotels that it owns along the Wild Coast (inherited from Bantustan agencies). This process is seen by ECDC as an opportunity to secure land and equity rights for communities while also developing tourism nodes. However, limitations on all sides (government capacity, private sector investment interest and community expertise and rights) mean that it is progressing slowly.

Similar plans for commercialisation were developed by Zimbabwe’s Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management (DNPWLM). Commercial campsite tenders were planned for Gonarezhou NP as part of a US$5 million World Bank Global Environmental Facility (GEF) project in 1998. However these plans were derailed by the current political impasse between Zimbabwe and its donors, and have now stalled.

**Strengthening community resource rights over natural/commercial assets**

For many years, CBNRM initiatives have sought to strengthen community tenure and management capacity in relation to natural resources, and often to develop these assets in commercial ways. In South Africa the emphasis has been on developing Common Property Associations (CPAs) or other communal bodies capable of managing common pool resources, while in Zimbabwe resource rights rested with District Councils. Thus CBNRM initiatives in South African wildlife areas and in Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE Programme (Communal Area Management Programme for Indigenous Resources) have involved commercial partnerships between local institutions and operators. More recently, CBNRM in Mozambique’s forestry sector is seeking to develop a role – albeit limited – for communities within forest exploitation (Nhantumbo et al. 2003). Forestry is a significant rural industry in parts of Mozambique, mainly comprising extraction of hardwoods for export. The over-riding policy goal of Direcção Nacional de Florestas e Fauna Bravia (DNFFB), according to an interview with the Director, is to increase the contribution of the forestry sector to sustainable national growth. Thus the aim is to increase private sector investment in the forestry sector. Investment is facilitated through granting extraction licences and, more recently, concessions. There is simultaneously a CBNRM element in the Forestry Law of 1999 that strengthens community rights by requiring that they are consulted before concessions are given out, and outlining a co-management role for them in managing

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16 Interview with Director, DNFFB, November 2001.
state protected areas. Further strengthening of residents’ rights comes from the Land Act’s recognition of residents’ land rights and need for consultation.

Alongside CBNRM, another long-standing approach to developing community roles in tourism markets is community-based tourism (CBT). Support to CBT has aimed to develop commercial assets – such as cultural centres, campsites, hiking trails – over which communities have ownership. The EU-funded programme of support to CBT in the Wild Coast, for example, aims to help establish 300 new enterprise units.

More recently, a different approach has gained prominence in South Africa, and may be emerging in Zimbabwe. As mentioned above, the Makuleke were the first community to win a land claim inside a protected area. Their land inside Kruger National Park was restituted to them on condition that they keep it under wildlife and tourism in a contractual arrangement with the Park. They have since developed a lodge and other tourism services, and the whole process has been well publicised. Thus the ‘Makuleke model’ describes an arrangement where communities gain title to land, but with highly restricted use rights that ensure that they keep it under conservation and tourism usage. The benefit to them lies in commercial opportunities from their market asset, not in agricultural usage (Reid 2001; Spenceley 2003). Whilst there is no formally stated policy to pursue the ‘Makuleke model’ in South Africa, it is evident that it dominates the assumptions of policy-makers and land-claimants in South Africa in considering other claims inside protected areas, and could well be described as an implicit policy approach.

An interesting variant of the Makuleke model has emerged in Zimbabwe. This is where communities have ‘self-restituted’ ancestral land through invasions and are now planning, in part, safari and ecotourism orientated land uses. Also, at the same time as private game ranches are being ceded to smallholder dryland agriculture in Zimbabwe, the potential for ‘wildlife-based land reform’ is being explored. This describes a scenario where long-standing commercial or state-owned wildlife land is partly resettled and partly used by the new settlers or black entrepreneurs for ecotourism and hunting enterprises with varying degrees of private-community partnership.

Indigenisation / Black Economic Empowerment

In South Africa, Black Economic Empowerment is the catch-all phrase for economic growth that involves ‘historically disadvantaged individuals.’ It is taken as a given to be incorporated into every sector. BEE wraps up a host of different elements, ranging from involving black Chief Executives and shareholders in companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, while also involving elements more

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17 For evidence of the way in which the model is taken for granted in other claims, see Ashley and Ntshona 2002.
conventionally part of pro-poor growth, such as community benefits, labour standards and small enterprise support. As noted above, BEE is incorporated into SDIs, tourism and forestry development policy, commercialisation policies, and indeed almost every economic initiative.

Similarly, the Zimbabwean government has been increasingly keen to promote Black Economic Empowerment through a stated policy of ‘indigenisation’. However, beyond the stated aim there had been few attempts to enact this until the ongoing land reform exercise. The ‘A2 resettlement model’ is a business-orientated model designed to rezone largely, mainly white-owned, commercial farms, as smaller black-owned and commercially-managed freeholdings (this is in contrast to the A1 model for resettlement with communal tenure and smaller holdings). These A2 plots could potentially be developed for ecotourism or hunting with a conservancy-type arrangement.

Assumptions and agendas, similarities and differences

In summary, there are a plethora of policy statements, approaches and initiatives that are seeking to commercialise tourism and forestry assets, while simultaneously incorporating some element of community involvement. Despite important differences, similar overall assumptions concerning the role of the private sector, communities and government are reflected in most policy approaches in South Africa and Mozambique:

- The private sector’s role is not just investment but social investment.
- The Government’s role is regulation not production, but provision of more than an enabling laissez faire framework.
- Residents’ role is not just as passive beneficiaries, not quite as ‘regular entrepreneurs’, but as partners in some way in commercial enterprise.

Important differences emerge in the way that policies seek to bring in investment, and the strength and nature of commitment to local benefit. These differences are important and will be explored further in the case studies. There are different assumptions regarding the role of local residents, particularly whether they engage as collective entities (through CBNRM or CPAs) or as individual economic actors (such as employers and black shareholders), and whether their involvement is entirely economic, through market transactions, or is more fundamental as decision-makers or controllers of assets (e.g. landowners). Both South African and Mozambican policy heavily emphasise the need for growth and investment, but with a stronger emphasis on redistribution of economic power and land rights in South Africa.

The overall thrust of the approach seems to be little questioned among policy makers in South Africa and Mozambique. In Zimbabwe, by contrast, the situation is a great deal more ambiguous, with mixed messages issuing from government. Private sector operatives in the wildlife sector are being simultaneously castigated and lauded. They are being encouraged to get involved in pro-poor wildlife based land reform
and in TBNRM, and the government seems keen to redevelop tourism. At the same time, game ranches and conservancies are being compulsorily designated for resettlement. There are mixed messages issuing from different government departments and differences between rhetoric and practice. This ambiguity derives from the political turbulence of the last two years in which ZANU(PF)’s drive for short-term political survival has over-ridden its deference to donor-driven policy (which has been further exacerbated by donor withdrawal). Some read this as a deliberate political strategy intended to undermine a potential opposition economic power base – the white dominated tourism sector. Alternatively, the policy ambiguity might be attributed to the rapid unfurling of a confused political moment during which many local and national actors are trying to capitalise upon and seize the initiative. However it is important to remember that the more openly pro neoliberal, and private-sector friendly, MDC opposition remains in the wings in Zimbabwe.

The Zimbabwean situation highlights an important point that applies to the analysis of policy approaches in all three countries. There are several differing agendas of different institutions at play, and not one uniform approach. Clearly government, private sector and communities have different interests. But within each of these there are competing interests too. There is competition between government departments, between national and provincial levels, between technocrats and politicians, and between waxing and waning political interests. Agendas are not just to implement policy but also to be seen to deliver results, to operate within budgets, or to expand spheres of departmental influence. ‘Communities’ are inevitably heterogeneous, with conflicts and tensions that are often exacerbated by new economic opportunities. The different and powerful interests of community elites are invariably a major issue. As for the ‘private sector’, it is a broad term encompassing a massive range of companies, from the smallest to the largest, both foreign and domestic, which inevitably have different commercial interests. Short-term commercial imperatives can differ from long-term strategic goals and can become dominant – as in the need for defensive strategies and negotiated compromises by Zimbabwean game ranchers now.

It is important to note that the distinction between public and private sectors in southern Africa is not always completely clear cut – it gets blurred when government officials have personal interests in particular schemes, and when public office is a means to developing a private portfolio, or gaining access to a share of the proceeds. For example, it is widely recognised that the system of allocating forestry licences in Mozambique generates benefits for many public office holders. The Mozambican Minister for Environment has a share in planned tourism

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18 For an example of the dominant influence of institutional competition between government departments, see Ashley and Ntshona’s (2003) analysis of implementation failures in the Wild Coast.
19 These emerge in several of the case studies (below) and are more amply documented by Kepe (1999) and Kepe et al. (2001).
developments in Vilanculos (Spenceley 2003) and local councillors are major players in new hunting and tourism schemes in resettlement areas in southeastern Zimbabwe (Wolmer et al. 2003), for example.

This section has reviewed a broad range of policy approaches that are promoting community and private sector interaction in tourism and forestry. But the influence of policy on practice should not be overestimated. Policies are derailed in the process of implementation, some are inconsistent with each other, some lack any detailed implementation plan at all, most evolve over time. Policies themselves are just one part of the bigger picture. In Zimbabwe, for example, the political struggle that is, in part, being played out through the high-profile ‘land question’ is obviously a key determinant of change, and is more likely to reduce and/or re-shape private sector roles than any detailed policy plan. Thus to understand their implications for the poor we need to look beyond the policies to their actual implementation and impact on the ground.

What is happening on the ground?

Southern Africa’s historically rigid boundaries separating land uses, racial groups, and types of economic activity are becoming blurred. Private investment is moving across the boundaries in ways that bring capital, markets, communities, and wild resources into new configurations. A decade ago, potential investors in a rural area offering some kind of community involvement or ‘partnership’ were relatively unusual. Today there are a myriad of offers and interactions. Neat phrases such as private-community partnership, or black economic empowerment, disguise a range of different arrangements that are entered into by different actors ranging from formal to ad hoc and illicit. There is no single or simple model – rather there are a multiplicity of arrangements, with substantial differences in the foundations on which partnerships are built. In particular, differences arise in terms of who owns the land, what type of role local residents have in the business, and who or what brings the private sector and community together.

In this section we draw out five different ways in which the private and community sectors are articulating spatially around wildlife-based tourism and forestry in South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Our five broad types of community-private sector interaction differ in terms of the type of land on which they occur, and hence, critically, in the strength of local land rights. They are summarised in Table 1. Each type is illustrated and analysed through case studies.20

20 The case studies used here cover a spectrum of approaches but constitute only a small selection from the SLSA fieldwork, and are not covered in any depth here. For further details on these and other cases, see: Spenceley (2003) on tourism cases in South Africa and Mozambique; Ashley and Ntshona (2003) on Wild Coast initiatives; Wolmer et al. (2003) on emerging arrangements in Chiredzi District, Zimbabwe; and Nhantumbo et al. (2003) on Mozambique.
Private investors operating in communal land

At their most basic, this sort of arrangement has been around for a long time: a private operator arrives in a communal area, provides a payout to the chief or other community leaders, and gets access to the resource. For example, many holiday cottages on South Africa’s Wild Coast are termed ‘illegal cottages’ but actually had, or have, some sort of local permission. Village headmen in Mozambique’s Zambézia Province reported that forestry loggers had made an arrangement with the local chief, though they did not know any details.

A ‘new’ variation is where the community has some control over resources but not access to capital and markets. Thus they provide the resource and the private operators provide the business. CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe was one of the first and most famous examples, in which district councils gained authority over hunting quotas and leased them to professional hunting operators. Essentially, this was an attempt to disburse wildlife revenue (from safari hunting and ecotourism) and devolve authority to local level. The central tenet of this scheme is that communities neighbouring protected areas should receive direct benefits from them and have some say in wildlife management and use if conservation policies are to be effective. However, as Wolmer et al. (2003) describe, in Sangwe, Chiredzi District, ‘the schemes reputation … has been tarnished by corruption scandals … and a lack of real devolvement of power – communities are not involved in the sale of hunting rights and are suspicious of misappropriation by council’. The meagre disbursements are seen as insufficient compensation for the

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21 In all three countries, what we term ‘communal land’ is state-owned, but nevertheless differentiated from state land under conservation status, or government management of resources (e.g. of forestry). The categories do not fit the Mozambican context perfectly as there is no private land, and the term communal land is not used. The Mozambican cases that are in state land where people live are classified here under ‘communal land’.

damage to crops and livestock caused by wildlife. As some have argued, the balance of power in this public-private partnership seems to be heavily stacked in the private sector’s favour. It is a non-redistributive development model that allows further expansion of established business interests into communal (black smallholder) areas and contributes to widening economic disparities (Hughes 2001; Katerere 2001).

There are now several other examples that involve a community, rather than a council, using different business models. In Namibia, where communities gain rights over wildlife by forming ‘conservancies’, joint ventures are usually developed on the basis of leasing out use of the wildlife area, lodge site and/or animal quota. Contracts usually cover revenue shares (as a percentage of turnover), lease fees, and joint management arrangements. Communities in Botswana’s Controlled Hunting Areas have similar arrangements with professional hunters, usually based on a percentage of revenue.

The revenue-sharing approach is also used in South Africa. One such small-scale partnership is between the Amadiba Community and UFUDU fly-fishing camp, at the mouth of the Mntentu estuary, over the river from Dwesa Cwebe Reserve in the Wild Coast. The community receive a fly-fishing permit for three months of the year from the Department of Marine and Coastal Management (MCM), which they lease to UFUDU. In return, they receive 12.5% of revenue, all jobs and services are supplied by local people, and there are arrangements for consultation and discussion. While there are, of course, problems on both sides (for example, in arranging meetings, transparency over use of revenue, and understanding of ‘the product’), and the scale is too small to substantially alter local livelihoods, it is an example of a partnership that seems to be a net benefit to both parties. Personal drive of the UFUDU owners, facilitation by an NGO (Pondocrop), and the decision by government to change policy and allocate a fly-fishing license, have all played key roles in getting it going.

In general, however, a more common model in South Africa is for the community to hold an equity share in a tourism company rather than to enter a lease arrangement. Its equity stake is generally derived from its contribution of land or land-reform grants. This is particularly true for community-private partnerships developed on either restituted land (where the community has clear title, see below) or inside conservation areas (where government brings in or funds the community partnership), but can also occur on communal land.

In other cases, where the community has access to investment funds or collateral, it is the owner or part-owner of a tourism venture. One such example comes from the Mdluli Tribal Authority, which has sought to exploit the commercial advantage of their land adjacent to Kruger

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National Park’s Numbi gate, a major tourism area. In 1998, the Mdluli TA formed Mdluli Trust with the assistance of a private property developer. Using a R6 million grant from DEAT’s Poverty Relief Fund, they have developed Mdluli Cultural Village, comprising a 17-chalet Phumlani Lodge (opened in June 2001), and two entertainment centres (not yet open). The Trust is 100% owner of the lodge, and has a contract with the property developer and his company, African Heritage Enterprise, to operate the lodge.

The economic scale of the development is considerable – much greater than the Amadiba-Ufudu partnership, for example. In the construction phase, 96% of workers were locally employed and as of early 2002, the lodge was providing over 50 local full-time jobs plus four spin-off SMMEs (laundry, security, thatch harvesting and tour operating, plus a contract to a sewing group). But at the same time, it has run into problems in terms of commercial viability and operation of the partnership in its first year of operation. There are reports of cash flow problems, unpaid wages, a contractual dispute with the construction company, and limited local training. As of early 2002, the lodge was subject to an enquiry by Mpmulanga Tourism Directorate due to non-payment of wages by AHE. The enquiry resulted in an audit, and plans for fast-track training for community members in business and financial management. One source of the problems identified is lack of community capacity, and excessive dependence on the one investor (see Box 4).

**Box 4: Excessive community dependence on one operator**

The Mdluli Trust was formed with the assistance of a private property developer, who became a Trustee. He is a director of African Heritage Enterprises which has the five year contract to operate and market Mdluli’s Phumlani Lodge. He received the grant from the Poverty Relief Fund on behalf of the Trust in September 2000, to build Mdluli Cultural Village. There have been complaints that the construction contract was not open to tender by local or other businesses but was given to a company employing the operator’s brother.

Spenceley (2003) identifies a key problem resting in the ‘considerable control over the project ’ that the community has afforded to the developer, including power to sign leases and shareholder agreements, take on the management contract, choose other contractors, and even raise a bank loan on the Trust’s lease of the land from the TA:

> Although the community Trustees have signed documentation that has provided [the operator] with the legal authorisation for the work he has conducted and the control he has, it is clear that they do not feel they have the business acumen to understand or control his activities.

*Sources: Spenceley (2003), drawing on Langley (2002).*

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All the potentials and pitfalls of new tourism developments on community land are just as vividly depicted in the case of Vilanculos in Mozambique. The Vilanculos Coastal Wildlife Sanctuary (VCWS) has been the subject of much controversy, seen by some as the new way forward for responsible investment and rural growth, and by others as a business, conservation and political deal that has over-ridden nascent community land rights. The VCWS is a 30,000 ha sanctuary (EAW undated), located on the Sao Sebastiao Peninsular, just south of Bazaruto National Park. The land is state-owned, with about 1,000 residents on the peninsula, whose livelihoods depend on subsistence fishing plus farming. In October 2000 the Council of Ministers awarded a concession to a consortium led by East African Wildlife (EAW) Prop Ltd (a South African property developer), and including shareholdings by the Mozambican Minister for Environment. EAW plans to build 50 private residences (priced at around US$100,000 per plot), as well as luxury tourism lodges totalling around 100 beds, and to manage the land and marine area as a conservation sanctuary. In Mozambican terms, this is a massive investment, with a cumulative investment of around R75 million (US$9.5 million) over five years, according to EAW (EAW undated).

The investment approach contains many more environmental and social measures than is the norm. Indeed, it is presented (VCWS undated) as much as a conservation initiative as a business investment, and donor funds are being sought to cover the conservation costs. EAW documents also emphasise the high degree of government and popular support that has been received, including from local communities, and the scale of economic benefits to be generated, particularly jobs (see Box 5, next page). However, many criticisms and counter-retorts have been made, involving varying degrees of factual information, interpretation, politics, and threats of legal action. Although there are some questions over the actual delivery of promised benefits, the key critiques focus on other issues (see Box 5): trade-offs between subsistence livelihoods and conservation measures, and the lack of community power and rights – as opposed to consultation or information-provision – in the process. Thus it is quite possible for both sides to be broadly correct: the development involves more consultation and jobs than has happened hitherto, and will bring more economic ‘development’ than any other land use; yet there

25 Resolution 4/2000 allocated the concession, which is for 50 years, renewable for a further 50. The Minister of Environment, John Kachamila, holds 5% in the holding company, East African Wildlife (EAW) Prop Ltd, and 25% in the local holding company and implementing company, Santuario Da Fauna Costeira De Vilanculos Lda. He has declared his interest publicly and received the official permission of the Minister’s Council and State President to hold the shares.
### Box 5: Vilanculos: livelihood benefit or livelihood loss?

EAW documents emphasise the high degree of local support and the positive impact they have on the region including:

- 260 full-time employment opportunities in the sanctuary and support for further rural diversification through micro-enterprise.
- Local residents have the exclusive permit to harvest crustaceans. ‘Ownership of the terrestrial wildlife will reside with the local communities, and any revenue generated by utilisation of the resource will accrue to them.’
- A Community Development Fund, supported by residential and tourist levies, will earn around US$100,000 at full development. It will be paid to the Kawene Community Association (KCA), and be spent on the advice of selected community representatives.
- Donations raised by EAW for a new hospital.

Three sets of problems stand out from a community perspective:

- There is more involvement on behalf of the community rather than by the community. The KCA is not actually an association of the community but a non-profit organisation established by EAW, and run by luminaries (seven prominent Mozambicans and three others), which will be advised by a community committee. Consultation seems to have been mainly at the level of chiefs (12 of whom are getting new houses and monthly allowances) and local government officials, with the extent of local participation unclear.
- The conservation and commercial operations involve trade-offs with livelihoods due to sustainability limits on marine harvesting, fishing regulation (particularly affecting fishermen not living on the archipelago but using the waters), re-introduction of elephants, and limitations on farming (or as EAW puts it ‘the local people will be allowed, within the limits of sustainability, to pursue their traditional way of life’ (EAW undated, emphasis added)). Some families will undoubtedly gain other livelihood benefits that outweigh losses, but not all.
- Despite the local level-consultation, the process to date has not built community rights over the land in a more far-reaching manner that would now be possible under the new Land Law. Across the country, NGOs are assisting scores of communities to ‘delimit’ their land. As far as is known, the Government has not encouraged this in any way at Vilanculos. An alternative process would have been to assist the community with delimitation and then negotiation, possibly including tendering out the area to the private sector. Thus in dealing with all the livelihood trade-offs and disbursement of benefits, the problem is that the power to ‘permit’ or allocate rests with the company, given its devolution of power from Government, and community rights are meagre.

Sources: EAW (undated); VCWS (undated); and EAW (2001).

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26 These details come from the company itself: an EAW document to GEF states, ‘the association was established by the development company (EAWC) … A Board of 10 prominent Trustees, seven of whom are Mozambicans, have been appointed to govern the association…. It has been launched with an initial capitalisation of US$300,000… A Community Affairs Committee (CAC) composed of selected community representatives will be established to advise the KCA on all the project’s community development and, where appropriate, biodiversity activities’ (italics added) (VCWS undated).
will be some community members for whom livelihood losses are not matched by gains; community benefits remain dependent on decisions by the company and government; and benefits are less than would emerge from a basis of stronger community land rights.

The aim here is not to add another judgement, this time from further afield, on whether this large-scale tourism is the most appropriate option for local development, but to reflect on the pattern that emerges. The controversies over Vilanculos reflect the very different context in Mozambique to South Africa. The overall climate is to seek and welcome investment as the *sine qua non* of growth and development. The government cannot pick and choose between investors, and has taken a role of welcoming and not questioning, the company’s plans. The added personal economics of individuals who combine a public office and a private position is also quite common.

Despite the progressive land law, Vilanculos is just one example of the Government focusing more on encouraging investment than on implementing land rights. In this sense, the area is being treated more as pure ‘state land’ than as a communal residential area. Despite the ‘consultation’, the community does not have rights to negotiate. The community, a subsistence low-density population, also lacks the technical resources to mobilise for greater participation – other than through traditional authorities. Thus the company is able to ‘lead the way’ in responsible investment with measures that would be seen as far short of ground-breaking in South Africa – for example, in providing community funds that are controlled by outsiders and not the community. It is clear that there are many different interests driving such large-scale developments and that any attempts to strengthen community-private sector interaction is a minor element in this context.

The weakness of communities in the face of commercial operators and government growth targets is also evident in Mozambican forestry developments. On the positive side, as indicated above, the new forestry law of 1999 requires consultation with communities over allocation of concessions, and provides for forestry co-management between government, the private sector and communities.

However, in practice there is very little evidence of communities actually engaging in negotiations over concessions, participating in co-management, or entering partnerships with private operators. The only contact with the private sector reported by households in Derre Forest reserve, where there is a forestry CBNRM project, is occasional casual employment by loggers – though they often bring their own labour gangs. Apart from this, a few individuals involved in the CBNRM

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27 For detail of case study findings in Morumbala and Maganja de Costa, see Nhantumbo et al. (2001); and Nhantumbo et al. (2003).

28 Although this is formally a protected area, the fieldwork is relevant to this discussion of forestry on communal land, as the fieldwork area is a settled area treated alike by resident, forestry department and loggers as communal land, with discussions of degazettement.
programme are setting up as carpenters, know something of plans for the community/chief to apply for a forestry licence for carpentry timber, and/or have heard of logging operators’ contacts with the chief. But the carpenters are not allowed to use the wood where they live inside the reserve, the community’s application for a licence appears stalled, and the operators’ contact with the chief appears to be no more than a quick visit and not any form of negotiation. For the majority, their expectations and hopes of forestry in the area are to provide temporary jobs.

Six different reasons why communities remain, in practice, powerless to engage effectively in private sector forestry can be disentangled, all of which are relevant to wider debates:

i. The pro-poor legislative measures are more progressive than the past, but nevertheless weak. The Forestry Act only requires consultation for allocating concessions, not the more common licences; consultation is ‘listening to’ not securing agreement from,29 and communities themselves cannot get concessions. Without either a veto or their own concession, communities will not be in a commercially strong negotiating position with a partner. Although communities have a role in co-management, power is not actually devolved to community level.

ii. The CBNRM measures are weak in the face of competing policy objectives. The political priority for the ministry is to attract investment, but it is not seen as having succeeded so far. Allocating licences and concessions, rather than insisting on details of community involvement, is an administrative priority.30

iii. Implementation and follow-through has been weak so far. The 1999 Act provided a framework but implementation requires regulations. These sat awaiting Cabinet approval from early 1991 until mid 2002. During that period, 24 concessions were allocated without any insistence on community ‘listening’. The CBNRM project at Derre is focusing on (1) forest inventory and management (getting basic data); and (2) community management. Though the latter includes some enterprise training in carpentry and bee-keeping, it does not seem to include measures to negotiate with private operators to secure improved employment practice. Nor are the stronger community rights created in the Land Law being pursued in forestry implementation.

iv. There are no commercial incentives for operators to work with communities. Many operators are logging on a short-term basis for immediate export and sale to middle men. Even a 50,000 ha concession can be

29 The Forestry Law uses the verb ‘auscultar’ for ‘listening to’, whereas the Land Law uses ‘consultar’ for consulting with communities.

30 As one senior Mozambican official put it: ‘This country has to attract investment. There has been no success in getting big investment in forestry.’ Interview with the Director of DNFFB and FAO’s DNFFB advisor, October 2001.
worked out in three years, providing little incentive for long-term local investment or training.31

v. ‘Community’ is interpreted as ‘leaders’: According to one forestry operator in Zambézia, consultation is usually with the District Office, then the local Agricultural Office, then the Regulo, and also possibly the President of the Localidad. In the CBNRM project in Derre, the ‘community institution’ involved, ACODEMAZA has a head office in Quelimane (300 plus kilometres away), and has a membership fee of 25,000 Mt (US$1.25), which is way beyond the reach of most residents.

vi. The communities lack capacity to engage with the private sector, such as strong institutions, negotiating skills, market awareness. Until now, outside facilitators have played a key role in CBNRM across Mozambique (Matakala and Mushove 2001).

The Mozambique forestry case is a valuable example of the many different reasons why an apparently progressive policy environment can leave all the power in the hands of commercial operators and government officials, and the focus on ‘growth’ can overshadow other livelihood priorities. At heart, it highlights the limitations of policy statements. As Nhantumbo et al. (2003) ask,

*what is the government prepared to give away in order to ensure equity in resource distribution to all users? … There is a gap between the policy statement and the willingness from the government to let the control go to the communities.*

Though policy details are important – as reflected in the significance of the verbs used for consultation – political will is also critical. There are other cases where Government went out of its way to open opportunities for communities, such as at the Tchuma Chato CBNRM project, where special ministerial provision was made for the community to keep revenues from hunting which would not otherwise have been possible under existing legislation.32 But at Derre, exceptions have not been made for the carpentry enterprise to access wood, and at Vilanculos, the special Council resolution was for the private developers to gain concession rights.

**Key issues emerging in relation to interactions on communal land**

The case studies in this section are highly varied, ranging from the small relatively successful UFUDU camp to the national-level policy shifts towards logging in community areas of Mozambique. There are clearly partnerships on communal land that go beyond the old bottle-of-whisky-for-the-chief approach. But also many limitations appear, particularly in:

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31 Director of Serracoes Reunidas da Zambézia Lda (SRZ, an established forestry company), part of Grupo Enamaco, in Quelimane, interview with Edward Lahiff 29/10/2001).

• The communities’ capacity to hold the private sector to account (e.g. at Phumlani, where they are entangled and dependent and in Mozambique where they are distant and minor players)

• Government commitment to enhancing community strength despite policies that recognise community rights or tenure on ‘communal’ land. While there are cases where action by government provided the critical window of opportunity (e.g. the fishing licence at UFUDU, the land reform grants used at Phumlani), there are many ways in which governments have not provided adequate incentive, regulation, or technical back-up for communities to engage as genuine partners.

In most cases, the driving partners of these ventures are the private sector, with some leadership by NGOs (e.g. at UFUDU) and community leaders (e.g. Chief Mdluli). In none has the community been in a position to say no. Trade-offs between different objectives clearly emerge – both for policy-makers, in the trade off between boosting growth and encouraging investors to be pro-poor, and for local livelihoods, in the trade-off between the need for commercial employment/business opportunities, and other livelihood needs including subsistence resources and power to control decisions.

**Government-initiated commercial investment with community linkage on state land**

This category describes arrangements in which the direct partnership is between the state (as landlord) and private sector (as concession-holder or lessee), but the operator establishes links with the neighbouring community, usually because of government incentives. Government has a more pro-active role (e.g. as concessionaire, lessor or protected area manager) than in our first category of interaction, which occurs on communal land.

This is an active area of policy in South Africa because the Government is shifting assets from state to private sector in many sectors of the economy, whilst at the same time using privatisation as a tool for encouraging economic restructuring and less racial disparity in the economy. Privatisation is hotly contested, particularly by the unions, mainly in the context of debates over unemployment and jobless growth. The focus here is on how the privatisation and commercialisation processes have encouraged more pro-poor interaction on the part of the private operators.

Three contrasting South African case studies are drawn on here. The first is the commercialisation of plantation forests, focusing particularly on the Singisi Plantation in the Eastern Cape, taken over by the Hans Merensky Company. The second is the commercialisation of tourism resorts and

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33 There are very few reported cases of communities actually rejecting a private sector partnership, though such cases in Namibia are reported in Ashley and Jones (2001).
facilities inside National Parks, focusing on the first wave of commercialisation inside Kruger National Park in 2000. The third is the incipient policy of the Eastern Cape Government to sell off its string of hotels along the Wild Coast.\textsuperscript{34} In all three cases, policy objectives of benefiting rural communities have been melded in some way with other objectives, particularly to improve government’s own financial position and to stimulate private sector investment.

The forestry commercialisation policy had to juggle a large number of policy objectives, and took several years to implement. During this process, trade-offs were made between the objective of benefiting rural communities and other policy goals, as outlined in Box 6 (next page). In particular, commercialisation preceded the resolution of land claims. Nevertheless a number of important pro-poor measures were included to encourage community share holdings and ensure an annual income stream for future land holders. An initial and cursory assessment of what is happening at the first commercialised plantation in the Eastern Cape – Singisi plantation – indicates a high level of commitment by the company to developing a range of links to local communities. Two community trusts have shares in the consortium that has leased the plantation, and these and several local enterprise initiatives are actively supported by Hans Merensky, and a number of business linkages are developing. Local linkages and investments appear to go well beyond ‘normal’ business practice. There are of course caveats – virtually all the investment is also in the long-term business interest of a forestry operation, and it is unlikely that the new economic opportunities will be shared equitably. Nevertheless, the business practice of the consortium is substantially different from the past practices of the state run plantation.

The pro-poor measures of the Hans Merensky consortium cannot just be attributed to the commercialisation approach, as HM is a Section 21 company with development objectives. Thus other commercialised sites may be following a very different path. However, the commercialisation process, and the weighting given to socio-economic criteria in adjudication, did provide the necessary window of opportunity for HM to acquire the plantation.

In SANParks’ commercialisation process inside Kruger National Park (KNP) the adoption of socio-economic criteria in the selection of bids was the key tool for encouraging BEE and pro-poor measures by new tourism operators. Bidders were informed that 20\% of each bid’s score would be based on evaluation of empowerment plans.\textsuperscript{35} Evaluation of empowerment was based on measurable criteria that would be weighted during empowerment proposal evaluations.

\textsuperscript{34} Further details of the KNP commercialisation is in Spenceley (2003). The Wild Coast forestry and hotel commercialisation initiatives are in Ashley and Ntshona (2002).

\textsuperscript{35} With the remaining 80\% allocated to financial criteria (e.g. business planning and financial offer for the concession). In the case of picnic sites, the ratio was 40\%, 60\%. For more detailed analysis of bids and criteria, see Spenceley (2003); Spenceley et al. (2002); SANParks (2001).
Competing policy objectives in forest commercialisation were to: dispose of loss-making state assets, generate government revenue from the sale, catalyse investment and forest sector growth, protect workers, encourage BEE in the industry, and protect local residents’ rights and access. (Bethlehem 2001, Foy 2001, Mayers et al. 2001). Thus it was driven, contested and shaped by the interests of a number of players: Forestry Department in DWAF, Treasury, Public Enterprise Agency (the privatisation agency), Water Affairs in DWAF, unions, and the forest companies.

One major trade-off emerged early on: the commercialisation process would not wait for the resolution of land-claims on the Category A forests (of which there are 152 nationally, Lahiff 2003a). Thus land claimants had no formal decision-making role over the use of their potential future land during the process. Other measures did emerge in the final policy which involved some trade-off with government’s financial or commercial objectives. These were:

- Use of socio-economic criteria in adjudicating the bids, in order to encourage companies to develop plans for BEE and community shares (therefore economic performance was not the sole criteria).
- The decision that companies should pay an annual lease fee, not a single up-front payment to government coffers. The lease fee will automatically go to successful land claimants, or possibly other land-right holders, and will be held in trust until then.
- Measures to protect the public sector workers for the first few years (this lowered the financial value of the bids).
- Recognition of existing rights of residents to forest access in the new agreements.

The presence of these measures can be attributed in large part to the wider context: the constitution, land law, forestry law and labour rights, which made it impossible for the process, for example, to sell off land subject to land claims, retrench workers or reduce forest access. In addition, champions within DWAF and donor support from DFID focused on pro-poor measures helped see the measures through.

Perspectives on how well the poor fared in this juggle vary. The Director of DWAF and an analysis by IIED both describe it as a difficult process of balancing competing policy objectives. Though only time will tell whether the process succeeded, they welcome it as a ‘break from the past’ (Bethlehem 2001), an encouragement to new ‘thinking about ways of making or encouraging the private sector to work to achieve better forest management in the national interest’ (Mayers et al. 2001). Senior staff in the Rural Land Claims Commission in the Eastern Cape, whose specific interest lies with restitution claimants, state that DWAF sees its role as protecting the forests as a national economic asset and promoting the interests of investors, and while they focused on BEE and community-shares, did not sufficiently protect restitution claimants (Lahiff 2003a: 24)
These measurable criteria included:

- Historically Disadvantaged Individuals or Groups (HDI/HDG) Shareholding ³⁶
- Training and Affirmative Action in Employment
- Business and Economic Opportunities for Local³⁷ Communities

Seven concession contracts were agreed in December 2000. Analysis of their bids suggests that the process successfully secured a high percentage of HDI equity holding: three of the concessionaires were black-controlled consortia; all of the others had significant percentages of shareholding by HDIs; and the average across all by the end of year three would be 53% (Spenceley 2003). However, under SANParks’ definition of HDI, only some of this is relevant to the poor. HDI equity holders include a former Minister and a director of a hotel chain, as well as locally employed staff and neighbouring communities. Bidders also included details of training for HDI staff, targets for HDI employment at senior positions, and creation of business opportunities relating to, for example, waste disposal, crafts, transport, food, and furniture. The new concessionaires are expected to report back to SANParks annually on their achievement of empowerment objectives, and SANParks has the right to impose financial penalties for non-performance.

While the evidence of pro-poor impact remains to be seen, it is clear that this process is resulting in commercial proposals that go further than most others. Certainly, the operators have set themselves targets that they would not willingly adopt entirely voluntarily if operating on private land. The process also marks a major shift on the part of the conservation authority, which under apartheid was firmly focused on conservation and not social objectives. The shift can be largely attributed to the depth of criticism levelled at parks, particularly KNP, since the un-banning of the ANC. For example, in 1993 Dr. Derek Hanekom, who became Minister of Land Affairs, accused the park of having no relevance for an impoverished Africa, and that it should be abolished to make way for a more productive land use (Marais 1996). Park authorities have had to rapidly shift to less reliance on central government funding, and the adoption of a role in promoting local economic development.

The commercialisation policy of the Eastern Cape Development Corporation (ECDC) has followed similar principles, but run into

³⁶ Historically Disadvantaged Individuals or Groups (HDI/HDG) were defined by SANParks as any organisation or group where the majority ownership or membership is held by citizens of the Republic of South Africa, and individuals who are citizens of the Republic of South Africa who, according to racial classification, did not have the right to vote or had restricted voting rights immediately prior to the 1994 elections.
³⁷ The term ‘local’ was not specifically defined by SANParks. Within SANParks guidelines for scoring the empowerment proposals, ‘Communities Adjacent to the National Parks’ were defined as ‘historically disadvantaged individuals ordinarily resident within the economic sphere of the Park’, although the range of the ‘economic sphere’ remained undefined (SANParks 2000b).
problems in practice. ECDC is keen to sell off its coastal hotels in order to dispose of loss-making assets, mobilise tourism development in the Wild Coast, and to use its power as current asset-owner to structure deals that involve communities. The new SDI manager in October 2001 described plans for creative ways to involve communities in the absence of land tenure reform for communal areas, using administrative measures in negotiation with Land Affairs. The principles of progressive policy and joined-up government seemed clear. But the first practical experience, however, reveals the weaknesses. While ECDC was adjudicating bids for the Lagoon Hotel at Coffee Bay, Land Affairs went ahead with the allocation based on a letter of ownership from the apartheid days. Land Affairs ensured a 30% community equity partnership, so the result is not necessarily bad for the community, but leaves questions unresolved about due process, the reliability of the operator selected, and the coherence of the privatisation policy.

In addition to these commercialisation policies, there have been several ad hoc government initiatives to lease sites to operators in ways that bring in local residents. For example, in the 1990s KwaZulu Natal Nature Conservation allowed Wilderness Safaris two new sites in Maputaland reserves on the condition that the community held equity shares (funded by KZN). Unfortunately the conservation authorities have not been so supportive since then and are seen as blocking developments that would benefit the communities and enable them to realise more from their share (Poultney and Spenceley 2001). At Manyeleti Game Reserve just south of Kruger, the provincial authority was unable to cede rights directly to the community (due to constitutional provisions) so instead tendered a site to the private sector on condition of community involvement.

Key issues emerging in relation to government encouragement of investment with pro-poor linkages

It is clear that concessioning or the commercialisation of government assets is a potentially powerful tool for encouraging more pro-poor business behaviour by private companies. The bids submitted for Kruger sites and forestry plantations indicate significant company investment in developing BEE measures that go further than past practice. Government policy is clearly not the only influence, but it is one factor. However, there are some major caveats. Existing practice may end up being more effective at benefiting the black elite than the poor. Nothing guarantees that a commercialisation policy will force pro-poor commitment, or that commitments will translate into practice. Implementing pro-poor commercialisation, with all the due process, ‘incentivisation’, and multiple objectives involved, is a long and complex institutional process.
The case studies suggest some conditions under which commercialisation is most likely to generate pro-poor benefits:

- If the political situation is supportive enough for pro-poor measures to be maintained amid the competition between different policy objectives and institutional mandates. This is more likely if there are already legal guarantees strengthening the rights of the poor (e.g. in the constitution) as well as champions in the process with capacity to last the duration of what can be a long process. Pro-poor measures probably will involve some trade-off with the amount of revenue government can earn, and the degree to which conservation can be prioritised. As both these agendas can be strong, the pro-poor agenda also needs political weight.

- If the asset to be commercialised is a competitive asset so that there is competition between investors. Otherwise government is in no position to add non-commercial conditions if it wants to attract investment. In South Africa, BEE is not only widely understood and assumed by the private sector, but tourism operators are competing with each other for new sites.

- If progressive policy measures are followed up with monitoring, sanctions, and other forms of continued support for implementation.

- If conditionality in the concessioning process is clearly focused on benefiting poor people – and cannot be satisfied simply by involving black shareholders. This in turn depends on dealing with political constituencies.

Given these conditions, it is not surprising that most progress is evident in South Africa. In Mozambique, it is not clear that the government would be able to impose conditions effectively without severely restricting investment opportunities and massively increasing administrative capacity. But in South Africa, the definition of HDI is a major blockage to maximising pro poor impact.

**Private operator on private land develops links with neighbours**

In situations where private sector operators – particularly in the wildlife tourism sector – enjoy relatively secure tenure on privately owned land, linkages with surrounding communities have often generally taken the form of good neighbour schemes, corporate social responsibility (CSR), and low-level philanthropy. These include community outreach schemes by wildlife conservancies in Zimbabwe, and the CSR initiatives of South African lodges such as Jackalbery Lodge and Ngala Game Reserve, in the Kruger NP area.

In Zimbabwe, ‘community trust’ and ‘neighbour outreach schemes’ spread in the 1990s. As Wolmer et al. (2003) describe, this was a response by the conservancies and better-endowed game ranches to government suspicion of their motives, and an attempt to gain a degree of political and social legitimacy. The most sophisticated example of this was the
Save Valley Conservancy’s wildlife endowment scheme; but more common are acts of good-will between game ranches and neighbouring communities such as borehole drilling, school fee handouts and permitting access to sacred areas.

However the Save Valley Conservancy’s high profile attempts at neighbour outreach have been stridently critiqued by some analysts for proffering ‘cosmetic changes that largely maintained the status quo of domination by one racial group’ (Saruchera 2001); and as strategic tokenism geared more towards attracting donor funding (Wels 2000). Indeed, many of the outreach schemes could be read as attempts at converting communal areas to adjuncts to the wildlife and tourism cause by, for example, establishing ‘cultural villages’. As a Councillor for one of the wards bordering Save Valley Conservancy put it: ‘conservancy outreach was too small, too late, then land reform came.’

In South Africa, several tourism lodges and game reserves, particularly on the extensive private lands near Kruger National Park, have CSR activities that support neighbourhood developments. Conservation Corporation (CCA, also known as ConsCorp) provides one of the internationally known examples, including its Ngala Game Reserve, adjacent to Kruger. Another example of CSR comes from Jackalberry Lodge, which is one of seven private lodges on Thornybush Game Reserve, near Kruger NP’s Orpen Gate. Both Ngala and Jackalberry lodges spend funds on community projects in their neighbouring communities (Welverdiend village of 10,000 and Timbavati Community of 11,200 people, respectively) within the Mnisi Tribal Authority (Spenceley 2003). Projects of similar types have been funded: infrastructural improvements to schools, environmental education, bursaries (particularly for wildlife/tourism training), community theatre and computing. As in Zimbabwe, the bias towards the operators’ own interests in conservation and tourism is clear. Both have had experience of projects that failed due to lack of community buy-in. The scale of such CSR initiatives is often small, given the small-scale of safari lodges, although at Ngala/Welverdiend the funds come from fund-raising by CCA and hence are many times greater, and probably higher per person than typical earnings from an equity or revenue share (Spenceley 2001).

While specific initiatives may be of livelihood value to some participants, and the individuals involved may be highly motivated, the problem with this approach lies in the structural weakness of the partnership, and more

38 This scheme was intended to use donor funding to purchase wildlife that would be released within the conservancy. The conservancy would then be obliged to buy their progeny each year at the prevailing market rate. This money could then be used to finance community projects (Wels 2000).
39 Interview with Councillor, Chiredzi 20/11/2001 (Wolmer et al. 2003).
40 Ngala is operated but not owned by CCA. This private reserve is owned by the South African National Parks Trust.
41 Spenceley (2003) is the source of all the information provided here on Ngala and Thornybush.
in what is not done than what is. Firstly, in neither case does the community control the money or how it is spent (though they propose projects to CCA). Comparison of the CSR investments and priority problems identified by respondents in household surveys by Spenceley indicates a mismatch, leading her to conclude ‘that the majority of projects that are addressed by Jackalberry Lodge and Thornybush Game Reserve reflect the private sector’s perception of what is required by the community’.

Secondly, there is little evidence of attempts to shift the core business practice of the lodges to maximise benefits to the poor. The record on employment of local staff, contracting local business and sourcing supplies locally is varied but generally limited, and compares unfavourably with the record of some partnership lodges, such as Rocktail Bay (Poultney and Spenceley 2001). Thirdly, there is little if any mechanism in place for community members to engage in decision-making with the lodge about land-management, resource use or other issues. At Jackalberry Lodge there are informal meetings but no regular forum between the reserve and communities, other than the anti-poaching company’s strategy to involve Ndunas in discouraging poaching. There are no mechanisms for community access to natural resources, other than wood from bush-clearing. At Ngala, the conservation authority has actually blocked community involvement in the reserve’s Management Committee. Most significantly of all, many community members surveyed in 2000 do not see the few benefits from tourism as worth the costs at present, particularly at Welverdiend, where damage by problem animals is high (Spenceley 2003).

Why is the private sector investing in these CSR arrangements and how is it benefiting? The mix of motives includes:

- **Promoting long-term interests** of the business and its resource base in the region. There is a promotional element here – creating vested interests among residents in protecting the tourism assets – and a defensive element, responding to the criticisms that have been levied against wildlife and tourism. The land claims on reserves in South Africa and land invasions in Zimbabwe have greatly strengthened this motive.

- **Gaining market advantage**: CCA has gained market advantage from tourists who want to experience a ‘feel good’ luxury holiday, where the enterprise benefits the community. CCA has increased its profile due to its philanthropy endeavours, with representatives of the company frequently invited to discuss the programme at international conferences and to showcase their work.

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42 For example, at Ngala, only two of 98 staff are from Welverdiend and there are no specific purchasing policies to stimulate local business. At Jackalberry, local staff account for a more encouraging 66%, but few products or services are purchased locally. By contrast, at Rocktail Bay, around 90% of staff are local and the company is seeking to increase its local sourcing of services beyond the three or four SMMEs currently used.
• Responding to the wider CSR agenda: in South Africa, there is a widespread, if vague and rhetorical, assumption that business should contribute to development. While this background rhetoric does not necessarily cause any specific pro-poor intervention, it creates a supportive climate for those that do wish to say how much they are doing.

The CSR measures have a relatively low financial cost for the companies. The cost is more in terms of personnel and management time, whether by the lodge staff (at Thorneybush) or of the dedicated agency (at CCA).

Key issues emerging in relation to interactions on private land

Interactions between tourism operators on private land and their poorer neighbours are mainly ‘philanthropic donations’ falling under the rubric of CSR. While specific projects may be useful and particular individuals well motivated, this form of interaction is structurally weak. It is one way, with all control resting with the company. Measures that could enhance the development impact of the lodges’ core business, such as local procurement and employment, seem to have had less attention than in lodges based on stronger partnership.

An increase in the vulnerability of private operators to local and political tensions – whether over land or conservation – may well have increased investment in CSR in recent years. But it has not, based on these case studies, changed it structurally into a more equitable interaction. Nor has it provided the defence mechanism operators hoped for, at least in Zimbabwe, where even the conservancies that had outreach schemes have been targeted for land invasions. More recently, some owners are dealing with registered land claims (in South Africa) or actual occupations and resettlement (in Zimbabwe) that do challenge these initiatives to become something more radical, as outlined in the next section.

Investments on reclaimed, restituted and resettled land

Land transfer may occur through resettlement or self-provisioning, as in Zimbabwe, or through the resolution of land claims, as in South Africa. In Chiredzi District, Zimbabwe, most of the land transferred to communities has come from commercial game ranches and conservancies, although, even more controversially, there has also been resettlement in Gonarezhou National Park. The ranch operators are being forced into new relations with their once-distant, now-close neighbours. In South Africa, restitution claims on land under wildlife have mainly been in national or provincial game reserves. Once settled, they lay the basis for a new form of commercial joint venture.

As described above, the Makuleke were the first South African community to win a land claim inside a protected area. Development of a tourism lodge and other facilities is now well underway. What is striking in South Africa is the emergence of a ‘Makuleke model’. This approach is one of the few ways of reconciling the interests of different parties: for
government, the political gains of land reform can be combined with the economic value of tourism development. For the private sector, although they have to deal with communities as owners and not ‘beneficiaries of CSR’, they gain access to new tourism sites and avert the loss of current conservation areas to farming. The community gains land, faster processing of the claim, and access to economic opportunities that were previously unobtainable. However, such benefits are not without cost, are variable, and not always accruing to the poor.

Box 7: Three key elements of the ‘Makuleke model’

- Ownership rights of the land and commercial development rights lie with the community.
- Conditionality that the land must stay under conservation with revenue derived from limited tourism use.
- Consensus behind, and thus faster processing of, the land claim.

Other examples that have emerged in South Africa are the successful claim of the Dwesa-Cebe community over the Dwesa Cebe Reserve on the Wild Coast (Eastern Cape) in June 2001. Full ownership of the reserve and existing accommodation, along with nearly R14 million in grants and compensation, was handed to a Trust representing the claimants, on condition that the reserve continues to be managed as such, jointly by the Trust and the conservation authorities. This complex agreement, produced through six years of negotiations with multiple stakeholders, has set the standard for what is likely to be a series of similar settlements in the Eastern Cape, such as at Mkambati, Mt. Thesiger, Silaka and Hluleka (Lahiff 2003a). Two other examples in South Africa’s northeast are the settlement of the land claims of the Mbhangweni community inside the Ndumo Game Reserve, in 2000, and the restoration of land from inside Kruger NP to the Mdluli community in 1994.43

The core assumption behind this South African model is that the community will benefit from its land by engaging in commercial tourism operations through some form of joint venture with the private sector. Thus these settlements are laying the basis for new types of joint ventures in which the community is the clear owner, within an established wildlife area.

Although the benefits vary case by case and cannot yet be fully measured, the community-private sector interactions based on transferred land have many advantages for communities over the arrangements seen on other

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43 The restoration of KNP land, known as Daanel Farm, to the Mdluli community was done through an instruction from Land Affairs rather than a formal land claim. For further details of Daanel and the Ndumo claim, see Spenceley (2003). Further details of the Dwesa Cebe claim and others in the Wild Coast are in Lahiff (2003a) and Ashley and Ntshona (2003).
types of land. As owners, communities are in a much stronger position. As landlord, their contribution of a commercial asset is evident, and earns them a substantial financial stake (whether as a rental or equity share). Revenue is not shared with conservation authorities. With secure land rights, the community do not just have to take whatever investment offer comes their way but, as the Makuleke did, can put out their own tender inviting business proposals. Thus they have much more control over the type of development and the nature of partnership. The land claim has a multiplier effect, by which the land title often brings substantial other development funds from government, recognition from donors, interest from the private sector, and often en route has already led to a higher level of community organisation. All of these, not just the land title, expand economic opportunities.

However, there are also some drawbacks for communities, and several reasons why the same model does not apply equally well in different situations. The major constraint is that the successful claimant is not free to use the land as they wish, and may not resume residential and farming practice (unlike in the Zimbabwean cases of invaded or resettled land). Thus the losses to livelihoods from this constraint may outweigh the benefits from tourism, at least for some community members. There are at least three different reasons why this trade-off and model may suit the Makuleke but not all others:

- **The opportunity cost of the land and the farming alternatives available.** For the Makuleke and Dwesa Cebe communities, reliance on land outside the claimed area for farming is not a major problem. The Makuleke are investing their revenue in irrigation on land outside KNP, and at Dwesa Cebe, the land inside the reserve was traditionally used more for resource harvesting than farming. But at Ndumo Game Reserve, the contested area is fertile flood-plains along the Pongolo river, which is highly productive farmland and a key access point for water and fishing. The community have to continue to farm in the sand forest area to which they were moved, thus the opportunity cost of the settlement is high.

- **The commercial value and likely benefits from tourism.** The Makuleke have a piece of land inside KNP, South Africa’s premier tourism destination, where there is market potential for new luxury lodges and considerable revenue. Even here, revenue will take some time to flow (given the nature of tourism investment), but is estimated to be equivalent to US$400 per family per year once normal operations are achieved.44 But the Dwesa Cwebe Reserve, though regarded as a conservation ‘gem’ of the Eastern Cape, has few tourists and most of these visits because of the very undeveloped nature of the reserve (Kepe 2001a). Although both the Wild Coast and the Ndumu area

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44 Based on projections for the lodge, camp and museum, once the lodge is operating at 60% occupancy (Koch 2001). The estimates are based on US$75,000 a year accruing to the community and US$150,000 to waged staff, so are not actually earned as amounts per household.
(part of the Lumbombo transfrontier conservation area) are being ‘developed’ as tourism destination, given the time lags involved in developing destinations, and then in earning any profit from tourism investments, community revenues may be many years away.

- **The degree of support available.** The Makuleke settlement has received massive publicity, and the Makuleke community have received support from many quarters, particularly the ‘Friends of Makuleke’ and a number of Government programmes. This helped in achieving the settlement, dealing with obstruction from the conservation authorities in Kruger (for example, over a ban on elephant hunting), and operating a successful tender. Yet the Mdluli Tribal Authority, also trying to develop land inside KNP, has received virtually no publicity or public support and has seen its commercial plans blocked or stalled several times. Eight years later, there is still no commercial development on Daannel.45 External support can play many roles in supporting communities in business, but is particularly important in these land claims because the settlements invariably involve an ongoing role for conservation authorities, with quite a different agenda. As Spenceley (2003) concludes, ‘the Conservation Authority has been consistent in prioritising its conservation interests over pro-poor agendas where the two conflict’.

- **Internal community conflict.** In any such community business deal, there are winners and losers, and internal conflicts are likely to be exacerbated. In all cases, chiefs and community leaders play a highly visible role. The Makuleke, nevertheless, have been noted for the ‘cohesion’ and high female participation within the community (Turner and Meer 2001). At both Dwesa Cwebe and Ndumo, the land claim process involved competing claims based on different definitions of ‘community’, and this has contributed to the long, drawn-out process. Even once such problems are resolved, when benefits do flow, they will not flow equally.

The Zimbabwean situation has parallels and important differences. There is no doubt that the re-settlers enjoy much greater negotiating power in relation to the private wildlife operators and greater control over commercial assets than they did as ranch neighbours on the other side of the fence. Until now, the occupations of game ranches and national parks have generally proceeded unencumbered by relatively tight proscriptions on land use – with the land being converted to agricultural production. Thus, the trade-off is the reverse of South Africa – satisfying long-standing unmet needs for land, rather than buying into long-term commercial opportunities in tourism and hunting.

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45 For example, KNP’s refusal to allow their investor traversing rights in Kruger killed off a proposal for a 12-bed Hilton hotel. Their third proposal stalled over the permitted maximum size of the development. This is the same community that is working with Piers Bunting. The problems caused by weak technical capacity in relation to both conservation authorities and the private sector is evident.
A scenario may well be emerging with some parallels to the Makuleke model, given the private sector’s need to find new arrangements that satisfy political demands and keep land under wildlife, particularly within the proposed TFCA with South Africa and Mozambique. In the Save Valley Conservancy, for example, the threat to its very existence posed by the land occupations prompted the conservancy to go beyond the much-derided wildlife endowment offer to surrounding communities (see above) and consider the obvious alternative: formally offering communities land inside the conservancy fence on the condition that much of the land remains under wildlife utilisation. This would mean the creation of a concession area where safari hunting and tourism revenues accrue to the local community as the concession holder. This arrangement is unlike CAMPFIRE in two crucial respects: it requires redistribution of land – albeit with strings attached to the way that land may be utilised; and (potentially) the arrangement is with the residents, as land-owners, and not with a council, as representative of thousands of people.

Should this develop, it faces similar questions to the Makuleke model in South Africa over the balance of benefits and costs to livelihoods. In Zimbabwe, access to natural resources and sacred sites are key priorities for residents. The Gudo people of Sangwe communal area, for example, have ancestral burial sites and ritual pools and conducted an annual fishing festival on a ranch that is currently part of Save Valley Conservancy. There has been long-standing antagonism over access to their ritual sites for traditional ceremonies and to natural resources – particularly fish. Acts of resistance have included the starting of veld fires, fence-cutting, thefts of sugar cane, burning of a ‘traditional village’ and now the massive-scale poaching accompanying the farm invasions (Wels 2000; Wolmer 2001). As Chief Gudo put it,

The relationship between us and the owners is bad. We don’t even know them, they have their separate lives and we have our own. We used to have our sacred pool … where we used to carry out our rainmaking ceremonies. … It is a place where we bury our chiefs. Now this is no more … But when they bury me, they will bury me there because that’s where my father lies. Also when I want meat, I will go there because I cannot always graze.

Particular pieces of land, on which historical claims exist, are coveted – not just a desire for commercial opportunities. Although no wildlife-based land reform scenario has yet been offered to the Gudo people, it is highly unlikely, given their recent experiences, that such a scheme for land restitution with ‘strings-attached’ would be satisfactory to them. They want direct access to natural resources and sacred areas rather than

46 The SVC annual report for 1997-98 reported that the ‘Gudo area has … been identified as an area posing the biggest threat to the SVC in terms of illegal hunting, veld fires, thefts etc’ (Wels 2000: 294). In fact, farm invasions first took place here long before the current occupations in 1998.

in absentia management, via a joint venture company. Thus, many in the very communities meant to benefit from this type of ‘wildlife-based land reform’ remain unconvinced as to its merits (Wolmer et al. 2003).

As in South Africa, the Zimbabwean cases also raise questions of equity, and of who benefits from which trade-off. In the case of the proposal for resettlement inside Zimbabwe’s Gonarezhou National Park, for example, the interests of the local elite and of ordinary farmers diverge. The majority of the settlers are focusing on ploughing dryland agricultural plots, whereas some of the better off are keen to establish a hunting and tourism joint-venture with a safari company inside the park (see below; Wolmer et al. 2003).

Key issues emerging in relation to interactions on reclaimed/resettled land

The community-private sector interactions on restituted and resettled land have the potential to be much stronger, from the community’s perspective, than other types of partnership arrangements. The community is likely to have more legal power (unless they are squatting), market power, access to resources and useful contacts. Thus, it is better able to influence the form of wildlife and tourism development in its interests. However, this is a new trend, and it remains to be seen how most of these partnerships develop in practice.

As this new form of land reform and business partnership develops, there are three concerns that need close attention. The first is the opportunity cost to communities of accepting this model; despite the attraction of commercial investment, the livelihood costs of non-agricultural use need to be understood.

The second concern is the nature, scale, timing and distribution of the gains to communities. Financial benefits may be long in coming, highly vulnerable to risk, variable in amount, and captured by elites. The community needs to know what it is opting for, with realistic expectations. Non-financial benefits, such as access to the land for natural resources, or human development investment, need to be well negotiated.

The third concern is how policy-makers are pursuing this ‘model.’ There is a tendency, at least in South Africa, to assume this model for new land claims in wildlife areas, whereas it may not suit all situations. Given differences in the commercial context, the opportunity cost, and the resources available, the net benefits to communities from tourism development on restituted land will vary enormously. That is precisely why unquestioning assumption of a ‘model’ is dangerous from a livelihoods point of view. The options need to be explored in each case.

Although there is no reason in principle why access to natural resources and sacred sites cannot be part of a land management plan that includes tourism and wildlife, so long as trade-offs with four-legged wildlife and their habitat are managed. In South Africa, issues of community access are part of discussions.
There are also strong signs that once the arrangement is set up, the power of communities to control developments remains circumscribed – by their own capacity vis-à-vis the private sector, but also by conservation authorities who remain committed to their own agenda. If this is the most empowering model there is of community-private sector interaction, the focus needs to be on building that empowerment, not constraining it.

Amalgamations of communal, private and government land into a tourism area

A further way in which the private, public and community sectors are articulating spatially around wildlife-based tourism in southern Africa is in the amalgamation of different land types into single extensive areas for managing wildlife and attracting tourism investment. Examples include SDIs and the Pondopark proposal in South Africa, and the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park and other TBNRM proposals across the region. They usually involve the zoning of core areas, multiple-use areas and corridors. In terms of the community-private sector arrangements that are emerging, these initiatives share some common features:

• They all aim to attract new private investment
• They all talk about benefits to local residents, particularly through bringing growth, development and employment, sometimes also through more direct community involvement in business
• They are all relatively high-profile initiatives driven by government(s), and thus are promoted in a top-down way

Most such ‘amalgam’ areas are still at the proposal or development stage. But given the number and scale of these spatial approaches to conservation and development in southern Africa, they are likely to have a strong influence on the future nature of the tourism industry and business partnerships. It is therefore important to assess more carefully the business roles open to communities, and to compare the rhetoric with emerging practice.

Here we look at three such initiatives: the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park (GLTP) spanning north-east South Africa, southern Mozambique and south-east Zimbabwe; the proposed Pondoland National Park in the Wild Coast (Eastern Cape, SA); and the Greater St Lucia Wetland Park (GSLWP) on the KwaZulu Natal coast. GLTP consists of an amalgamation of the ‘core protected areas’ of Kruger National Park in South Africa, Gonarezhou National Park in Zimbabwe, and the Limpopo Park (formerly Coutada 16 Wildlife Utilisation Area). It sits inside a more broadly conceived Transfrontier Conservation Area, covering an area of 99,800 km² (66,00 km² in Mozambique, 22,000 km² in South Africa and 12,000 km² in Zimbabwe), encompassing private game reserves and state-owned ‘communal’ agricultural land as well as the national parks. The proposed Pondopark falls in the northern half of the
Wild Coast SDI. Although ideas for a conservation area have existed for decades, national government action to develop Pondopark began in 2001. The proposal is for a National Park, to include core conservation areas (including Provincial Reserves and forest reserves), buffer zones and residential areas, with significant tourism development. The GSLWP covers 120 km of coast south from the Mozambican border, and falls within the Lubombo SDI. It is a World Heritage Site, and is managed by a new authority: the Greater St Lucia Wetland Park Authority.

While the GLTP, GSTWP and Pondopark project documents all emphasise the development benefits that will accrue to communities, there is little evidence so far that the initiatives will lead to increased roles of residents in the tourism industry, or to stronger partnership with the private sector. If anything the reverse may be true. There are several different reasons for this. One is that these proposals derive their logic from a curious blend of agendas in which development concerns are a late addition (Wolmer 2003). First and foremost they are conservation-oriented initiatives. The rationale for the GLTP, for example, revolves around re-establishing ‘ecological integrity’ and migration corridors for mega-fauna across national borders and has been lobbied for principally by conservation organisations such as the Peace Parks Foundation. The idea of a Pondoland Reserve dates back to a 1977 proposal by the Wildlife and Environment Society of South Africa. Another large park proposal in the Eastern Cape – the Greater Addo National Park – is driven by terrestrial ecologists at the University of Port Elisabeth and SANParks. Spenceley (2003) finds that there has been little progress on community development there, and lists reasons such as ‘lack of capacity and commitment’ on both sides, and the perception that conservation authorities wish to design poor people happy ‘on the other side of the fence, and failing to engage with the greater but more necessary challenges of starting to share management and benefits with them’ (Turner and Meer 2001).

As well as being driven principally by conservation goals these initiatives also owe more to political dynamics than a desire for community development. South Africa’s Department of Environment and Tourism’s enthusiasm for GLTP owes much to the government’s desire for a high profile regional conservation initiative to coincide with its hosting of the World Summit on Sustainable Development and World Parks Congress and other political and symbolic criteria (see Wolmer 2003). Similarly the Pondoland Park needs to be understood in terms of a power struggle between national and provincial government in the Wild Coast. While national government has failed to deliver anything from the Wild Coast SDI, provincial government has increasingly asserted its role, and now become a major partner. national government remains deeply sceptical of the Province’s capacity to deliver, so, in effect, carved out the Pondoland Park as the nationally-led component of SDI, while relinquishing control over the southern SDI to the Province. Added to this is high-profile political backing from the top: President Mbeki and the Minister of Environment. The result is a government-driven, top-down process that
leaves remarkably little room for private sector involvement, let alone resident input.

The development case for these initiatives rests on the idea that they will spur growth, become a magnet for investment and economic activity, stimulate valuable by-products such as malaria control, road improvements, and market development, and generally create a step change in economic activity in poor areas suffering chronic underemployment. They are not premised on the idea of communities taking economic power, but on the creation of jobs and business. There is, in addition, some discussion of Black Economic Empowerment measures, particularly support to SMMEs and community-private partnerships. BEE criteria may be influential in the allocation of new concessions (which is already underway at GSLWP). However there is little sign that the initiatives are investing in measures relating to land reform, SMME training, or partnership development, rather than relying on other parts of government to provide these. The occupation of part of Gonarezhou National Park in Zimbabwe by a community with a land claim was portrayed as a threat to the very existence of GLTP. Among government officials presenting Pondopark at a December 2001 public forum, the SANParks official did not know whether there were any land claims within the proposed boundary, while the other staff were clearly assuming that successful land claims would follow the Makuleke model so that the land stays within the park. As one put it, ‘we need to find a way that Land Commission decisions can be implemented and we can still implement a Park.’

The overall thrust of these spatial programmes is to expand the amount of tourism activity, not to alter its economic/political/social balance.

If local residents were powerful decision-makers in the development process, they may be able to expand their role in the emerging business opportunities. But evidence to date is that they are not. The level of consultation has been widely criticised (e.g. Katerere et al. 2001; Wolmer 2003). As Ashley and Ntshona (2003: 35) point out, the Pondopark approach to community involvement reveals deep ambiguities. On the one hand, it is supposed to be a park like no other: the first national park run in partnership with residents. On the other hand, the process and timetable simply do not allow for the creation of such a community role. Following a public forum in December 2001, the officials were planning a ‘roadshow’ with community consultations from January to March 2002. But given that they were determined to get consensus on the proposal within three months so that politicians could announce it in April, there was clearly no time to go beyond discussions with chiefs on broad-brush issues. The political need to get something done and demonstrate results leads to a pace of development that further stifles participation. All seven committees running the technical process comprise government officials (plus a secondment from the Wildlife and Environment Society) without any community or private sector involvement.

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It may be that the ‘trickle-down’ model inherent in these proposals, combined with successful investment and a tourism upsurge, will bring new levels of prosperity to many in the rural areas. The GSLWP is estimated to create 4,000 permanent jobs and 9,000 during infrastructure development (DEAT 2000). It may be that there are some business booms and some business busts, that there is no step-increase but a gradual development providing local opportunities for a few. But the worst-case scenario is that there is massive disruption of existing local livelihoods to make way for these developments that do not then in turn deliver valuable alternatives. This is looking all too likely, given that current livelihood activities and resources are being given insufficient attention in development plans to date. One effect of GLTP, for example, will be to police more closely the boundaries of Kruger National Park – which is currently a conduit for illegal labour migrants from Zimbabwe and Mozambique to South Africa. This transborder labour migration and the consequent remittance income are vitally important to livelihoods in the region. Pondopark officials talk about combining residential, agricultural and conservation areas into one park, using white stones rather than fences for demarcation, retaining access to forest resources, and enabling communities to live there with minimal disruption. But some written documents (e.g. Wildlife and Environment Society of South Africa 2001) include mention of ‘disallowed activities’, such as further increasing homesteads, cultivated land area or numbers of domestic stock.

**Key issues in relation to interactions in ‘amalgam’ conservation/tourism areas**

Spatial approaches to combining protected, private and communal land for conservation and tourism development are affecting vast swathes of the main tourism areas in southern Africa. This is a very influential approach. But the proposals have strikingly little to say about how communities are to be genuinely involved at any level, including their engagements with the private sector and new business opportunities. The implicit assumption seems to be that the main economic benefit will be from employment in an industry developed by the formal sector. In South Africa, there are also several references to the standard approaches of BEE, land restitution partnerships, and SMME development, but developing these is not a core area of the programmes. The allocation of concessions will be a critical time for pro-poor business issues to receive policy priority. But before this, there are many other pro-poor issues that need to be addressed, starting with the basics of local participation in decisions, and assessment of livelihood trade-offs. Among the many reasons why interests of local residents are not influencing these processes, two related ones stand out. Firstly, the main driving forces are conservation interests and political interests, supplemented by business interest, thus development gains are an add on. Secondly, because of the political and international interests involved, these programmes are being driven by governments, sometimes in haste to demonstrate results, and the resulting top-down approach is inimical to community involvement.
Overview, comparisons and conclusions

Overview of trends and changing roles

Across the three countries, in tourism and in forestry, changes are occurring in the interactions between communities and the private sector. This section provides an overview of the main trends in each country, then explores the benefits and limitations of changes from the perspectives of the poor. It concludes with the lessons and implications that can be drawn for enhancing the interests of the poor in relation to community-private sector interactions.

The main trends that can be identified occur at different levels:

- A substantial change in assumptions about the roles that communities and the private sector play: an assumption that local residents, previously economically as well as politically disenfranchised, should have a more active role in the formal economy; an assumption that the private sector's responsibility includes a contribution to local or national development objectives, not just commercial operation.
- A growing degree of interaction between communities and the private sector on the ground.
- The emergence of some new forms of institutional arrangement between them, involving some changes in roles and blurring of functional and geographic boundaries.
- A large number of policy initiatives, mostly not yet implemented, that seek to encourage investment in rural areas and some form of partnership or linkage between residents and investors.

Each of these occurs in very different ways and to different degrees within the three countries studied. There is also great heterogeneity within and between approaches and sectors. Within a multitude of initiatives, few are at the stage of implementation or impact, making lessons for the poor difficult to draw.

Trends in each country

The substantial differences between countries appear to be as great between South Africa and Mozambique, as between these two ‘pro market growth’ countries and Zimbabwe. In South Africa, changes in the functions and roles of communities, the private sector and government are evident. Communities are taking on some government roles as land managers/owners, and are entering the private sector themselves. Many private operators are embracing the idea that they have a social as well as a corporate responsibility to their shareholders, and a few private operators (e.g. Hans Merensky) are taking on development roles traditionally more associated with government or NGOs, such as supporting clinics, enterprise and training. While it may be easy to dismiss the private sector’s adoption of BEE, ‘transformation’ or CSR as
mere rhetoric, the fact is that there are now strong commercial incentives for reform. Government is increasingly setting long-term transformation targets, and major companies are investing resources in their transformation approach.\textsuperscript{50} The land claims and the commercialisation policies are one way of embodying these shifts. Government is supposedly reducing its direct engagement in productive sectors, but in practice its role is currently more complex and multi-functional rather than reduced. It often has a key role in shaping the roles of the other players.

Despite the fact that the biggest shifts in business behaviour can be observed in South Africa, this does not mean that pro-poor concerns are dominating the growth agenda. Indeed, it is the growth and investment agenda that clearly predominates. The heart of economic policy is to pursue growth, private investment and macro-economic stability. It is only within this dominant context that pro-poor measures are built in within specific sectoral initiatives. Policies to involve the poor are based on the assumption that their direct needs are access to jobs, and that their indirect needs are a growing economy, therefore private investment rather than investment in, for example, farm-based livelihoods, is the priority. Where there are trade-offs between boosting growth and promoting the role of the poor, there are cases where the authorities have tried to go ahead with investment – such as the Wild Coast SDI and TFCAs – though not always successfully.

In Mozambique, there is a much greater focus on encouraging investment and commercial operation, than on transforming private-community relations. Nevertheless, new private sector investment in tourism (possibly in forestry) is likely to lead to growing interaction with rural communities, particularly as communities gradually delimit their land areas and as CBNRM initiatives spread. However, functions of the state, private sector and communities remain clearly distinguished (excepting the on-going blurred divide between public and private office, see Box 8). The private sector produces or extracts the product and sells it. Government licenses, taxes and controls. Communities are consulted, but have little direct role in production (except as workers) or in decision-making. Their productive activities in the agricultural and subsistence sectors remain distinguished from the commercial formal sector. There has been a small shift in power from government to community under the Land law, and the weaker wildlife and forestry law. But for a large number of reasons, it will be sometime before communities can translate this into a more pro-active role in their

\textsuperscript{50} One practical example illustrates the difference between the commercial-political environment in South Africa and other countries of the region. A new programme on pro-poor tourism is offering facilitation to private operators to assist in implementing pro-poor strategies on site at a lodge, hotel or resort. The reception and uptake of this initiative has been much greater in South Africa than elsewhere, because South African companies see it as a means to help in achieving their stated transformation policies, whereas companies in other countries are more preoccupied with getting facilities up and beds filled than developing new pro-poor approaches.
commercial engagements. Key amongst these are the different commercial situation (less competition among investors), greater poverty (an even greater priority to get growth going at almost any price), less political pressure and commitment for balancing growth with social justice, weaker community capacity (to make use of what rights do exist or emerge) and a different political legacy (more focused on reconstruction than redress of injustice).

Box 8: Blurring public office and private gain

The use of public office for private commercial gain has its roots in historical structures, and is not just an issue of personal corruption. In Mozambique it can certainly be argued that the ‘market approach’ is only superficially overlaid on a deeper Mozambican system of economic management, which stems from the colonial approach to administration, trade and natural resource use, followed by the centralised socialist approach.

Under the colonial approach to captaincy (local administration), administrative power gave the holder economic opportunities to make money during their short tenure. The obvious aim was to maximise it while it lasted. There was a queue for the three-year posts and even trade in captaincy positions and exchange within dowries. The captaincies of Sofala and Ilha de Mocambique were apparently particularly profitable positions, akin to contemporary Ministers of Tourism, Environment, Telecommunications. This attitude to maximising personal returns from public sector roles is somewhat different to assumptions of free markets, market competition, and tenets of pro-poor growth.


In Zimbabwe, there is ostensibly a long history of separate commercial and communal agricultural sectors but in practice there has been much inter-penetration since the colonial era – with livestock marketing, labour-recruitment, contract-growing and CAMPFIRE contracts occurring across landuse boundaries. And perhaps surprisingly, the political turbulence, land occupations and fast-track land reform programme have increased private-community articulation in several ways.

Firstly, the occupation and settlement of private game ranches has meant safari companies have had to operate more in communal areas as many former private hunting areas – and the wildlife within them – simply no longer exist. Secondly there has been a need for the private land-based wildlife sector to enter into more radical partnerships with communities in order to survive. Now the private sector is being forced into closer articulation with communities not explicitly because of any government policy – but out of fear that not to do so would make their land more likely to be designated for resettlement. The Save Valley Conservancies’ shift from wildlife endowment to wildlife-based land reform is a good example. It is also important to emphasise that despite the extremely
adverse political and economic environment established private sector players are still actively investing and positioning themselves to benefit from future developments in the region (such as GLTP).

Thirdly the chaotic circumstances in Zimbabwe have provided openings for new entrepreneurs (including war veterans and political bigwigs) to venture into the wildlife industry – and sometimes in negotiated partnerships with ‘old’ entrepreneurs. Examples include war veteran ‘security guards’ in the conservancies and plans for a ‘mini-conservancy’ inside Gonarezhou National Park (see Wolmer et al. 2003).

Thus although there is very little clearly elaborated policy beyond CAMPFIRE on public-private partnerships in the wildlife sector in Zimbabwe, events on the ground are moving faster than formal policy deliberations. However, the extent of, and potential for, private-community articulation around ecotourism and safari hunting should not be overplayed. Given the economic meltdown and political turbulence, there are far fewer investment opportunities in the field and many existing hotels, tour and safari operators have closed down. Also, as we have seen, many communities making land claims want land for farming and access to sacred ancestral sites, not wildlife management (particularly the poor and land hungry).

Thus while each different model of community-private sector interaction can be witnessed in at least two of the three countries, they clearly differ greatly in implementation. Irrespective of the internationalisation of neo-liberal thinking, or the apparently generic nature of our models, the country context clearly leads to very specific formations in practice.

Within a common overall set of assumptions, which are internationally derived and shared (in South Africa and Mozambique), local and national influences are the real drivers. To provide a few examples:

• The legacy of the past shapes current thinking: colonialism and socialism in Mozambique, apartheid planning in South Africa, and 25 years of Independence without equity in Zimbabwe strongly influence the current political agenda, and specifically the high degree of economic activity that remains with the state, and assumptions about how the state should shape private sector activity now.

• In both Zimbabwe and South Africa, the country-specific land reform process shapes the structure of new interactions between the private sector and communities. The negotiating power of communities and the commercial strategies of companies have been altered by land reform.

• In several of the case studies, locally-specific bureaucratic mandates and institutional rivalry have dominated how policy has been implemented in practice. For example, in the Wild Coast, competition between national and provincial government, and
between different ministries, have stalled several tourism initiatives that were conceptualised from broader national approaches.

**Interests of the poor**

How does practical change live up to the promises of pro poor growth and livelihood benefits from market involvement? The case studies provide plenty of examples to doubt whether the rhetoric of community benefit can be translated into reality. For example: the blocking of any developments on Mdluli Trusts’s Daannel farm sheds doubts on the Makuleke land claim model. In the Ndumo corridor, there has been plenty of talk and politics but no benefit, despite a successful land claim. Phumlani lodge is up and open, but with official enquiries, complaints and local resentment. On the Wild Coast, there are a multitude of tourism initiatives but almost nothing to show for them except the small Amadiba trail and partnership. In Mozambique there is no sign that progressive legislation has increased local participation in or benefits from commercial forestry. And in Zimbabwe, rural residents’ have voted with their feet and hoes to reject earlier community outreach models.

On the other hand, there are a few examples of community-private sector interactions that have become operational and seem to be working in the interests of community members (at least some members – discussed further below). The Makuleke have their tourism developments underway and have been able to force a resolution of problems with KNP. The Amadiba community has its own enterprise and a relatively successful, if small, private sector partnership. Local communities (not just black-owned Johannesburg companies) have an equity stake in some of the new concessions inside KNP, as well as in new forestry concessions. A longer-established equity stake at Rocktail Bay has demonstrably increased commitment to local employment, and possibly local sourcing. At the Singisi plantation, it is still early days, but the scale of company investment in liaison and local business support is striking and some local entrepreneurs are certainly accessing credit and markets that they could never have secured on their own.

The questions we thus need to explore are: what conditions made these happen? Do patterns emerge, or is every case ad hoc? What are the benefits and costs that accrue to the poor? And to whom within the community? Are there measures that can be undertaken that would lead to more ‘success stories’ and fewer trade-offs? The remainder of this section is in two halves: first we consider the benefits and costs accruing to the poor. Then we consider the strengths and weaknesses of the different institutional arrangements from the perspective of the poor. These lay the basis for recommendations in the final section.

**What benefits, what costs, and for whom?**

Looking across all the models, the benefits that have accrued locally are predominantly economic – cash or means to eventual earnings: waged jobs, enterprise opportunities, equity shares, revenue shares, and cash
donations. Amounts vary enormously. There are only a few examples of significant sums being earned or estimated for the medium term (e.g. earnings of the Makuleke, local wages, plus other cash flows at Rocktail Bay), several cases of small amounts being earned (e.g. at Amadiba) or none at all (many are yet to earn anything). Non-financial benefits – such as access to decision-making, information, infrastructure, participation, increased pride or cultural strengthening (which can be significant in, for example, community tourism and community wildlife management) – feature little.

It is significant that very few opportunities emerge for the poor to shape the policies that are supposed to benefit them. Participation in decision-making is limited in all the case studies, even those where the community are land-claim winners. This is partly due to limited community capacity, but largely because in all the cases there are several stronger agendas at play. Their participation is most constrained in cases where the agenda is set entirely by the private sector (on private land) or by government’s political objectives (in TBNRM and ‘amalgams’).

There are many cases where leaders or allies of an investor capture the benefits. At Vilanculos, chiefs are already benefiting. On resettled land in Zimbabwe, it is the elite who are taking up new wildlife investment opportunities. Most of the South African cases (tourism development at Makuleke, Dwesa Cwebe, Mdluli and others, community holdings in the Hans Merensky consortium and others) rely on a Community Trust, Common Property Association, or other institutions to receive and use benefits, and thus have clear potential for elite capture. It is not just a matter of elites versus the rest. In many cases, there are different groups of stakeholders obscured by the phrase ‘community’, such as the residents in the immediate locality and the wider ‘local’ area (at Dwesa Cwebe), or between immediate neighbours, workers, local entrepreneurs/contractors and land claimants, as at Singisi Forest (see Box 9, next page).

The costs to the poor of the development of these enterprise initiatives tend to be of three kinds:

- The opportunity costs of resource use and trade-offs with other livelihoods. This is very variable, but high where the land designated for wildlife and tourism has high agricultural value compared to alternative available land (for example at Ndumo), where new conservation measures are introduced to limit resource harvesting (for example, limits on sustainable harvesting of marine resources at Vilanculos), or where problem animals damage crops and livestock (for example at Welverdiend, near Ngala Lodge).

- A lack of power and a sense of exploitation. For example, at Mdluli, there are suspicions and frustration at how the lodge has developed.

- A lack of delivery and hence unmet expectations and wasted effort. For example, in many interviews in the Wild Coast, one of the main
criticisms levelled against the SDI was that it had raised expectations, led people to invest hope, energy, or even land in SDI plans, but then not delivered.\footnote{Interviewees in Ashley and Ntshona (2003). See also Kepe (2001b) for details of this problem.}

**Box 9: Distinguishing between stakeholders within ‘the community’**

Within the ‘community’ interacting with the Hans Merensky consortium at Singisi forest plantation, there are very different interests between:

- Immediate neighbours who access forest products (and possibly grazing) inside the plantation.
- Residents of the two large community areas who have each formed a Trust, which sits on the company board and receives and manages revenue from the company.
- Leaders of the Trust (Trust members) who have frequent contact with the company and information, and the majority of the community who have to rely on Trust mechanisms for sharing information and benefits.
- Workers at the saw mill and plantation, who come from a wider area, and for whom the protection of labour rights is key.
- Small local entrepreneurs who have contracts with the plantation (e.g. security firms) or are receiving business support (e.g. furniture makers, the local supermarket).

In both the Dwesa Cwebe and Ndumu land claims there were initially competing land claims from two overlapping groups. At Dwesa the issue was whether the claim should be by the smaller group of people that had traditionally lived on the claimed land inside the reserve, or by the wider community (the community under one chief) of which they were a part. At Ndumo, one claim was from traditional leaders and one from a newly defined group. Thus the process of defining ‘the community’ and resolving contesting definitions was a key step.

All these costs are less tangible than cash benefits, more difficult to quantify, and thus more easily ignored in policy decisions. But in the few cases where we have detailed data from community members, their significance is illustrated. Fieldwork with residents around the Amadiba trail in 2001 (Ntshona and Lahiff 2003) highlighted that one of the benefits of this small trail is that it is compatible with other local livelihood activities, and does not require migration. The evolving situation in terms of their sense of ownership of the trail was also a matter of hot debate. Detailed surveys of community attitudes to Ngala and Thornybush tourism lodges in Northern Province (Spenceley 2001a, 2001b) revealed that expectations were not being met: the majority felt that tourism had the potential to contribute more to the local economy than it is currently doing. At Ngala, given high damage to agriculture, the majority believe that the costs of tourism outweigh the benefits.
Direct trade-offs with other livelihood activities need to be measured – both because they are important to the diverse strategies and livelihood security of the poor, and because often trade-offs can often be reduced once recognised (for example, by ensuring continued access to forests for subsistence use within a commercialisation context). Another type of trade-off needs more indirect consideration: whether the investment of resources and effort on these investment-led approaches to development is diverting attention from other priorities of the poor – such as measures to boost their own agricultural productivity, or to support the informal markets on which the poor continue to depend. In Mozambique, is it actually of more immediate importance to reduce taxes on bicycles, which are a key means for the poor to extend informal sector trading, than to focus on consultation over concessions? The question of whether all the resources of the Wild Coast SDI would have achieved more if invested in local-level, land-based development has not been answered, but is not a question of mere academic debate. Policy choices are being made without such information.

The net balance of costs and benefits to the poor will clearly vary for different initiatives and for different groups. No simple generalisation is possible. Indeed, one of the lessons is that generalisations about the benefits of these models should be avoided. Drawing on the case studies, the key factors that will determine the costs and benefits in any situation include:

- The basis of community engagement: whether they engage with a fair degree of power or not. Power may come from legal rights over resources (constitutionally-protected access rights, ownership) and can be increased by the commercial value of their resources and their ability to mobilise and engage with others.
- Whose interests are considered: leaders, workers, immediate neighbours, resource users, those included and excluded from the ‘community’ defined as partner.
- The timescale: in many cases of commercial development, particularly in tourism, substantial benefits are years, or decades ahead, and are subject to normal commercial risk.
- The degree of trade-off between commercial developments of the resources and other uses of the land and resources.
- Which costs and benefits are taken into account beyond direct cash flows. Any estimation of impacts depends on how benefits such as participation and costs, such as reduced subsistence resources use, are valued.

This final issue of measuring costs and benefits depends, in turn, on the assumptions made about the priority needs of the poor. In many of the initiatives, there is an implicit assumption that cash and jobs are the priority, and that the spread of private property models is the way forward as a basis for market transactions. This assumption needs to be
made explicit so that its relevance in different situations can be assessed. The assumptions turn on wider debates about appropriate models of development: jobs versus land, remittances versus subsistence, differing expectations of the young versus the old, and equity versus trickle down approaches. There are clear differences between countries here, with much more emphasis on land and farming in Zimbabwe and Mozambique, and more on jobs and remittances in South Africa (including among local interviewees, not just policy-makers), but there are divergent views and local differences in all.

In conclusion, the case studies suggest that the new forms of interaction between communities and the private sector are highly varied in their impacts on the poor. They are, in general, better than pure commercialisation with no pro-poor consideration. But there are too many unsuccessful examples and too few successful examples to suggest that ‘making markets work for the poor’ happens easily or automatically. While some of the poor are earning or will gain cash incomes and economic opportunities, there is (i) inequality in these opportunities, (ii) insufficient attention to the participation of the poor in decision-making, and maximising other non-financial benefits, and (iii) insufficient attention to trade-offs with other livelihood priorities.

Strengths and limitation of investment approaches

Which approaches are most likely to enhance benefits to the poor? While all can have some value and none can be sure of delivering benefits, there are important structural differences between the five types of institutional arrangements explored through the case studies.

Table 2 (next page) summarises the strengths and weaknesses of the five different types of community-private sector interaction.

Most of the arrangements involve some greater degree of community benefit than has been traditionally part of private investment in tourism or forestry. But all also have significant limitations in terms of the livelihood and power benefits they bring and do not necessarily amount to ‘pro poor growth’ or making markets work for the poor.

Two types of arrangement emerge from the case studies and discussion above as offering the greatest potential for pro-poor investment:

i. Commercial partnerships on land that has been restituted or resettled. In these arrangements the community has stronger legal, economic and usually political power, and thus can negotiate a qualitatively different arrangement from one based on goodwill from either the state or private sector.

ii. The use of state power to encourage pro-poor private sector deals through the process of concessioning/commercialisation state land or assets. While commercialisation does not automatically involve a strong weighting for socio-economic issues, or if it does these may focus on BEE not poverty, experience shows that when this
approach is used it can provide strong commercial incentives for the private sector to adopt new pro poor measures.\(^2\)

### Table 2: Strengths and weaknesses of different community-private institutional arrangements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community-private investments on:</th>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Limitations</th>
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| Communal land                     | • Relatively easy to implement  
  • De facto community power: investor needs local support (buy-in) | • In absence of strengthening of communal tenure, legal and negotiating rights remain limited  
  • Lack of capacity to hold private sector to account  
  • Driving force rarely community – unlikely to veto | |
| State-owned commercialised land or assets | • The considerable power of the state as lessor/seller, and the commercial value of the assets can be used to leverage in socio-economic commitments from operators (if used as a major criteria in judging bids) | • Reduces options of future land claimants  
  • Requires commercially competitive environment, political will, and administrative capacity.  
  • To date, focus on BEE not necessarily pro-poor measures. | |
| Private land                      | • CSR: an improvement over past practice.  
  • Establishing contact can lead to further dialogue/action | On private sectors’ terms, with community as ‘recipient’, so structurally weak  
  • So far, donations rather than adapting core business | |
| Restituted land (reclaimed, resettled) | • Community as land-owner has commercial rights and negotiating power. Benefits based on ownership, not good will of others.  
  • Gains ownership of potentially valuable sites inside reserves.  
  • Land-ownership has multiplier effect, e.g. access to training, funds. Negotiation can enhance non-financial benefits too, e.g. management issues. | • Trade-off (in South Africa): cannot use reclaimed land for residence or agriculture.  
  • Benefits from commercial tourism may be slow, variable, inequitable.  
  • Commercial development may be blocked, particularly in conservation areas  
  • Requires capacity and support to exploit opportunities. | |
| Spatial amalgam                   | • Can raise commercial value of communal area – increasing negotiating power vis-à-vis investors. | Top-down – little scope for participation from the bottom  
  • Conservation/political/commercial agendas dominate. | |

\(^2\) In planning terminology this is known as ‘planning gain’ – when government authorities use their power in the planning process to secure benefits from investors in return for planning permission/licensing/access to a site – whether litter management from awarding a new supermarket site, or local employment commitments from a new tourism concession.
Both approaches are bringing communities into new spaces and new opportunities, and not just trying to squeeze more benefit out of existing assets. Both also involve some redistribution of either assets or returns. In the case of restituted land, the redistribution is clear, whether the land comes from private or state hands. In the case of commercialisation, some kind of trade-off between different objectives and returns is involved. For example, this may be a shift of benefits from the state to community in terms of the returns expected to commercialisation: the state accepts less of something (e.g. revenue or estimated profit stream) in order to expect more in socio-economic performance. This in turn causes a shift in the structure of the bids and their respective benefits to the company and its (HDI, poor, local) partners.

However, as the discussion above and in Table 2 make clear, these arrangements have severe limitations too. Not least that – whilst transferring assets – there is no guarantee that this will be in an equitable or pro-poor fashion and that they come with strong strings attached.

These two models are relevant to both forestry and tourism, though play out somewhat differently in the two sectors in South Africa. In both, the commercialisation process (of South Africa’s plantations in South Africa, and of KNP tourism facilities) resulted in successful bids that incorporated substantial BEE equity and local community involvement. In forestry, this commercialisation is the main impetus for private investment. Land claims overlap with the commercialised areas, but have taken a back seat, with no formal decision-making role for claimants in the process. Should they win their claim, claimants will inherit land with a well-established business, considerable revenue, and relatively little commercial room for manoeuvre. They will receive the concession fee that the operator is paying government, back-dated to the date of commercialisation. Their decision-making power is less, and their short/medium-term revenue is likely to be more from an industry based on harvesting a standing stock of trees, rather than from attracting tourists. In the tourism sector, commercialisation and Makuleke-style restitution are both catalysing private investment in separate processes. Winners of claims in tourism and conservation areas are much more likely to win undeveloped land. Thus compared to successful claimants over forested land, they start with more flexibility in their options but will have to wait much longer for any income benefits for their assets. In forestry, the pre-emptive decisions by government may breed resentment among claimants. In tourism, the years of waiting for benefits may undermine livelihood benefits in the eyes of many.

53 Thus, for example, land claimants around the Singisi Plantation in Eastern Cape would gain a share (based on their area share of the 72,000 ha plantation) of the R6 million a year concession fee, back-dated to 1/8/2001.
The other three models represent some progress over past commercial practices, which took no account of community roles, but are significantly weaker than the restitution and commercialisation approaches. On communal land, community benefit is highly variable. If communal land involved stronger land rights (e.g. via tenure reform in SA, via delimitation and more in Mozambique) it could get closer to the restituted land model with more pro poor benefits. On private land, there will, almost by definition, always be less imperative for operators to invest in pro poor approaches than in situations where community ownership, de facto tenure, or government requirements as concessionaire demand more. While some companies may voluntarily increase the scale of benefits, the structure of such interactions remains weaker for the poor, as it is based on operators’ goodwill and not community rights. In the amalgam approaches, there is in theory considerable potential for government to use its planning power and the commercial value of the area to leverage in pro poor benefits – in a similar vein to the concessioning process. The potential in principle is similar. The practice appears very different largely due to the dominance of other political and economic objectives. In all three of these models, the generally small scale of community benefit is less than the rhetoric implies, and depends on the specific situation and goodwill. Nevertheless, certain measures can strengthen them (see recommendations below).

Overview of strengths and limitations

The analysis above identifies some key characteristics of arrangements that are likely to strengthen the interests of the poor: i.e. community power, control over assets (and particularly secure rights to land), a competitive environment, community capacity and use of government power on behalf of the poor.

It is equally important to identify the weaknesses that are limiting benefits to the poor. These are broadly of three types: implementation weaknesses (for example, lack of capacity, or institutional blockages); political constraints; commercial realities; and more broadly and potentially seriously, problems with the assumptions about the workings of the market and livelihood priorities bound up in the pro-poor growth model.

There have been a host of practical problems with the implementation of pro-poor growth measures so that these measures have yet to achieve much in the way of concrete results. These include delays in implementation, bureaucratic inertia and rivalry and a lack of understanding of what participation involves in terms of capacity and resources, in practice. Another practical problem has been the inappropriate pace and sequencing of measures. Where private

54 Amalgam areas usually include protected, private and communal land. While the state does not control the private land in the same way as it controls protected land or concession sites, it has control over many of the elements of the TFCA package – branding, marketing, linked infrastructure and planning permission.
Investments have been made before pro-poor interventions, the market power of the poor suffers. By contrast where land rights are resolved in advance of investment the community partners have more leverage. This contrast can be seen in the comparison between the Makuleke and Dwesa Cwebe case studies on the one hand, and the land claimants in forestry concessions and Vilanculos residents on the other. There are obviously constraints on the degree to which new investments can be delayed but the trade-off in sequencing needs to be addressed.

There are also political constraints on the implementation of pro-poor market interventions and a lack of willingness to see progressive policies through. Forestry regulations in Mozambique, for example, were long delayed before their final approval in June 2002; meanwhile concessions were given out without consultation. Tenure reform is still unresolved in South Africa, and there has been a gradual return to prioritising conservation interests at the expense of development after the initial deals at Rocktail Bay, Dannell and Mdluli. In some cases the personal and commercial interests of the elite – often politicians – mitigate against full implementation of the spirit of progressive policies (such as bypassing concession regulations in Mozambique’s forests).

Pro-poor measures also get buffeted and relegated by other priorities and countervailing policies. In particular, bringing in investment or conserving protected assets can take priority over maximising community benefits. Examples of this include: continuing to allocate forest concessions in Mozambique without applying the new law on consultation, allocating the Vilanculos concession rather than utilising the delimitation process of the new land law to strengthen community rights first; speeding ahead with Pondopark plans to meet political deadlines rather than implement genuine participation, limiting or rejecting the commercial uses of Makuleke, Mdluli and other land claims on conservation grounds.

Investors own scarce resources: private capital and business expertise. Unless there is competition between investors for a resource, they have considerable power. In many situations the reality is that neither government nor communities have much power by comparison and thus are in a weak position to demand pro-poor practice if they want to secure investment. Communities in particular lack experience in private sector negotiation, have few sources of information, and their own internal problems of organisation and leadership. Bureaucrats have more authority and education, and possibly considerable power over allocation of licences. But if their technocratic background gives them no experience in the commercial sector, or at the other extreme, many of them are themselves operating privately in their ‘other job’, the capacity of government to use its power to influence commercial behaviour may be low.

The situations in which communities and governments are most likely to have commercial power are there is:
• a commercially attractive asset, such that there is competition between investors;
• community tenure or legally-recognised control over access to the asset;
• the capacity within the community to utilise its power; or
• government control over a commercial asset and the political will to utilise its power for the benefit of the poor.

The mainstream pro-poor growth model applied in southern Africa assumes that: policy will be implemented swiftly in an unproblematic way; that competing political objectives will not interfere; and these policies will allow governments and communities to be able to exert power vis-à-vis the private sector; that the priority needs of the poor are jobs and external investment; and that the benefits of these approaches will be widely spread. As the case studies have highlighted these assumptions do not always hold up in southern Africa. How then can the interest of the poor be promoted?

**Recommendations to promote the interests of the poor**

Given that the pro-poor state-land commercialisation and restitution models have been identified as having the most potential, the logical implication is to expand the use of these two. In fact, the geographical application of these is circumscribed by what currently exists (in terms of land claims and state tourism/forestry assets). But the strengths of these approaches can be extended more widely to other areas by treating communal land more like restituted land, and private land more like commercialised state-land:

• Strengthening tenure rights on communal land is tantamount to increasing communities’ legal rights, commercial power, and negotiating strength, as on restituted land (though the commercial value of their asset will not match that on restituted conservation land in many cases).
• Strengthening government incentives for private companies to invest in pro-poor elements of CSR would encourage operations on private land to do more, although this would never match the incentivising power that government has when commercialising assets from its own estate.

But for the poor to engage in markets in any beneficial way, access to assets is crucial and the case studies show the crucial importance of access to land. Land rights create market power – not only because land itself is an asset of market value, but holding rights creates avenues to other sources of power. This might include: the ability to negotiate terms (for example, jobs from concessionaires); to leverage in more money (such as development funds from the South African government, or agricultural extension support in Zimbabwe); recognition from the private sector (leading, for example, to a willingness on behalf of
### Table 3: Summary of recommendations specific to each model

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<tr>
<th>Community-private investments on:</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Warning</th>
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| Communal land                    | • Strengthen tenure to strengthen negotiating power, veto power, and commercial asset base of community.  
• Invest in capacity-building      | • Don’t assume homogenous community. Elite capture or conflict likely. |
| State-owned commercialised land or assets | • Emphasise pro-poor measures for local residents, land claimants, workers, and not just BEE/black elite.  
• Recognise decision-making role and rights of land claimants early on.  
• Monitor implementation of pro-poor commitments, with sanctions. | • Need sustained policy commitment to maintain pro-poor objectives amidst several other policy objectives within commercialisation. |
| Private land                     | • Explore how core business practice (purchasing, recruitment, and training) can be adapted, rather than focus on donations.  
• Government regulations/incentives to strengthen and standardise the need for pro-poor CSR. | • Likely to remain structurally weaker and more ad hoc than on commercialised, communal or restituted land. |
| Restituted land (reclaimed, resettled) | • Do not assume that Makuleke models is right for all communities.  
• Assess product potential and livelihood trade-offs.  
• Support communities to get tangible benefits from the restituted conservation land | • In some cases, return to agricultural use would be better.  
• When pursuing the ‘Makuleke model’ benefits are likely to be very long-term and uneven. |
| Spatial amalgam                  | • Increase genuine local decision-making – over what is done and how. | • Top-down politically driven initiatives and deadlines are likely to clash with pro-poor approaches. |

Zimbabwean farmers and wildlife operators to negotiate with settlers); and a greater likelihood of being consulted (for example, recognition of delimited communities in Mozambique). In practice this means resolution of land claims and strengthening of land rights is crucial. There is a need to go beyond simply delimiting or legislating for community rights over resources, to building their negotiating power. This means building the capacity to engage in markets (including through practical measures such as improving access to telephones, information and credit), and also exploring how the commercial value of their assets can be increased.

Further, for consultation to be genuine, sufficient time must be allowed for it, and there needs to be serious consideration of the opportunity costs of supposedly pro-poor initiatives in the tourism and forestry sectors as one might for other livelihood strategies. Overall there needs to be a recognition that the glib assumption that pro-poor growth can be
simply and unproblematically implemented is flawed. For the market to be helpful in alleviating poverty there needs to be a more level playing field; a recognition that markets are intensely politicised and easily captured by elites, providing opportunities for corrupt practice and patronage politics, etc.; and finally a willingness on behalf of the state to intervene in markets and address the issue of equity with redistributive mechanisms where necessary.

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